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Preface: 
2006-07 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the coming of the refugees of 
the 1956 anti-Soviet revolution in Hungary to North America. With the 
arrival of those refugees, the writer of these lines included, the life of 
North America's Magyar colonies was revitalized. 
To celebrate this anniversary we undertook to publish two 
volumes of our journal, both of them bulkier than has been our tradition 
in the past. In the first of our "1956" commemorative issues we presented 
a collection of essays that dealt with or touched on the subject of the 
image Hungary and Hungarians at home or abroad. This was vol. 33 of 
the HSR, and it was published for 2006. 
The second of our commemorative volumes, entitled 1956 in 
Hungary, we publish as vol. 34, for the year 2007. A third compendium 
of studies is in the making as well, also dealing with aspects of 1956, 
since not all the papers collected fit in one volume of less than 250 pages. 
This third volume will be published for 2008. 
The first essay of the present 2007 special volume deals with the 
subject of the treatment of Hungarians by Hungary's post-1945 Soviet 
masters, as illustrated by the fate of those Magyars who fell into Soviet 
captivity at the end of the Second World War. The next paper deals with 
the role of Hungary's Churches in the Revolution and the impact of the 
1956 events on them. The following study examines the days when Hun-
gary was free of Communist rule especially in the context of the function-
ing of the country's newly re-bom political parties. This is followed by an 
examination of the interrelationship of the events of 1956 and the coun-
try's working class. Most appropriately, the next study deals with the sub-
ject of the revolution and Hungary's peasantry, focusing especially on the 
impact of the events of 1956 on the country's villages. The subsequent 
study examines the attempts by Hungary's post-1957 regime to re-write 
the history of the revolution through the means of films made for popular 
consumption. The volume's penultimate article surveys the reactions of 
writers and poets to the Revolution all over the world, while the last 
article reviews some of the most important recent books on the subject. 
These studies, while offering comprehensive analyses of their 
subjects, represent only a sampling of the historical analyses that had 
appeared in connection with the celebrations of the Revolution's fiftieth 
anniversary. More studies will be forthcoming even in our journal. Some 
of these will be concentrating on the Canadian aspects of 1956: Canada's 
reactions to the Revolution — and, specifically, to the refugee crisis it 
generated — as well as the experiences of some of the refugees in 
Canada. 
As usual in our collections of essays on a particular subject our 
offering is somewhat eclectic. While some important aspects of the events 
of 1956 in Hungary are well covered, such as the interactions of the 
regime on the one hand and the country's workers and peasants on the 
other, other aspects of the Hungarian revolution are hardly touched on in 
this volume. Some of these aspect will receive attention in Part II of this 
collection of essays, others will not be covered. Readers will have to turn 
to other publications for those topics. We would also suggest that they 
examine what has been published in our journal in previous years.* 
NOTES 
* In 1976 we published a collection of essays. Although many original 
documents relating to the history of 1956 in Hungary have become public in the 
intervening time — especially regarding the reactions to the Revolution in 
Moscow and Washington — some of the studies in this collection might still be 
of interest, as should be the studies that appeared in our journal after 1976. Here 
is a list of both the 1976 compendium and the papers that we published later: 
Aczel, Tamas. "Between the Awakening and the Explosion: Yogis and 
Commissars Reconsidered, 1953-1956." Ill, 2 (Fall, 1976), 107-114. 
Gollner, Andras B. "Foundations of Soviet Domination and Communist 
Political Power in Hungary: 1945-1950." Ill, 2 (Fall, 1976), 73-105. 
Gosztony, Peter. "The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 Viewed from Two 
Decades' Distance." Ill, 2 (Fall, 1976), 139-153. 
Granville, Johanna. "The Soviet-Yugoslav Detente, Belgrade-Budapest 
Relations, and the Hungarian Revolution (1955-56)," XXIV, 1-2 (1997), 15-63. 
Klay, Andor C. ed. "Document: Budapest-Washington, 1956." VII, 2 
(Fall, 1980), 145-162. 
Nagy, Karoly. "Gyula Illyes' Poetry of Hope." V, 2 (Fall, 1978), 53-61. 
Pilisi, Paul. "La Revolution Hongroise de 1956 et l'ldee de la Confedera-
tion Danubienne." Ill, 2 (Fall, 1976), 125-132. 
Volgyes, Ivan. "Social Change in Post-Revolutionary Hungary, 1956-19-
76." V, 1 (Spring, 1978), 29-39. 
The 1956 Hungarian Revolution in 
Historical and International Perspective: 
An Introduction 
Nandor Dreisziger 
In the story of the world communist movement the Hungarian revolution 
of 1956 occupies a special place: the turning point that separated the 
ascending fortunes of this movement from the beginning of its gradual 
demise. 
It can be argued that the mid-1950s constituted the high-point in 
the history of world communism. It was the time when the Soviet Union 
became a super-power, when Communism made great strides in Asia and 
when Communists seemed poised to gain a foothold in Western Europe 
through their powerful parties in France, Italy and elsewhere. It is inter-
esting to note that those years seem to constitute the half-life of the 
movement, very much as certain elements, as well as medications, have a 
half-life, when they begin their journey toward inevitable decline. If we 
consider 1917 as the birth of the world communist movement and 1989 as 
the year of its demise, at least in Europe, 1956 is almost at the middle 
point. 
The movement appeared on the world stage in the fall of 1917 
when the Russian revolutionary Vladimir Lenin and a handful of his 
followers grabbed power in Petrograd and ousted the moderate leftist 
revolutionary regime of Alexander Kerensky. And the movement disap-
peared as a major political force in the world when the Soviet Empire 
collapsed in Eastern Europe in 1989, followed by the U.S.S.R.'s implosion 
a short time later. 
Of course communist ideology had been around for a long time 
before 1917. Karl Marx and other thinkers developed it during the 19th 
century, but it was not till 1917 that the ideology of Marxism, and its 
very different Leninist variety, triumphed in a major country, in Russia. 
Had Lenin and his Bolshevik followers not come to power in a country 
the size of Imperial Russia, our school textbooks would probably never 
mention Karl Marx. 
Having come to power, the Bolsheviks were able to launch their 
movement for world domination. In this quest they were given a god-sent 
opportunity when in 1939 Nazi Germany embarked on the conquest of 
Europe and the Mediterranean and, by 1945, had collapsed in the process. 
The resulting political void, especially in Eastern and Central Europe, was 
filled by Russia's communists. 
Antecedents in Hungary 
At war's end the Soviet Union occupied Hungary. Unlike in Poland, 
Bulgaria and Rumania, the Soviet leaders did not impose a communist 
government on the country in 1945, yet they made preparations for its 
imposition later. During 1945-47, using the Red Army's presence, 
Hungary was primed for a gradual communist takeover. By the end of 
the 1940s, the communists were eliminating the last of the opposition to 
their rule. They abolished the multi-party system and nationalized the 
economy. They introduced centrally planned production of all goods. 
They also began to persecute the churches and purged non-communists 
from the government and public institutions. Their aim was to replace the 
pluralistic society Hungary had had for centuries with a one-party govern-
ment that exercised total control over every aspect of Hungarian life. 
Hungary was to become a miniature version of the Soviet Union where 
Stalinist totalitarianism had flourished since the late 1920s. 
All this meant the rule of the secret police and the internment or 
deportation to concentration camps of all real and suspected opponents of 
the new order. There were purge trials for the more prominent of the 
Communist Party's opponents and many people were sentenced to long 
jail terms — or death. The cult of personality intensified year after year. 
The Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and his Hungarian satrap Matyas Rakosi 
were glorified and venerated an every possible occasion and everywhere. 
Hungary was forced to focus on heavy industry while production 
of consumer goods was neglected. Peasants were forced into collective 
farms or had to work as labourers on factory farms owned and managed 
by the state. All this came with Hungary's total isolation from the West, 
and even from socialist, but not pro-Soviet, Yugoslavia. The Iron Curtain, 
that was born already in 1945, was increasingly fortified and by about 
1950 Hungary's border with Austria, and then also with Yugoslavia, had 
become guarded by special security forces, high barbed-wire fences, 
guard-dogs, and minefields. Ordinary citizens were forbidden from 
travelling to non-communist countries and they were ordered not to 
fraternize with the occasional visitor from the West. 
After the death of Stalin in March 1953, a slow process of 
reversing the pace of the country's socialist transformation was started. In 
June of that year Moscow replaced as Prime Minister the unpopular 
Rakosi with another communist, Imre Nagy. Nagy implemented many 
reforms. His government allocated more funds for the production of 
consumer goods. It reduced taxes and deliveries paid in kind by peasants 
and peasant cooperatives to the state. In fact, Nagy even allowed peasants 
to leave the collectives — and many of them did. 
Alas, reforms did little to improve the economic situation in 
Hungary and hard-liners such as Rakosi still retained much influence. 
Soon, Nagy's reform program was derailed and the Stalinists regained 
power. They were still in power early in 1956. 
The International Background 
On the international scene, the ten years leading up to the events of the 
autumn of 1956 in Hungary were times of the Cold War. There is general 
agreement among historians that the developments that precipitated the 
Cold War included the following: Soviet insistence in 1945 to impose a 
Communist government on Rumania, Bulgaria and, especially, Poland. 
Added to this was Soviet help to communist insurgents in Greece, and 
Soviet attempt to starve West Berlin into submission (the Berlin Block-
ade). Then there was the communist coup in Czechoslovakia through 
which a western-style government was replaced by one dominated by 
local communists. At about the same time relations deteriorated between 
Stalin's Russia and Marshall Tito's Yugoslavia. The Soviets prepared to 
invade this "renegade" communist country but thought better of their plan 
when the United Nations, lead by the United States, intervened in the 
conflict between North Korea and South Korea. The years 1950-53, with 
their Korean conflict, constituted the height of the early Cold War. 
Starting with the death of Stalin in 1953, East-West tensions were 
slowly relaxed. A high point in these new relations was the Austrian 
Treaty of 1955. Through it Austria was proclaimed a neutral (and dis-
armed) state and the Allied occupation forces left the country, including 
the Red Army from eastern Austria. 
In February of 1956, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev denounced 
the crimes of the Stalin era at a closed session of the 20th Congress of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This speech further accelerated 
de-Stalinization in the Soviet Camp. 
At the end of June, anti-communist disturbances took place in 
Poznan, Poland. They were put down rather ruthlessly by the Polish army. 
Nevertheless, Wtadislaw Gomulka, who had spent much of the first half 
of the '50s in detention for the crime of "nationalist deviation", was re-
admitted to the Communist Party and was soon named the party's First 
Secretary. Probably in order to prevent similar discontent and disturbances 
in Hungary, the Soviets removed the unpopular Rakosi — for the second 
time. Unfortunately for them, they replaced him with another old Stalinist: 
Erno Gero. Not surprisingly, Hungary's public was not appeased. 
In the meantime, disquiet in the country grew. The desire for 
further change, both in the country's leadership and in government 
policies, became openly voiced, even within the Hungarian Communist 
Party. The regime tried to make concessions. On October 6 took place the 
re-burial of Laszlo Rajk and his accomplices who had been the victims of 
a purge trial some half-dozen years earlier. The event turned into a mass 
demonstration against Hungary's existing leadership. 
The Crises in Poland and Hungary 
By this time a new crisis had developed in Poland. The reform-minded 
Gomulka demanded changes to the way his country was treated within the 
Soviet Camp. He insisted that Red Army officers in charge of the Polish 
Army be dismissed, that the policy of forceful collectivization of agricul-
ture be relaxed, and that accommodation be reached with Poland's influ-
ential Catholic Church. 
Anticipating a crisis Khrushchev and the other members of the 
Politburo (the supreme decision-making organ of the Soviet Communist 
Party) flew to Warsaw. At the same time the Red Army was put on alert. 
After arduous negotiations a compromise was worked out: Gomulka and 
his reforms were to stay but he promised that Poland would remain a 
loyal member of the Soviet Camp. 
Meanwhile in Budapest university and college students were 
planning a demonstration to support of the reformers in Poland. The 
event took place on the 23rd. There were no clashes till the evening when 
a confrontation took place at the Radio Building. Soon, the panicked 
government of Gero denounced the disturbances as a "counter-revolution" 
and called on the Soviet troops stationed in the vicinity of Budapest to 
disperse the demonstrators. 
To gain control of the situation, on Khrushchev's orders, Imre 
Nagy was brought into the Hungarian cabinet, very much as Gomulka had 
been brought out from his enforced isolation in Poland. Next, the Central 
Committee of the Hungarian Communist Party appointed Nagy as Prime 
Minister. By this time a high-ranking Soviet delegation had arrived in 
Budapest but for the moment it saw no evidence of a dangerous crisis. 
On the 25th a mass demonstration in front of the Parliament 
Building was dispersed by gunfire that resulted in many casualties. Next, 
Gero was fired from his post on the order of the Soviet leaders and was 
replaced as Party Secretary by Janos Kadar, a former victim of the 
Stalinist purges. 
The next day the revolution started spiralling out of control. 
Reports were reaching Moscow of the anti-Soviet overtones of the up-
rising. And, as the days passed, matters got worse for the Soviets. From 
the 28th on, Premier Nagy no longer called the uprising a counter-revolu-
tion. More importantly, he began appointing non-Communists to his 
government. Still another development came on the 29th: Israel attacked 
Egypt and with that act started what is known in history as the Suez 
Crisis. As it would have great importance for Hungary, we should exam-
ine it in some detail. 
The Suez Crisis 
The Suez Canal is a waterway that connects the Mediterranean Sea to the 
Red Sea. It makes the route from Europe to south Asia much shorter as 
ships do not have to circumnavigate Africa. There had been canals 
connecting these seas in ancient times but they had fallen into disrepair a 
few times, the last time in the 8th century a.d. In the late 1850s, almost 
hundred years before the Suez Crisis, the project was revived and a 
modern canal was built. Soon thereafter Britain acquired control of the 
company operating the canal. The canal was to be open to all shipping 
and Britain was to guarantee the neutrality of the canal. In 1936 a treaty 
was signed by the United Kingdom and Egypt that allowed British troops 
to remain in the Canal zone. After World War II the Egyptians began 
pressing for the withdrawal of these troops. In June of 1956 the British 
forces finally withdrew. 
About this time Egypt became involved in plans to build the 
Aswan Dam on the Nile River. For some time it seemed that this project 
would be financed largely with American loans but in July of 1956 
Washington cancelled these plans. In retaliation, Egypt's new leader 
Abdul Nasser established closer ties with the Soviet Union and nationali-
zed the Suez Canal company. Soon thereafter he expelled some remain-
ing British officials from Egypt. In the meantime the Egyptians continued 
to deny passage on the Suez Canal to Israeli ships. 
These developments in the Middle East brought Britain, France 
and Israel together. Their governments began hatching a plot to wrest the 
Suez Canal away from Nasser. The plan was for Israel to attack Egypt, 
which would give and excuse for the British and the French to "inter-
vene" and send troops to control the Canal. A crisis was about to erupt in 
the Middle East that would have consequences on the outcome of the 
revolution in Hungary. 
The main players in this crisis would not be the British and the 
French, Western Europe's ex-great powers, but they would be the United 
States and the Soviet Union. To understand the roles each played, it is 
useful to examine their actions in the international relations of the 1950s. 
American Attitudes and Policies 
In 1945 the United States of America had emerged as of the world's most 
powerful economic and military power. With Germany and Japan in ruins, 
and Britain and France exhausted by war, America became a superpower. 
While throughout most of 1945 America's attention was focused on the 
defeat first of Nazi Germany and then of Imperial Japan, by the end of 
that year her diplomats and statesmen had turned their concern toward the 
emergence of the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. For 
many years Washington kept proclaiming the need to "liberate" Eastern 
Europe from Soviet rule while it also sought peaceful accommodation 
with Moscow. This two-faced policy became especially pronounced after 
the advent to power of the Eisenhower administration in January of 1953. 
Under Eisenhower, funds were made available to such establishment as 
Radio Free Europe, as well as anti-Soviet emigre organizations and their 
publications, all for the purpose of promoting the chances of the "libera-
tion" of Eastern Europe from Soviet rule. 
In reality, however, as the mid-1950s approached American diplo-
macy increasingly sought negotiated solutions to such issues as the ques-
tion of Germany and the status of Austria. When anti-Soviet demonstra-
tions broke out in East Berlin in 1953, America was not able to do any-
thing for the people of East Germany. In the eyes of many American poli-
ticians and defence experts this incident drove home the futility of the 
policy of roll-back. Yet, in American anti-Soviet propaganda the rhetoric 
of the "liberation" of the "captive nations" continued. 
While the United States never incited East European nations to 
rebel against Soviet rule and it never promised to aid any such rebellion, 
some Radio Free Europe broadcasts, made by Hungarian-language broad-
casters, made statements that could easily be interpreted as promises of 
US intervention, or if not, the promise that Washington would, in case of 
a revolt in an East European country, put overwhelming pressure on 
Moscow to withdraw its forces from there. 
Regarding American thinking during the period 1953 to the fall of 
1956 we can say that Washington was not expecting any fundamental 
changes in Eastern Europe. The only change there that was seen as 
possible by a few American analysts, was the spread of the "Yugoslav 
model" of communism. Not surprisingly under the circumstances, when 
an anti-Soviet uprising broke out in Budapest on 23 October, the Eisen-
hower administration was taken by complete surprise. But there were 
other factors complicating the reaction of America to the events in 
Hungary. One was the fact that the United States was in the midst of a 
presidential election campaign. The other was the outbreak of the Suez 
crisis which caught Washington completely by surprise and disrupted the 
unity of the West. 
Soviet Reactions 
By far the most important factor in determining the fate of the Hungarian 
Revolution was the attitude of the Soviet leadership to the events in 
Hungary. The Soviet Union had, by the fall of 1956, become the other 
superpower of the world. It had emerged victorious in the Second World 
War and had occupied much of Eastern and Central Europe in 1944-45. 
There it created its new empire. In Asia it had extended its influence 
when China had gone communist, and it had gained the friendship of 
many Asian powers, including that of India. In 1956 the Soviet Armed 
Forces were numerically superior to any non-communist military in the 
world. The U.S.S.R. had developed atomic weapons and the capability to 
deliver them over hundreds of kilometres of distances. For the time being 
it lacked long and medium-range missile capabilities, a fact that probably 
made a difference in the minds of Soviet military leaders in the fall of 
1956. The Soviet Armed forces could hit certain NATO bases, for 
example in northern Italy, only from Hungarian soil, a fact that made 
Hungary a more important strategic factor in Soviet military thinking than 
it could have been had the Russians had missiles with longer ranges. For 
the Soviets, the ability to counter the threat they perceived from NATO 
countries was a paramount consideration throughout the 1950s and in 
particular, during the fall of 1956. 
While the Soviets feared "imperialist aggression" from the West, 
they did not feel it possible that there would be a local threat to their 
occupation forces in any of the satellite countries. Moscow was aware of 
discontent in countries such as Poland and Hungary, but it did not 
anticipate a major anti-Soviet, let alone anti-Communist outbreak there. 
So, Moscow was just as surprised by what took place in Hungary on the 
23rd and 24th of October as was Washington. 
When the news of these events reached Moscow, the first reaction 
there was one of caution. Some Soviet leaders, notably Politburo member 
Anastas Mikolyan, was unhappy about the fact that Soviet troops had 
been deployed against the demonstrators. Certainly, most of the Soviet 
leaders were anxious to resolve the crisis through negotiations rather than 
the use of force. Only the hard-liners insisted on harsh measures. Among 
these was V.M. Molotov in the Politburo and the Soviet ambassador to 
Hungary Juri Andropov in Budapest. 
Elsewhere in the communist camp limited initial sympathies for 
the demonstrators in Budapest quickly evaporated when it increasingly 
became evident that the uprising in Hungary was not as much an anti-
Stalinist manifestation but an anti-communist movement. Especially 
important was the influence of the Chinese who after urging caution, in 
the end favoured the crushing of the revolution. Marshal Tito of Yugosla-
via also had an input into the deliberations in Moscow. First he and his 
government sympathised with what they thought to be an anti-Rakosiite 
and anti-Gero uprising, but changed their mind and advised harsh action 
when they realized that what was in danger in Hungary was not the 
influence of the Stalinists but the rule of the Communist Party itself. 
Nevertheless, for some time, and especially on the 30th of Octo-
ber, the Soviet leadership came down on the side of caution and agreed to 
withdraw Soviet troops from Hungary — if by doing so it would make it 
easier for the Hungarian communists to restore order and preserve their 
rule. Even the hard-liners in Moscow acquiesced in this stand. But then 
events transpired that made the Soviet leaders change their mind within a 
day. 
The End of October: The Time for Decision 
During the closing days of the month of October matters came to a 
climax both in Hungary and the Middle East. In the former Prime Minis-
ter Imre Nagy came to the conclusion that he had to chose between the 
people of Hungary and those Hungarian communists who wished to 
preserve the "Socialist order" along with the Soviet alliance. He chose to 
side with the Hungarian people. Accordingly he endorsed the most 
important demands of the freedom fighters: the call for the withdrawal of 
Soviet forces from Hungary and the restoration of a multi-party democ-
racy in the country. 
Just about the same time in the Middle East, after the British and 
the French governments had sent an ultimatum to Israel and Egypt 
threatening to invade if the fighting didn't stop there, the British and the 
French air forces began their bombardment of Egyptian military airfields 
in preparation for the landing of Anglo-French forces in the Canal Zone. 
The news of these events reached Moscow about the same time that 
reports arrived from Hungary that anti-communist crowds had lynched 
members of the communist security establishment. This strongly sug-
gested to the men in the Kremlin that the uprising was not aimed at a 
reform of the "socialist order" but at the abolition of communist rule. 
It was under these circumstances that the Soviet leaders met again 
on the 31st of the month. Not surprisingly they reversed their decision of 
the day before about troop withdrawal from Hungary and a negotiated 
settlement of the crisis. They now agreed to crush the revolution. They 
also agreed to keep their intention secret for the time being so that the 
illusion would be created in Budapest that the Red Army is leaving the 
country. In their new decision the Soviet leaders had the support of the 
Chinese delegation that had been present in Moscow for some time. 
Ever since this change in Soviet policy toward the events in 
Hungary has become known, historians have pondered over the question 
why, on the last day of October, the Soviet leaders abandoned the stand 
they taken only 24 hours earlier? Some commentators have pointed to 
the developments in the Near East as being the reason. After the British 
and French attack on Egypt, the Soviets realized that the Suez Crisis was 
a more serious threat to their interest than they had assumed it to be 
earlier. With Egypt under attack, it would be highly likely that Moscow 
would lose influence in the region and the dream of Egypt as a Soviet 
client state would crumble. Under these circumstances losing Hungary too 
would deal a double blow to Soviet prestige. And, as Khrushchev said at 
the time, withdrawing Soviet troops from Hungary would no doubt further 
embolden the "imperialists" in their quest to curb Soviet influence every-
where. 
The Anglo-French attack on Egypt had further implications for 
the outcome of the events in Hungary. It put the Americans into a 
precarious position. With such Western democratic countries as Britain 
and France being involved in an invasion, it became more awkward for 
the United States to condemn Soviet aggression. More important was the 
fact that the Suez Crisis destroyed the unity of the West. At the United 
Nations America found itself voting with the Soviet Union in condemning 
French and British actions. 
In any case, President Eisenhower feared that any military 
measures taken to oppose Soviet policy in Hungary could trigger a third 
world war that would probably be fought with nuclear weapons. Further-
more, military action was hardly a possibility with the Soviets having 
many divisions in Hungary while American forces were hundreds of miles 
away and would have had to cross neutral Austria just to approach the 
Hungarian border. In other words, neither the military nor the political 
situation made actual American aid to the freedom fighters in Budapest 
feasible. 
In his most recent book about the Hungarian revolution, Professor 
Charles Gati has argued that Soviet withdrawal from Hungary would still 
have been possible, even without Western pressure, had the Hungarians 
not gone too far in demanding changes and in doing things that threatened 
with a loss of prestige for Moscow. He suggests that had the crowds in 
Hungary been more restrained and had they forgone the lynching of secret 
servicemen, and had Imre Nagy's government not started the restoration 
of a multi-party system, amounting to the abandonment of communist rule 
and even membership in the "socialist bloc", the Soviet leaders would not 
have reversed their decision of the 30th of October to pull Russian troops 
from Hungary. He is probably right, but such a "might-have-been" of 
history is quite unrealistic. The hatred of communism in Hungary was so 
deep-seeded that restraint could hardly be expected of the country's 
masses, even of its revolutionary leaders. 
For the depths of that hatred the Soviet leadership was in large 
part responsible. True, Khrushchev cannot be blamed for most of the 
excesses of the Stalin era and of the Stalinist leadership in Hungary, but 
he and his colleagues could have been wiser in 1956. They should not 
have waited till the summer of 1956 with the replacement the much-
reviled Rakosi. They made an even bigger mistake when they replaced 
him not with a reform communist but with another Stalinist in the person 
of Gero. 
The Soviet leaders made another mistake when, soon after the 
first pro-Polish demonstrations in Budapest, they allowed Gero and 
Andropov to call into the city Soviet tanks from nearby Russian bases. Of 
course, had they been wiser, perhaps the discontent in Hungary would not 
have spilled over into an anti-communist uprising. Had the Soviets been 
wiser, and Ambassador Andropov been less alarming and more compro-
mising, the course of events in Hungary could have followed the Polish 
example. 
But this was not to be. The Hungarian people, angered by what 
they had seen as provocative measures dictated from Moscow, were not in 
the mood for compromise. And once concessions were made to them 
they demanded more, and ultimately they called for an end to communist 
rule and Russian domination of their country. But all that was too much 
for Moscow. 
Letting Hungary leave the Soviet Camp and become a western-
style country would have been too dangerous to the Soviet leadership. It 
would have resulted in a serious loss of face for Moscow. It would have 
meant a gap in the defensive ring surrounding the Soviet Union. It would 
have invited other members of the Socialist bloc to try quitting the 
alliance. For Khrushchev to support such a proposition would have 
undermined his leadership and would have left the door open for the 
Stalinists in Moscow to reclaim power. The Hungarian revolution had to 
be crushed. 
The Aftermath 
The Hungarian revolution had wide-spread international consequences. 
The fleeing of some 200,000 Hungarian citizens and their re-settlement in 
the countries of the Western world created a Magyar diaspora that in time 
would play an important role in keeping links between the Hungarian 
people and the nations and cultures of the Western world. Their largely 
indirect role in bringing communism to an end in Hungary has not been 
studied, but it will become obvious once it will be investigated by histori-
ans. 
The crushing of the Revolution by the Soviets had an impact on 
American foreign policies. The event drove home to everyone in Wash-
ington the futility of the idea of the "roll back" of communism. After 
1956 American rhetoric was adjusted to the policy of seeking peaceful 
coexistence with the Soviet bloc and finding accommodation and compro-
mises. 
The greatest impact of the defeat of the Hungarian Revolution 
was on Soviet history and the history of the world communist movement. 
For the Soviets, the sending into Hungary of thousands of Soviet tanks in 
early November was a costly affair. It led to the condemnation of Soviet 
actions in many parts of the world. It confirmed the suspicion of many 
people that communism as practiced in the Soviet camp was a tyrannical 
system backed by brute force alone. 
More importantly, Soviet intervention in Hungary resulted in a 
great deal of disillusionment among communists everywhere regarding 
Soviet leadership of the world communist movement. This was especially 
true of communists in the West upon whose support Marxist parties 
depended. Only a decade earlier it seemed that some European countries, 
as for example France and Italy, might embrace communism through the 
electoral process. By 1956 the chance of this happening had diminished 
and, after November of that year, it decreased even further. Viewed from 
the distance of half a century, it seems that 1956 was the beginning of the 
end of the world communist revolution. 
The demise of the Soviet Empire came 33 years later. By then the 
Soviets were ready to abandon their imperial ambitions. By the late 1980s 
they, especially new Soviet leaders such as Mikhail Gorbachev, saw in 
Eastern Europe a drain on Soviet resources. Furthermore, unlike in 1956 
when the Soviet military regarded Hungary (and, in particular, her terri-
tory) as an invaluable military asset, by 1989 it felt that the country was 
not needed for the defence of the Soviet Union in the age of interconti-
nental missiles. 
Not surprisingly that year Gorbachev let Hungary — as well as 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany — go its own way, mainly by 
making it evident to the communist leaders in the country that the Red 
Army would no longer prop up their regimes. When Hungary's commu-
nist masters realized this, they did their utmost to assure that the transition 
to a non-communist society came about peacefully rather than through 
another bloody revolution. 
The dreams of Hungarians about independence, democracy and 
association with the West started to be realized only in 1989. But the road 
to a Western-European style society and economy has not been an easy 
one. Forty years of communism had bequeathed the country a burden-
some legacy. The most tangible part of this has been the national debt 
that had been amassed by the country's communist regime from the 1970s 
to the 1980s. Hungary of the times shouldered the heaviest per-capita 
national debt in Eastern Europe — and it still does. In the wake of 1989 
Hungary had to reorient completely her external trade and replace Russia 
as her principal trading partner with Western Europe. She also had to 
phase out her uneconomical heavy industries and replace them with 
economic activities more in tune with European markets. 
Another, somewhat less tangible unfortunate legacy of the Soviet 
era in Hungary had been the tradition of the dependence of the individual 
on the state. Such attitudes will take at least a generation to eradicate. The 
country also has to learn, and this is a painful process for her people, that 
the cost of the cradle-to-grave social safety net that had been financed in 
Janos Kadar's Hungary mainly with western loans is too great for an 
economy that has not yet made a full transition to the economic order that 
exists in much of Western Europe. 
The stresses caused by the transforming of Hungary from a 
socialist state to one more in line with Western models are still with us 
today and had helped to foster much of the discontent that we witnessed 
in the country on the 50th anniversary of the outbreak of the revolution. 
We can only hope that by the time of the Revolution's centenary, all 
negative legacies of forty years of communist rule in the country will be 
eliminated. 
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Soviet Treatment of Magyars, 1945-56: 
Hungarian Slave Labourers in the Gulag 
Steven Bela Vardy 
and Agnes Huszar Vardy 
The Origins and Development of the Soviet Gulag 
While most people have heard of the word "Gulag," few are really 
knowledgeable about its meaning and significance. To our great surprise, 
this also holds true for Hungary, even among some educated people. 
Based largely on the title of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's monumental Gulag 
Archipelago (1973), many believe it to be a collection of penal islands 
somewhere in the far northern region of Russia.1 In reality, however, 
GULAG is simply an acronym or mosaic word for the Soviet administra-
tive apparatus Glavnoye Upravleniye Ispravitelno-Trudovykh Lagerey 
[Chief Administration of Corrective Labour Camps], which unified the 
administration of the many thousands of slave labour camps in the Soviet 
Union.2 
Some corrective labour camps had come into existence immedi-
ately after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. The system that held these 
camps together, however, was established only in 1934. Becoming known 
as the GULAG, it soon gave its name to the collection of all slave labour 
camps, which numbered in the thousands throughout the vast reaches of 
the Soviet Empire. At its height, from the 1930s through the 1950s, the 
Gulag embraced a territory that was 5,500 miles long and 2,500 wide, and 
it may have included up to forty-thousand camps of various sizes. It 
stretched from the Ukrainian Donbass region to the Kamchatka Peninsula 
in the Far East, from the Lapp-inhabited Kola Peninsula to the Kuril 
Islands north of Japan, from the Caucasus Mountains in the south to 
Vorkuta beyond the Arctic circle, and from Mongolia to the mouth of the 
Lena River on the Arctic Sea. 
Although the Gulag was a separate administrative system, it al-
ways remained under the direct control of the Soviet Secret Police, even 
though the latter was repeatedly reorganized and frequently renamed. The 
most important of these names included Cheka, GPU, OGPU, NKVD, 
MVD, NKGB, and finally KGB, which remained intact until the very end 
of the Soviet Union. 
The young men and women — mostly innocent victims — who 
found themselves in one of these forced labour camps were put to work 
on every possible physical labour. They were forced to work under the 
most inhuman conditions, which decimated them very rapidly, forcing the 
authorities to replenish these camps repeatedly. In point of fact, in the 
course of time they devised a system of work and replenishment which 
appeared to them to be the most effective means in exacting work from 
the inmates. The person who is credited with having devised this system 
was a certain Naftaly Aronovich Frenkel (1883-1960),3 who in the course 
of time was awarded the Order of Lenin, and was also promoted to the 
rank of a general in the NKVD. These promotions were his rewards for 
his ability to exact work most efficiently from the helpless inmates in the 
forced labour camps.4 
Frenkel's method was to "substitute hunger for the knout," or to 
put it another way, "to link the prisoner's food ration... to his produc-
tion."5 But this was only one of Frenkel's methods of labour exaction. He 
also became aware of the fact that the prisoners were most productive 
during the first few months of their incarceration. After those initial 
months they became increasingly enfeebled and drained of their energies. 
As such they became progressively less productive. Based on these 
observations, Frenkel came to the conclusion that production levels of 
camp inmates could only be kept on a high level by repeatedly culling 
them — killing them off — and replacing them with newcomers. 
This culling process was also applied in many different ways. In 
one instance, when called out for the daily work detail, the laggards who 
were not fast enough and thus brought up the rear of the line, were 
simply shot from behind. Others died of exhaustion and of the various 
diseases that were rampant in the Gulag camps. These "weaklings" were 
judged to be useless for the "building of socialism," and consequently 
were simply replaced by fresh prisoners. This culling and weeding out 
process continued for decades through much of the life of the Soviet 
Gulag in Stalin's Russia.6 
With his well-oiled method of exacting the maximum amount of 
work from the hapless slave labourers, Frenkel had endeared himself to 
Stalin so much that in 1931 he was put in charge of the construction of 
the infamous White Sea Canal, which was completed in 1933 at the cost 
of the lives of 60,000 human beings. Moreover, in 1937 he was appointed 
director of the newly founded GULZhDS [Chief Administration of 
Railroad Construction Camps], and in 1939 he was entrusted with provid-
ing railroad transportation for the Red Army for its invasion of Poland, 
and then of Finland in the so-called "Winter War." Frenkel's proven 
methods of labour exaction were successively applied to many other large 
construction projects, including the Baltic-Amur Railroad Project, the Far 
Eastern Construction Project, and to the construction and running of such 
infamous slave labour camps as those of Vorkuta and the Kolyma region 
of Eastern Siberia.7 
It is difficult to estimate the number of inmates in these forced 
labour camps, and even more difficult to assess the number of prisoners 
who died during their incarceration. Solzhenitsyn claims that between 
1928 and 1953 "some forty to fifty million people served long sentences 
in the Archipelago."8 The estimates of those who perished range up to 
thirty million, although one of the recent estimates stopped at twenty-
three million.9 
Up to the outbreak of the war in Europe in 1939, the inmates of 
the Gulag camps came almost exclusively from the ranks of Soviet 
citizens. Starting in 1939, however, the camps were being replenished by 
an increasing number of other nationalities, including Latvians, Lithuani-
ans, Estonians, Finns, Poles, and several smaller Caucasian and Crimean 
nationalities. These deportations were especially hard on the anti-com-
munist intellectual elites of these nationalities, which nations were thus in 
effect decapitated. 
During the final months of World War II, a new set of prisoners 
appeared. They came from the various conquered — according to the 
Soviets, "liberated" — nations of Central Europe. These included prison-
ers of war, but also a great number of civilians. The countries under 
Soviet occupation were depleted of able bodied young men and women. 
They were deported to the Soviet Union partially as a form of collective 
punishment, and partially to help rebuild the country after the devastation 
suffered in the war. Both of these goals were important, although their 
relative importance changed from time to time. 
The alleged "liberation" of Hungary 
After four years of war and one year of German occupation, in the spring 
of 1945 Hungary was freed from the Nazi German occupying forces, only 
to be subjugated by the "liberating" Soviet Red Army. In the course of 
the next forty-six years this Soviet control became a permanent feature of 
Hungarian life, and on April 4th every year, Hungarians were told to 
celebrate this alleged "liberation" of their country by the Soviet Union. 
Although these celebrations ceased in 1990, the Soviet troops did not 
leave Hungary until June 19, 1991. 
To most Hungarians who had experienced first hand the circum-
stances of this Soviet occupation of their country, this "liberation" ap-
peared more like the rape of their nation and their families. In private, 
this view was often expressed through a slightly different pronunciation of 
the expression "szabadulas" (l iberation), which with the appropriate 
emphasis came out as "szabad dulds" (=free ravaging). Naturally, this 
view does not negate the fact that for some people — at least for a while 
— the Soviet conquest was in fact liberation. These include the Jewish 
and those non-Jewish Hungarians who openly opposed the Germans and 
their Hungarian cohorts. In the course of time, however, even these 
anti-Nazi groups began to feel the heavy hand of Soviet occupation. 
One of the best examples of this "liberation-turned-into-oppressi-
on" is the case of Nicholas M. Nagy-Talavera (1929-2001), the scion of a 
well-to-do Hungarian Jewish family, who survived Auschwitz only to be 
taken to the Soviet Gulag soon after his return to Hungary. Allegedly, this 
was done because he was born into a well-to-do upper bourgeoisie family, 
and thus counted as one of the "oppressors" in Hungarian society. Nagy-
Talavera also survived the Soviet Gulag. Soon after his repatriation, the 
Hungarian Revolution of 1956 broke out. He took the opportunity to flee 
Hungary and emigrated to the United States. Ten years later he acquired 
a Ph.D. at Berkeley, and then rose to a professorship at California State 
University at Chico.10 
No Hungarian knew and felt the pain of Soviet "liberation" more 
than those tens of thousands of innocent civilians who were collected 
during this "liberation process" and then deported to the slave labour 
camps of the Soviet Gulag. As observed by Tamas Stark, a respected 
scholar of the period of World War II: "Who would have thought that in 
the immediate past century — in our own century — the institution of 
slavery would be reinstated? We may even assert that in the twentieth 
century more people were enslaved than in all of the previous centuries 
together. Furthermore, in our age, slavery became 'more sophisticated' 
than in ancient times, not only in its organization and quantity, but also in 
its 'quality.' In those days the goal was simply the exaction of labour. 
Nowadays it was extermination for which labour was 'only1 an instru-
ment. The goal of German national socialism was to weaken and to 
annihilate certain 'races' or ethnic groups. The goal of Stalinist socialism, 
on the other hand, was to use forced labour for the decimation of Soviet 
subjects, and for the intimidation of the neighbouring states."11 
We have no clear-cut picture of the number of Hungarians — 
military personnel and civilians — who ended up in captivity during the 
last phase of the war, but in generally it is assumed that their number was 
above 900,000. Of these, somewhat less than one-third were captured by 
the Western Allies (Americans, British, French), while over two-thirds or 
600,000 to 640,000 ended up in Soviet forced labour or prisoner-of-war 
camps. Of the latter, 220,000 (or perhaps 270,000) never returned home.12 
About half of these internees — possibly 120,000 to 140,000 — were 
innocent civilians who had been taken captive in the period between 
November 1944 and March 1945. According to the Magyar Nagylexikon 
[Great Hungarian Encyclopedia],13 of these 120,000 and 140,000 civilian 
captives from within Hungary's current borders only about 10% sur-
vived.14 If we consider the territory of enlarged Hungary as it existed 
during World War II, then the number of civilian internees moves up to 
between 180,000 and 200,000, most of the extra ones coming from 
Northern Transylvania and Sub-Carpathia or Carpatho-Ruthenia.15 
Although the above figures are usually mentioned, some scholars 
put the Hungarian losses even higher. As an example, Gusztav Menczer, 
the President of the Directorate of the Central Office of Compensation 
[Kozponti Karrendezesi Iroda Tarsadalmi Kollegiuma], the number of the 
Hungarian deportees was close to 700,000 (680,900), of whom about 
400,000 or 60% perished in Russia. This number, however, has to be 
amended by the addition of 120,000 person who died during transporta-
tion to the slave labour camps, and about whom very little information is 
available.16 If these figures will prove to be correct, the number of 
Hungarian slave labourers who succumbed to the vicissitudes of deporta-
tion is above half a million. 
But statistics about these deportations are scarce and often contra-
dictory. This can easily be demonstrated even with the writings of such 
recognized experts of this mass deportation as Tamas Stark and Gusztav 
Menczer. In one of his relevant writings, for example, Menczer summa-
rizes the statistical date of the various deportees as follows: "According to 
researchers, of the 750,000 Hungarian deportees at least 200,000 perished 
during the death march, in consequence of the horrendous conditions of 
their deportation. An additional 150,000 Hungarians succumbed to various 
diseases in the concentration camps. The primary culprit among these was 
alimentary dystrophy, tuberculosis, and malaria caused by shortage of 
protein."17 As is evident, the statistics in this statement — which speak of 
350,000 Hungarians who perished in the Gulag — do not quite coincide 
with the statistics given in the earlier summary, where Menczer speaks 
about the death of 520,000 Hungarians. This proves conclusively that 
even the most astute researchers are confused by the various contradictory 
statistics on this topic. 
Although scholars inevitably disagree with each other about the 
number of the deportees and the number of those who perished during 
deportation or in one of the many Gulag slave labour camps, we all can 
agree with Gusztav Menczer's following conclusions that touch all 
Hungarians: 
The two horrible dictatorships of the Twentieth Century [Nazi 
and Bolshevik] show a 'strange' similarity not only in their 
methods of operation, but also in the number of Hungarians 
who have fallen victim to them. As such, placing special 
emphasis on the victims of only one of these dictatorships 
offends the victims of the other dictatorship. It puts a dividing 
wall between two groups of Hungarians, who have suffered so 
much in the Twentieth Century.IK 
The civilians who ended up in the Soviet slave labour camps at 
the end of the war were in two distinct categories: political prisoners, who 
were convicted on various trumped-up charges, and the malenky robotsrs, 
who were deported for a "little work" without being convicted of any 
crime. According to some sources up to 90% of the political prisoners 
may have perished in the Gulag camps under the most gruesome circum-
stances, but based on the number of returnees, this claim appears to be 
too high (We should add here that the grammatically correct term should 
be malenkaya rabota. Repeated Hungarian usage or misusage, however, 
made this incorrect expression the accepted term for this phenomenon in 
Hungarian popular and scholarly literature.)19 The mostly unsuspecting 
victims of malenky robot were collected in villages and towns, after 
having been called to a public meeting under various pretexts. 
According to available statistics, in the period between the 
summer of 1945 and the fall of 1948 somewhere between 330,000 to 
380,000 Hungarians — most of them members of the military — were 
repatriated. Between 100,000 to 150,000 of these arrived before the 
summer of 1946, 202,000 returned home between July 1946 and Novem-
ber 1948, another 20,000 to 25,000 in the course of 1949 through 1951, 
and a further 3,000 between 1953 and 1955. This comes to between 
330,000 and 380,000 Hungarians who survived, leaving as many as 
220,000 to 270,000, or even 310,000 who did not.20 Those who were 
repatriated between 1946 and 1948 also included 9,425 documented 
civilians, most of whom were victims of the malenky robot. They repre-
sented perhaps only 10% of the innocent civilians who have ended up in 
the Soviet Gulag in wake of World War II.21 
Those who were convicted for espionage or for some other 
imaginary "crime" were not so "fortunate" as the malenky roboters. They 
were generally taken much further into Soviet Siberia, and they had to 
stay there for several more years after the surviving malenky roboters had 
already returned. If the political prisoners survived, they were permitted to 
repatriate only after eight, ten, or even fifteen years of Soviet slave 
labour, in the period following Stalin's death in 1953.22 
Some Recent Scholarship and Memoir Literature on the Gulag 
In recent years, the institution of the Soviet Gulag has been ably chroni-
cled by a number of Western scholars, among them Robert Conquest 
(1965 and 1992),23 Nanci Adler (1993 and 2002),24 and Anne Applebaum 
(2003).25 Most of these syntheses were born in wake of the monumental 
works by the world-renowned Alexander Solzhenitsyn (b. 1918), whose 
account of life in Soviet forced labour camps (1963, 1973) had earned for 
him a Nobel Prize in 1970.26 There were, of course, many other survivors 
who have recorded their frightening and torture-filled experiences in the 
Soviet Gulag, but none of them were able to do so on the aesthetic level, 
and with the political impact of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's Gulag Archipel-
ago. 
Among the scores of Hungarians who did so, the earliest was 
Aron Gabor (1911-1982) and the best known is Janos Rozsas (b. 1926). 
Both of these former Gulag prisoners wrote powerful descriptions of their 
experiences in the Soviet death camps. Aron Gabor had spent fifteen 
years in the Soviet Gulag (1945-1960), and then five more years under 
controlled political circumstance in his homeland. Only after his illegal 
emigration in 1965, was he able to recount his trials and tribulations. 
Only then was he able to publish memoirs in the form of his Siberian 
Trilogy.27 These volumes were also published in English, German, 
Spanish, and Portuguese, but as they were put out by small obscure 
publishers that lacked the necessary tools of mass publicity, these books 
were never able to penetrate Western social and political consciousness. 
The situation with Rozsas — the author of the first Hungarian 
Gulag encyclopedia28 — is somewhat different in that his works were 
never published in any language other than Hungarian. But because of the 
unfriendly political atmosphere back in his homeland, the first edition of 
his voluminous memoirs had to be published abroad in Germany (1986-
1987).29 Only in 1989, at the time of the change of the political regime 
in Hungary, was he able to have them republished in his native land.30 
Of all the Hungarian Gulag-memoirs Rozsas's reminiscences are 
by far the most detailed. Yet, not even these memoirs were able to 
penetrate the Hungarian mind. The nearly half century of Soviet domina-
tion has left its mark upon Hungarian society. The memory of these mass 
deportations was virtually obliterated from collective memory of the 
nation. Moreover, those who survived and returned home were received 
as war criminals. They were forbidden to speak about their Gulag experi-
ences, and in this way they were unable to pass through the catharsis that 
would have made their lives more bearable. 
The situation was somewhat different with George Bien (1928-
2005), who spent over ten years in Eastern Siberia province of Kolyma, 
and soon after his repatriation he left Hungary to the United States. In 
contrast to those who remained at home, George Bien was free to speak 
about his life, but he never got around writing about his experiences until 
after his retirement in the 1990s. His work entitled Elveszett evek [Lost 
Years] appeared both in Hungarian and in English.31 Bien also appeared 
in a number of documentaries about Siberia and the Soviet Gulag. As 
such, his reminiscences made much greater impression upon Western 
scholarship than those of any of his predecessors. This is true notwith-
standing the fact that his work is much shorter and more cursory than 
those of Aron Gabor and Janos Rozsas. His graphic portrayal of the 
"Death Ship to Kolyma," in which he described the torturous six days 
between Vladivostok and Magadan without a drop of drinking water, is a 
particularly impressive and frightening picture of the inhumanity of the 
Soviet Gulag.32 
This incredible lack of information, disinterest and disregard for 
the Soviet Gulag and its many death camps is evident from the various 
major syntheses of modem Hungarian history that have been written by 
respected scholars several years after the fall of communism. In most 
instances the authors of these syntheses barely mention, let alone discuss, 
this major Hungarian tragedy that landed perhaps 700,000 Hungarians in 
Soviet slavery, and resulted in the cruel death of at least quarter million 
fellow Hungarians. They simply gloss over this tragedy, without any 
effort to point out the enormity of the crime that had been perpetrated 
against innocent Hungarian civilians by the brutal Stalinist system that 
had inundated the lands of Western Christian Civilization at the end of 
the war. The violence, the rapes, the mass tortures, and the resulting loss 
of innocent lives by the tens of thousands all remain unmentioned by 
these historians who had been educated without any reference to these 
dark and painful events of Hungarian history.33 
The rape of Hungarian women by the conquering Soviet armed 
personnel was so widespread that their number may have passed one 
million. Of the various sources that mention these rapes include the 
memoirs of the former Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy (1903-1979), who 
presided over the Hungarian Government between February 1946 and 
June 1947. He writes that "ruthless red soldiers have captured and in-
fected with venereal disease tens of thousands of women and young 
girls."34 At the same time "Russian female soldiers raped many thousands 
of Hungarian men, who were forced to perform unnatural acts. [These 
Soviet women]... congregated in gangs, attacked surrounding villages, and 
collected men, whom they held captive for several days."35 Ferenc Nagy 
also mentions that these allegations were examined by the Swiss Embassy 
in Budapest, which than published the results of this inquiry in May 1945. 
Another historical work also discusses the mass rape of Hungarian 
women by members of the Red Army. The author of this work claims 
that in August 1945 the Hungarian Government was forced to seek help 
and medication from several West European states to deal with the 
470,000 women who were suffering from the so-called "Lenin disease."36 
If this allegation is correct, then the number of women who have been 
raped should be at least around one million. After all it is prudent to 
assume that not all women who had been raped contracted the disease, 
and not all of them reported this violation to the authorities. 
One may also mention the case of the case of the small town of 
Felsozsolca in the vicinity of the industrial city of Miskolc. In 1945 it had 
a population of approximately 2,500, among them perhaps 500 adult 
women. Of these women, according to local historian Sandor Zsfros, well 
over a 100 were raped or otherwise mishandled under the most gruesome 
circumstances. As related by him, "we... know of cases where on the very 
first night of our 'liberation' Russian soldiers marched into the cellars... 
and raped crying-shrieking young girls, next to a corps, within the sight 
of thirty or so frightened adults."37 
This lack of attention to the terrorization and deportations of Hun-
garian civilians by the Soviet conquerors after World War II is character-
istic of virtually all historical syntheses and textbooks published in post-
communist Hungary. These include even the twenty-one-volume Magyar 
Nagylexikon [Great Hungarian Encyclopedia], which devotes a whole 
column to the description of the Soviet Gulag, but only a single sentence 
to its Hungarian prisoners: "In addition to various Soviet nationalities, 
many foreign citizens also lived and died in the camps of the Gulag, 
among them hundreds of thousands of Hungarian prisoners-of-war, and 
after 1944 also civilians who had been deported from Hungary, of whom 
90% never returned home."38 While very brief, here at least the low 
survival rate of Gulag-prisoners is mentioned. 
It is interesting and even frightening that this lack of attention to 
the Hungarian victims of the Soviet Gulag are short-shrifted even by 
some prominent Western authors, as well as by Hungarian historians who 
had spent considerable time in the West following the collapse of commu-
nism. 
This lack of attention to the victims of the Soviet Gulag is all the 
more surprising in view of the fact that, in addition to a few specialized 
studies by scholars such as Tamas Stark and Lajos Fur,39 at least five 
dozen memoirs of Gulag-survivors and documentary collections have 
appeared in Hungary and in the neighbouring Hungarian-inhabited lands 
in the course of the past fifteen years.40 
The most important of the latter were the interviews with former 
prisoners, who for the first time since their repatriation were permitted to 
speak openly about their torturous experiences. One of the first of these 
interview collections was Miklos Fiizes's volume Modern rabszolgasdg 
[Modern-day Slavery] (1990).41 Fuzes was a professional historian and 
archivist. He wrote an extensive historical introductory study to the 
volume which contains twenty-seven interviews and reminiscences by 
Hungarian Germans, commonly known as Swabians. Similarly to Tamas 
Stark, Fuzes also makes an attempt to synthesize the many contradictory 
statistics about the number of the deportees and survivors. In light of the 
scarcity and the unreliability of the existing sources, he too had to 
conclude that it is really impossible to come up with reliable figures for 
the deportees, although he does agree with the conclusion by some other 
historians that "about two-thirds of the deportees perished."42 
Only a few months after Fuzes's work appeared, Ilona Szebeni's 
Merre van magyar hazdm? [Where is My Hungarian Homeland?] (1991) 
was published. It contains interviews by seventy-four former Gulag priso-
ners 43 Szebeni also appended the names of 3,230 malenky robotzrs who 
had been collected and deported from the Upper Tisza region. The large 
majority of these prisoners perished in the Soviet Union. Szebeni was 
aided in her work by Tamas Stark, who wrote a postscript to this volume, 
which essay placed the whole Gulag-experience into the proper historical 
perspective.44 
In 1994 appeared the work by Sandor Zsfros, A front alatt [On 
the Front], which is based upon the reminiscences of eleven former Gulag 
prisoners from the town of Felsozsolca, as well as on some official docu-
ments and memoir fragments. The author himself escaped deportation 
because he was only fourteen years old in those days. His book is a 
microcosm of the mass deportation of Hungarians to the Soviet Gulag that 
took place in late 1944 and early 1945.45 This work was subsequently 
published in an expanded edition in 2004, and then in English also' in 
2006.46 
Ten years after Szebeni's and Fuzes's, and six years after Zsfros's 
work, there appeared another interview volume by the journalist Valeria 
Kormos, entitled A vegtelen foglyai [Prisoners of Endlessness].47 This 
book is much more selective in its coverage, for it contains interviews 
with less than a dozen survivors, but it was put out by a Budapest pub-
lisher in a much more attractive format. The interviews are more profes-
sional than in Szebeni's case, and they are placed into more easily read-
able literary form. This book is embellished with several dozen photo-
graphs. They compare and contrast the appearance of the survivors before 
their deportation with how they looked five decades later. 
Notwithstanding these numerous publications, the history, and 
even the very existence of the Gulag camps and their Hungarian inmates 
continues to remain largely unknown and unrecognized in Hungary. By 
refusing to incorporate the history of the Gulag into their syntheses of 
Hungarian history, professional historians assign this great national 
tragedy to total oblivion. This approach, however, is just as wrong and 
unjust, as trying to deny the Jewish Holocaust. The Gulag and the 
Holocaust are human tragedies on a previously unheard-of scale, which 
need to be remembered by all succeeding generations. 
The Background to the Hungarian GULAG 
The collection of innocent civilians for the Soviet Gulag was done in 
accordance with a tacit understanding among the victorious allies that 
Soviet Russia would have to be compensated for its losses during the war. 
The Soviet Foreign Minister, V. M. Molotov had alluded to this policy 
already two years before the end of the war, when in a letter to the 
British Ambassador dated June 7, 1943, he stated clearly that "the Soviet 
Government is of the opinion that the responsibility for the military help 
that Hungary had given to Germany... has to be borne not only by the 
Hungarian Government, but to a lesser or greater degree also by the 
Hungarian people."48 
This policy of forced labour for the citizens of the defeated states 
was reaffirmed by a Decree of the Soviet Union's Committee of State 
Security on December 16, 1944, which stated that "all German men 
between the ages of 17 and 44, and all German women between the ages 
of 18 and 30, who are residents of the territories of Romania, Hungary, 
Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia have to be mobilized and 
transported to the Soviet Union. 
In Hungary, the Soviet zeal to collect slave labourers went much 
beyond the intent of this decree. As a matter of fact, Soviet military 
authorities, with the enthusiastic cooperation of their local cohorts and 
opportunists, collected not only Germans and Hungarians with German 
names, but also ethnic Hungarians who had nothing to do with the war 
except as suffering bystanders. At various places they collected Hungari-
ans simply because their names ended in the letter "r." As remembered by 
ninety year old Mr. Imre Kolozsi in 1989: "Some stupid person came up 
with the idea that every family name ending in the letter V is German, 
because Hitler's name also ended in an 'r.' This is how Pasztor, Molnar, 
Bodnar, Csiger... and even Gytiker got on the list.... But the surname was 
not really important.... A certain number of people had to be deported, 
and the quota was filled with whomever could be caught."49 They de-
ported Hungarians with pure Hungarian names such as Bodnar, Bognar, 
Kadar, Feher, Kover, Vinceller, and so on, from numerous other localities 
as well.50 
The Collection of Prisoners 
In Hungary the first wave of deportations was haphazard and disorga-
nized, but the second wave was a well-planned and well-carried out 
operation. It took place about a month or two after the first wave, and its 
goal was twofold: To supply free labour for rebuilding Soviet economy, 
and to apply collective punishment to Hungary's civilian population, 
particularly those of German ethnicity. This policy was to be applied not 
only to small rump Hungary that had been created after the Treaty of 
Trianon in 1920, but also to those largely Hungarian-inhabited territories 
that had been regained in the course of 1938-1941. 
This is evident, among others, from the deportation of about 
5,000 ethnic Hungarians from the city of Kolozsvar (today's Cluj) the 
capital of Transylvania, which in 1940 had been returned to Hungary but 
then in 1945 reverted once more to Romania. But it is also evident from 
the mass deportations that took place in Sub-Carpathia [Ruthenia],51 as 
well as in the southern fringes of interwar Slovakia that had been re-
gained by Hungary in 1938.52 
The process of organized collection of Hungarians began in the 
Upper-Tisza Region of Northeastern Hungary. From there it proceeded 
partially toward Debrecen, and partially toward Miskolc and Eger, and 
then on to Budapest and its vicinity. After that it moved to the lands 
between the Danube and the Tisza Rivers and to Transdanubia. It seems 
that this process was carried out in accordance with a grand central plan 
that had been devised in Moscow for Soviet-style social reconstruction of 
postwar Hungary. Apparently, each section of the country had to supply a 
certain number of victims in accordance with a predetermined quota 
system. But once that quota had been filled, collections generally ceased. 
While official documents concerning these mass deportations are 
sporadic, the nature of this policy can be deduced from various other 
sources. It is substantiated even by some of the personal papers of a 
number of top communist leaders. As an example, there is the letter of 
Hungary's future communist cultural czar, Jozsef Revai (1898-1959), 
written to Hungary's "Little Stalin" Maty as Rakosi (1892-1971) who at 
that time was still in Moscow. Revai recognized and readily pointed out 
the shortcomings of this meticulously planned deportation program: 
Sadly (he wrote) the plan concerning the deportation of the 
able-bodied German population did not have the effect it was 
meant to have.... In most places local commandants imple-
mented this policy on the basis of family names and quotas. If 
there were not enough Germans, they collected Hungarians. 
They harvested even people who did not speak a word German, 
who were proven anti-Fascists, and who had even suffered 
imprisonments and internments [at the hands of Hungary's 
Fascist Government]. No matter. They were all taken.53 
The collection process itself depended heavily on misinformation 
and outright deception. The majority of the internees were told that they 
would have to perform a "little work" ["malenky robot"] for a few days to 
clear away rubble, clean the streets, help distribute food, restart produc-
tion in the local shops and factories, or to receive documents attesting to 
their innocence in matters relating to Nazi activities. After a few days or 
a couple of weeks, they would be permitted to return home to start 
rebuilding their own communities. 
In the villages and smaller towns, the prospective Gulag-prisoners 
were told to assemble at one of the local public buildings — school, town 
hall, church, or armoury — for the purposes of being informed about new 
developments and for receiving their assignments to one of the many 
public work projects. Those who declined to come, were collected 
personally by the so-called "polic," usually accompanied by an armed 
Soviet soldier. These "polic" were eager collaborators, who usually tried 
to hide their recent Nazi past by over-fulfilling the demands of the 
occupiers. Most of the victims were not even given time to dress prop-
erly, nor to prepare themselves adequately for the so-called "little work" 
that allegedly awaited them. Once assembled, they were surrounded by 
Soviet military guards, forced to remain there for days, and then force-
marched to one of the "receiving camps" or "holding camps" in their 
region. There, they were loaded onto cattle cars and deported to the 
Soviet slave labour camps.54 
The convicted political prisoners 
The malenky roboto.rs constituted only one segment of the deported 
civilian population. The other, perhaps slightly smaller segment was made 
up of the political prisoners; that is of those who were actually tried and 
convicted for an alleged crime and then sent off to Siberia for a period of 
ten to twenty-five years. These political prisoners were convicted for a 
wide variety of so-called political crimes, including alleged Nazi affilia-
tion, fighting against the Soviet forces, spying, being involved in sabotage 
activities, uttering critical remarks about the behaviour of the occupying 
Soviet forces, or simply being listed on the personal papers of one who 
had already been arrested for any of the above alleged crimes. 
If at all possible, the conditions of their deportation and confine-
ment were even worse than those of the malenky roboters. They had to 
travel under identically harsh conditions for a much longer period of time; 
their period of incarceration was much longer; and they were taken to the 
northern Ural region or to the far reaches of Eastern Siberia, without 
reasonable hope of ever returning to their homelands. Thus, among these 
political prisoners the number of those who survived was even smaller. 
Arrest and deportation 
The arrest, deportation, life, and survival of the Gulag slave labourers in 
the forced labour camps of the Soviet Union is a perpetual living compo-
nent of the memories of those repatriated Hungarians who have survived 
their torturous lives in the "Soviet Paradise." They dream about it, they 
re-live their tormented and hopeless experiences repeatedly, they are often 
awakened by nightmares from their sleep, and it is this arousal that makes 
their lives bearable. Those who survived the camps, returned to Hungary, 
and then lived on to see the collapse of communism and the end to 
Hungary's Soviet military occupation gave us a detailed description of 
their march into captivity. 
Their collection was done by Russian soldiers directed by Hunga-
rian collaborators, known in common language as "polic," who performed 
their task with considerable brutality. They shouted and used their rifle 
butts to gain the compliance of the unfortunate prisoners, and many times 
they were more vicious than the Soviet occupiers themselves.55 
The situation was very similar to what happened to the Hungarian 
Jews only a few months earlier. A number of the deportees to the Gulag 
recognized this similarity immediately and made known their views as 
soon as they could. Mihaly Zoldi, for example, who ended up on the 
Gulag as a malenky roboter, had this to say about this parallel situation: 
"When in 1944 we as paramilitary forces [levente] were ordered by the 
gendarmerie to guard the unfortunate Jewish families [who were being 
deported], none of us thought that within a short time we too will be in 
the same situation.... Neither they, nor we were guilty. It was the law and 
human viciousness that was guilty."56 
Some of the cattle cars were equipped with berths on both sides, 
and they generally crammed sixty persons into a wagon. Both sides had to 
accommodate thirty persons. In the middle there was a wooden stove with 
some pieces of wood. The bottom of the wagon had a hole which served 
as the toilet. There were no possibilities for cleansing oneself. Drinking 
water was stored in a standing barrel, but most of the time there was 
hardly any water in it. Moreover all of the doors were locked, and there-
fore there was very little possibility for escape. Yet, there were still some 
who tried, and a very few who actually succeeded. 
Failed escape attempts were followed by brutal punishments, and 
successful escapes, by replenishment. The numbers had to match. If three 
people escaped then three new ones were caught to replace them. Follow-
ing an escape, the Russian guards began to replenish the vacancies even 
before the train resumed its journey. As related by Imre Kolozsi, after a 
successful escape by two prisoners, the Russians "caught two men on the 
station and threw them into the wagons. One of them was thrown into our 
car. His name was Asztalos and he was a railroad man, who was just 
leaving for home. For many days the unfortunate man could not really 
believe what happened to him."57 
Another case was described by Mrs. Ferenc Vojto, nee Ilona 
Vinnai, in her reminiscences: 
I witnessed a dreadful incident in the vicinity of a train station. 
We did not reach the village yet and our train was standing at a 
railroad crossing. On the other side of the barrier stood a 
horse-drawn wagon... with a driver and his young son. The 
driver must have been about thirty-six or thirty-eight, his son 
about thirteen or fourteen. A Russian soldier ran over to them, 
yanked them off the wagon, and shoved both of them into one 
of the cattle cars. It was terrible to listen to the hysterical 
screams of the man who shouted: 'Take me anywhere you 
want, I don't care, but let the boy go so that he can drive the 
wagon home. My wife will never know what happened to us.' 
They did not heed his plea, but took them away. The train 
started to roll. I looked back as long as I could, and I saw the 
two horses standing there stock still, without their master. They 
did not move at all. The wife would have to wait in vain. 
Except for us, there were no eyewitnesses.5tl 
The long weeks of travel in the cattle cars made all of the deport-
ees very nervous. Many of them were unable to survive the tribulations 
and died on the way. They suffered from being confined to a tight space, 
from the inability to move, from lice and other vermin, and from hunger 
and thirst. But from among all these sufferings, the constant and unending 
thirst was by far the worse. They rarely received water, and when they 
did, it was never enough. They tried to quench their thirst by removing 
snow from the roof of the wagons and then eating it. As described by one 
of the survivors, "those who were close to a windows and had long arms 
would reach out between the barbed wires and collect snow from the roof 
of the wagon. We would snatch it, gobble it up, devour it, and also pass 
it from hand to hand, because it was impossible to change places."59 
This long travel, which in case of the malenky robotsrs lasted 
three to four weeks, and in case of the political prisoners, who were taken 
to Eastern Siberia, perhaps as much as eight weeks, wore the deportees 
down. A significant number of them were unable to take the horrors of 
the deportation and died on the way. 
These slave labour transports are described by the Soviet writer 
Gennadi Beglov, who spent nine years in one of the Gulag's Siberian 
forced labour camps. On one occasion he was present when a new trans-
port arrived. He watched as the guards, equipped with machine guns and 
fierce dogs, flooded out of the lead wagon to unlock the cattle cars to let 
the prisoners out. The convicts who exited slowly were more dead than 
alive, but at least they still lived. When the guards reached the sixth 
wagon, however, no one emerged. Upon inspecting it, they realized that 
all of the prisoners were dead. They were frozen together in groups of 
three or four. Apparently, in trying to protect themselves against the 
Siberian cold, they cuddled and then froze together like blocks of ice.60 
Life in the Gulag Camps 
The lifestyle, surroundings, and living and working conditions of the 
workers in the forced labour camps were as diverse as the camps them-
selves. These conditions depended on the camp's geographical location, 
nature of the work that inmates performed, climatic conditions, as well as 
on the composition of the camp leadership. Political prisoners sent to 
Vorkuta, Norlinsk, or to one of the Kolyma camps in Northern and 
Eastern Siberia faced conditions that were far different from those en-
countered by the malenky robotsrs in Eastern Ukraine and the Don region. 
Work requirements and daily quotas were very high. A normal 
workday consisted of twelve hours, but occasionally it was pushed up to 
fourteen. This heavy workload, combined with such other factors as 
"inhuman treatment, constant hunger, inappropriate clothing, dismal living 
conditions, and not the least, the merciless and forbidding climate, 
claimed its victims steadily in ever increasing numbers."61 But this created 
no problems for the camp administrators, for they were assured of a 
constant flow of new prisoners. "Replacements were assured by the 
incessantly functioning state security organs, people's courts, and military 
tribunals. By turning nights into days in political show trials, based on 
false accusations, they were handing down arbitrary and severe sentences 
at the victims' expense."62 This is how many tens of thousands of Hungar-
ians also ended up in the Gulag. They were convicted by Soviet military 
tribunals on various trumped-up charges and then sent to Soviet slave 
labour camps for ten to twenty-five years. 
The prisoners' chances of staying alive depended to a large degree 
on the type of work they were forced to perform. Much greater were the 
chances of survival for those who were employed in agriculture or in 
manufacturing in the more civilized parts of the Soviet Empire. This was 
just the opposite for those who were taken to remote Siberian lands and 
forced to clear forests, build railroad lines, or mine gold in far northern 
Vorkuta or far eastern Kolyma. There the temperature would often dip 
down to minus 60 degrees centigrade. Minus 36 was normal for much of 
the year, when the prisoners were routinely marched out for work. During 
the daily marches many of them collapsed and then froze to death without 
anyone caring until the next thaw in the summer. 
A few years ago the British writer, Colin Thubron, travelled 
through Siberia to visit some of the former forced labour camps that since 
have been abandoned and are in various stages of decay. He wrote about 
his experiences in his book entitled In Siberia.63 After visiting the far 
eastern province of Kolyma, he described his experiences as fo l lows: 
This country of Kolyma was fed every year by sea with tens of 
thousands of prisoners, mostly innocent. Where they landed, 
they built a port, then the city of Magadan, and then the road 
inland to the mines where they perished.... People still call it 
the 'Road of Bones.'.... They called Kolyma 'the Planet', 
detached from all future, all reality beyond its own.... Bit by bit 
they [the prisoners] they were reduced to savages, famished 
and broken. They became the animals that the authorities had 
decreed them to be.... They descended into the walking dead, 
who lingered about the camp on depleted rations, then slipped 
into oblivion.... Young men became old within a few months.... 
They were tossed into mass graves.64 
In Vorkuta Colin Thubron visited and explored the remains of a 
number of mining places, and then he recorded his impressions: 
Then we reached the shell of Mine #17, Here, in 1943, was 
the first of Vorkuta's katorga [hard labour] death-camps. Within 
a year these compounds numbered thirteen out of Vorkuta's 
thirty: their purpose was to kill their inmates. Through winters 
in which the temperature plunged to -40 F, and the purga 
blizzards howled, the kathorzhane [prisoners in hard labour 
camps] lived in lightly boarded tents sprinkled with sawdust, on 
the floor of mossy permafrost. They worked for twelve hours a 
day, without respite, hauling coal-trucks, and within three 
weeks they were broken. A rare survivor described them turned 
to robots, their grey-yellow faces rimmed with ice and bleeding 
cold tears. They ate in silence, standing packed together, seeing 
no one. Some work-brigades flailed themselves on a bid for 
extra food, but the effort was too much, the extra too little. 
Within a year 28,000 of them were dead. A prisoner in milder 
times encountered the remnant of the hundreds of thousands 
who were sentenced between 1943 and 1947. They had sur-
vived, he said, because they were the toughest — a biological 
elite — but were now brutalised and half-insane.65 
Thubron continues his description of the Vorkuta's infamous slave 
labour camps: 
Then I came to a solitary brick building enclosing a range of 
cramped rooms. The roof was gone, but the iron-sheathed 
timbers of their door-frames still stood, and their walls were 
windowless. 
There were isolation cells. Solzhenitsyn wrote that 
after ten days' incarceration, during which the prisoner might be 
deprived of clothing, his constitution was wrecked, and after 
fifteen he was dead.... I stumbled into a quagmire curtained by 
shrubs, and waded out again.... I began to imagine myself here 
fifty years ago. What would I have done? But knowing how 
physical depletion saps the will, the answer returned: You 
would have been no different from anyone else.66 
When saying good-bye to the ruins of Vorkuta, Thubron encoun-
tered a rock, on which was written: "I was exiled in 1949, and my father 
died here in 1942. Remember us."67 How many innocent prisoners must 
have had similar thoughts, and how many must have whispered the same 
words, without anyone hearing or caring for their sighs? They all died far 
away from their loved ones in that hell on earth. In most instances not 
even their names are know. And among them were tens of thousands of 
Hungarians, who also died thousands of miles away form their homeland 
and their weeping families. 
Sickness and the medical support system 
The primitive living conditions, the inadequate portions of food, and the 
exacting and oppressive working conditions, soon lead to the deterioration 
of the prisoners' physical conditions. Many of them died already during 
the first month of their incarceration. In addition to the demanding work 
and the constant hunger, most of them died by contracting typhus, malaria 
or scurvy. Frequent beatings and equally frequent industrial accidents 
caused many wounds and sores, which almost invariably resulted in 
untreatable infections. Many of them became victims of the ever present 
mine mishaps, landslides, workplace accidents, as well as being frozen to 
death. 
Many of the "camp doctors" were not really full-fledged physi-
cians. They acquired their medical skills either by working in hospitals, or 
by having been medical students at the time of their arrest. These captive 
"camp doctors" were generally highly regarded even in the forced labour 
camps. In many instances the fate, and even the life of a prisoner de-
pended on their kindness or willingness to help. If they decided to 
assigned a prisoner to the "hospital," this decision usually meant a tempo-
rary relief from the life-exacting mine work, and at the same time an 
increased hope for survival. 
As an example, Gusztav Menczer, the immediate past President of 
the General Directorate of the Central Office of Compensation in Buda-
pest, was among the elite of such "camp doctors." When convicted to 
hard labour in Siberia, he was a fourth year medical student at the 
University of Budapest. During his eight years as a Gulag prisoner he 
lived in about half a dozen forced labour camps, but his medical knowl-
edge always elevated him above the common prisoners. And he used his 
privileged position to help other prisoners, many of whom found them-
selves in desperate situations, at times even close to death.68 
To a lesser degree, this was also true of George Bien, who was 
arrested with his cardiologist father at the age of sixteen-and-a-half. Al-
though he was too young to have finished even high school, by virtue of 
having been a physician's son, he eventually landed a position that made 
him into a ' f e ld sher" [medical orderly] and thus a virtual "camp doctor." 
After this fortunate turn of events, his position improved significantly. He 
was even permitted to grow his hair and his mustache. Naturally, he too 
was in a position to help some of the less fortunate inmates of his camp.69 
Although most "camp doctors" were decent and helpful people, 
there were a number among them who were cruel and vicious. Among 
them was a certain Lorand Endrei from the provincial Hungarian town of 
Cegledbercel. He was generally known among the camp inmates as "Len-
ci doktor" or "Dr. Lenci." According to the malenky roboter Janos 
Kohlmayer, 
we were treated by a doctor who didn't know the difference 
between diarrhea and arthritis. He was form this town of 
Cegledbercel. He used to be a stretcher-bearer before becoming 
a coach polisher.... He was the camp's chief doctor. He was 
also the one who admitted one [to the hospital]. If he felt like 
it, he hospitalized you, if he didn't feel like it, he chased you 
away. It made no difference how sick you were, he drove you 
off to work.... This Dr. Lenci... one day made a visit to my 
hospital bed and ascertained that I am not alive any more. He 
declared me dead. He also had me put into the collection ditch, 
next to five or six bodies. He had me thrown into their midst.... 
I did not feel anything... because I was unconscious.... Next day 
came the cadaver collectors with their dump truck to take the 
dead to their final resting place.... They were dragging the 
bodies around, but than one of them... shouted: This man is still 
alive, he is breathing!70 
This is how Janos Kohlmayer was saved from being buried alive as a 
result of "Dr. Lenci's" medical incompetence. 
Havoc perpetrated by criminals in the labour camps 
With very few exceptions, life of the unfortunate Gulag prisoners was 
living hell. They had to struggle and strive for everything to say alive. As 
described by Janos Rozsas, 
Every working day was filled with quarrels, altercations, often 
accompanied by violence. To this must be added the fact that 
the overseers designated by the camp command were usually 
ruthless slave-drivers. In order to retain their privileged posi-
tions, they forced the half-dead prisoners to fulfil the norms. 
Life in the forced labour camps was made even worse by the 
fact that until the 1950s political prisoners were mixed in with 
the common criminals, such as gangsters, robbers and murder-
ers. Political prisoners were placed at the mercy of these 
criminal elements. They freely took their fellow prisoners' 
garments, cheated the peaceful inmates out of their food, and 
even forced the latter to work in their place to fulfil the norm.71 
Common criminals included several layers, from the Mafia-like 
professional felons to the small-time pickpockets. But these two groups 
together made up only a small portion of the so-called "common crimi-
nals." Actually, most of the latter were convicted for "crimes" that would 
hardly have been categorized as such in the Western World. Thus, there 
were some who were given five years of hard labour for having been late 
to work on a number of occasions. Some received six years because need 
compelled them to steel some clothing or a pair of shoes at the bazaar. 
Others were convicted to seven to ten years for having appropriated a 
couple of bottles of wine or a few loaves of bread during store deliveries. 
Still others were convicted for having stolen a few pencils and some 
writing paper from the offices where they worked. These were the types 
of "felons" who constituted the largest segment of the "criminal elements" 
in the forced labour camps. Naturally, they had little to do with the above 
mentioned Mafia-like professional felons, robbers and murderers. 
The various criminal groups functioned under their own acknowl-
edged leaders, and they could be identified by the diverse identification 
marks on their bodies. These professional criminals conducted virtual 
haunting expeditions against the defenceless political prisoners. They took 
away the latter's best clothing and shoes, they robbed them of their food 
rations, and they also took the largest share of the gift packages sent to 
them by their families. At the same time they refused to work, but forced 
their less fortunate fellow prisoners to work in their place. Anyone who 
resisted, was beaten, maimed, or even killed mercilessly. 
Janissaries of the Forced Labour Camps 
Ruthless brigade leaders generally came from the ranks of those inmates 
who were willing to prostitute themselves by collaborating with the Gulag 
authorities, and thus become sukis or bitches. They were present in 
virtually all of the camps. This was recalled, among others, by Henrik 
Pfaffenbiichler who was picked up as a malenky roboter in the latter part 
of 1944. Soviet camp commandants "always found people who were 
willing to carry out their orders. They were sadists, who would beat us 
regularly. Most of them came from Romania, from among the Saxons, but 
there were also some Czechs. I never encountered a Hungarian."72 
This view is counterbalanced by the camp experiences of Rozsa 
Nagy, who was collected and deported to the Soviet Gulag at the meagre 
age of fourteen. She remembers that denunciations to and collaborations 
with camp authorities "was a very widespread phenomenon."73 There were 
many who for more food or better treatment were willing to squeal on 
their fellow prisoners. As an example, Rozsa herself was denounced by 
her Russian brigade leader — who was serving a fifteen-year sentence in 
the Gulag — for smuggling a letter from the camp for one of her fellow 
prisoners. 
The traitors or so-called Janissaries, who were willing to join the 
ranks of the torturers of the Gulag prisoners, also appeared in the ranks of 
the malenky robote rs who had been collected and deported from the 
Upper Tisza Region of Hungary. One of the worse among them was a 
certain Transylvanian woman, who had married someone in the village of 
Bocs, from where she was take to the Gulag. In Imre Kolozsi's reminis-
cences she is depicted as a horribly cruel and brutal person, who appeared 
to enjoy torturing others. Within the camp this vicious Hungarian woman 
from Transylvania was appointed an overseer and then joined her Roma-
nian lover by the name of Korushchuck to torment the camp inmates. She 
placed her female victims into a partially water-filled small concrete den, 
where they were "kept for days without food and drink, standing in the 
water in their undergarments This woman from Bocs and her Roma-
nian lover devised various methods of torture beyond one's imagina-
tion."74 
This also holds true for a certain Juci Schubert, allegedly a Slovak 
girl from the Nyi'rseg region of Hungary, whose name is remembered by 
all of those who had been tortured by her, but who managed to survive. 
In Imre Kolozsi's words, "the Romanian man, the woman from Bocs, and 
the Slovak girl, these three were the terror of the camp. They were not 
satisfied with constantly harassing and beating the prisoners. Some of 
them were punished by being placed into the disinfectant room with 
temperatures above 100 degrees. By the time they were removed, most of 
them were dead."75 
Kolozsi also related the case of a Polish escapee who was brought 
back to the camp and then tortured to death by this infamous trio: "It was 
difficult to speak with him, his face and his mouth were scarred every-
where. Within two or three weeks he escaped once more, but they caught 
him again. They brought him back to the camp that same night. Then 
they began to torture him under the stairs. They beat him and pounded 
him repeatedly. By next morning he was dead.... His liver had been 
kicked to pieces."76 
The activities of this vicious trio remained embedded in the 
memory of many other Gulag prisoners. Among them was Margit 
Rozgonyi (later Mrs. Lajos Gulyas), who enumerated many of the 
methods of torture employed by these inhuman Janissaries against their 
fellow prisoners. On one occasion, for example, they caught Margit Suller 
from the town of Rakamaz, while she was trying to escape. Upon recap-
ture, "she was placed in a pit and doused with cold water. Then she was 
forced to walk barefoot in the snow."77 In another instance, Istvan 
Kovacs, who also escaped, hoping to return to his wife and his six 
children, "was beaten to death right in front of us by these mad dogs."78 
The prisoners had to line up and were forced to witness his torture. The 
torturers were again the above mentioned threesome: "The red headed 
Juci [Schubert], beautiful Rozsika [woman from Bocs], and her [Roma-
nian] lover. They were indeed a horrendous threesome."79 
Mrs. Peter Schmidt from the Transdanubian town of Feked also 
recalled one of these vicious Janissaries. He was a lame man from Becs-
kerek, whose name began with the letter K. 
He was much worse than the Russians, for the latter generally 
did not hurt us.... [This man] always carried a rubber baton and 
he would use it to [beat us]. [On one occasion] a young boy 
from the town of Bikal, who had been working in the woods, 
fell asleep. The rest of the workers came back, but the boy did 
not. They assumed that he had escaped.... Then they found him. 
All of us had to stand in the courtyard. The Russian officer was 
also there. But he only stood there, while [the lame man from 
Becskerek] beat the boy. He pounded him until the boy died.... 
He beat him to death right in front of us.X() 
There were some prisoners who tried to escape even though they 
knew that being caught would mean certain death. But such attempts were 
seldom successful. And when they were, this could only happen in the 
Don region. To escape from Eastern Siberia was absolutely impossible. 
One of our interviewees, Magdolna Rohr, related such an escape attempt. 
After collecting a large supply of food two men decided to escape. Given 
the terrain and the climate, they were only able to reach a nearby forest, 
where they got stuck and could not continue. There they consumed all 
the food they had, and then one of them ate the other. (We don't know 
whether the "food" was killed first, or simply died before being con-
sumed.) After having eaten his friend, except his head, the remaining 
escapee had no choice but to return to the camp and give himself up. 
Upon doing so, he was taken back to their hiding place, where he was 
forced to pick up the frozen head of his colleague and carry it around in 
the camp to show to the others what happens to one who tries to escape. 
Magdolna Rohr did not know the ultimate fate of this "cannibal," but we 
can safely presume that he too was executed.81 
Another case of such an escape was described by an American-
born Armenian girl, who, upon visiting some of her relatives in Soviet 
Armenia, was accused of spying and sent to a Gulag forced labour 
camps. She spent five years there, before — following Stalin's death — 
she was permitted to return to the United States. She recalled an incident 
when upon being recaptured, two escapees were thrown to a pack of wild 
dogs. As she recalled: "They were torn to pieces by the dogs, and human 
flesh was being scattered all over the place. We were forced to stand 
there and watch their torturous death so as to put all thoughts of escape 
out of our minds."82 
Of course, occasionally even these vicious and treacherous 
Janissaries tended to stumble and ended up in the same place as their 
former victims. 
Compassionate Overseers — Humane Russians 
While life in the Gulag was cruel, occasionally one did encounter com-
passionate camp overseers and humane Russian citizens. Such a humane 
commander was a certain Russian Jew by the name of Milligram, who 
had been a military officer before being appointed camp commander in 
the Donbass region of Russia. According to Imre Kolozsi, "he was a most 
decent and most humane [commandant] in the camp.... We still speak of 
him with respect and reverence."83 
When becoming aware that some of the prisoners were very 
weak, Milligram would generally remove them from the mines and send 
them to a collective farm, where they would live and work under much 
better conditions. Their diet was also improved significantly. When he 
was informed about the cruelness and viciousness of the above-mentioned 
threesome, he ordered an inquiry. The result was that Korushchuck and 
another Romanian "war criminal" was sent off for ten years to Siberia.84 
The interviewee did not know what happened to the two women, his 
bestial cohorts. 
Based on the above, it is evident that the former prisoners who 
managed to stay alive returned to their homeland burdened with oppres-
sive memories. These memories, however, were attached to forced labour 
camps, to the cruel and inhuman prison guards, to their equally insensitive 
commanders, and to the above-described Janissaries who sponged off 
their unfortunate fellow prisoners, and not to the Russian people them-
selves. 
The situation was totally different with the simple folk of the 
countryside, who were almost as hungry and almost as badly off as the 
prisoners in the Gulag camps. Of course, because of their initial inability 
to communicate with the deportees, and because of the vicious propa-
ganda they were fed night and day, most of the locals viewed the inmates 
as "murderous Fascists." But as soon as the prisoners learned enough 
Russian to make themselves understood, and were able to explain how 
they ended up in the Soviet Union, their relationship changed. Hate 
suddenly turned into compassion and the desire to help. Naturally, this 
was true only in regions where the Gulag camps were located close to 
human settlements. Such relationships were impossible on the frigid Sibe-
rian steppes, without any human habitation. As remarked by historian 
Tamas Stark, "the majority of the reminiscences emphasize the benevolent 
and generous nature of the Russian people."85 
Testimonials to the humanity of the Russian people in the remi-
niscences of former Gulag prisoners are almost as frequent as references 
to the inhuman actions of cruel overseers and brutal Janissaries. Janos 
Rozsas, for example, dedicated a whole volume to Sister Dusya, who 
protected him and nurtured him back to health. It was her care that made 
it possible for Rozsas to survive, to see his homeland again, and to write 
about his Gulag experiences. Rozsas regards Sister Dusya as his "guardian 
angle" and his "saviour," whose real identity he was never able to learn.86 
All these reminiscences point to the fact that human beings are 
the same everywhere. Every nation harbours good and humane individu-
als, as well as villains and scoundrels. Given the above, one can hardly 
deny that in Russia and the Soviet Union — like everywhere else — the 
problem was and is not with the people, but always the political system. 
And it was completely irrelevant whether the system was headed by a 
"holy" czars or an "infallible" communist dictator. 
Women on the Soviet Gulag 
About one-third of the deportees — at least those from the Upper Tisza 
Region — were women. This is how the deportees themselves remember 
it. This ratio was probably also true for those convicted of various 
political crimes.87 
The majority of the women deportees were between sixteen and 
twenty-five years of age. Naturally, after their unexpected arrest by the 
Soviet forces they were even more frightened than the men. After all, in 
their case there was also the possibility of being raped. And even though 
this was not very common among the malenky robots rs, it did happen, 
particularly among the political prisoners.88 
During the process of deportation all sorts of wild stories were 
spread, which frightened the women even more. By the time they reached 
Focsani [Foksani] in Moldavia (Romania) it was widely believed that the 
reason they were being deported was that they should give birth to little 
Russians. "There is a need for many women" — so the story went — 
"because many Russians have died and women are essential to give birth 
to children." This is how one of the survivors recalled it. Upon hearing 
this story "everyone of us began to cry," even though we thought it 
"impossible that such a thing could take place."89 Fortunately, this rumour 
turned out to be completely false. 
Upon reaching the destination camps, all prisoners were subjected 
to disinfection and depilation. This really caused panic among the women: 
They grudgingly agreed to the shearing of their heads, but 
further depilation could only be carried out after a hand to hand 
combat. Women also protested violently against the shearing of 
their locks.... Thereafter all women were lined up... and were 
given injections to stop their menstruations.... The reason 
behind this act was the belief that these 'Fascists' were brought 
here to work.... And because this was a joint camp, they could 
not discount the possibility of sexual relations. Women were 
therefore injected to prevent the possibility of child births.90 
Others believe that something was mixed into their food, which sopped 
their menstruations. It is possible that in certain instances Soviet authori-
ties may have mixed something into the food of the female prisoners, but 
most women claim that they were given injections. They were all very 
much afraid of this treatment, because they feared that it may destroy 
their ability of ever having children. 
There were those who felt the negative effect of these injections 
already while in camp. Some of the side effects of this treatment included 
skin rashes and severe blisters. Among them was Erzsebet Pasztor, the 
future Mrs. Joseph Turko, whose body was covered with large, ugly and 
painful boils, especially under her arms. And these boils lasted for many 
weeks.91 
The same story was repeated by Magdolna Rohr, but she also 
added that the depilation of women was always performed by men, while 
the depilation of men was done by women. This was a horrendous 
experience for them, because they all had been reared with traditional 
ethical values. And this open violation of their modesty made their lives 
even more miserable than it already was by virtue of their deportation and 
incarceration. 
After a while a number of children were born in the Gulag camps, 
but almost exclusively to women, who were already pregnant at the time 
of their arrest and deportation. There is the case of Mrs. Frigyes Muszbek, 
nee Maria Szloboda, who was in her fifth month at the time of when she 
was taken to the Gulag, where she gave birth to a little girl.93 Meanwhile, 
Soviet authorities realized that they could not expect much work from 
pregnant women and breast-feeding mothers. As a result, a few weeks 
after the birth of these babies, they were collected and sent home. 
There were thirteen young mothers and thirteen babies who began 
their repatriation to Hungary on October 20, 1945. The conditions of their 
travel, however, were such that there was little hope that most of the 
babies would make it home. As a result of malnutrition, most mothers had 
very little milk. And the unheated cattle cars were hardly fit to house 
newborn babies. 
Diapering took place by removing one rag from under them, 
putting another soiled rag back that had already dried. We were 
unable to bath them, nor to wash them. We were tearing apart 
whatever rags we had so as to prevent them from being kept in 
wet rags in the unheated wagons. Meanwhile we hardly ate 
anything.... The mothers' milk went dry. It became less and 
less. Our children slowly withered away..., and at the end they 
died of hunger.94 
The unhappy mothers were forced to see the dying off of their 
children, one after the other; and also witness when the guards would toss 
their little corpses upon the snowy Russian prairie next to the railroad 
tracks. At the end, of the original thirteen babies only two remained alive. 
There is another fact that has to be mentioned about female 
prisoners: They survived in much greater numbers than the male prison-
ers. This phenomenon was partially the result of the fact that women's 
bodies are tougher, because they are built to withstand the tortures of 
child birth. But at least of equal importance was the fact that in the Gulag 
camps all food portions were of equal size. Thus, it was the heavier and 
larger individuals who suffered most from the lack of food. Being consis-
tently underfed, they were the ones who perished first. Those with smaller 
bodies — be they women or men with small frames — had a much 
greater chance to survive. 
Repatriation and Reception at Home 
As noted earlier, those who survived the vicissitudes of the Gulag were 
repatriated in several waves. Most of the malenky robotsrs returned after 
three years toward the end of 1947 or early 1948. Political prisoners, 
however, were repatriated only in the years following Stalin's death in 
1953. Of course, there were exceptions in both instances. Some of the 
former returned only in 1950, while some of the latter as late as 1960. 
The desire to return home was so great among the prisoners that 
often they did not even feel the vicissitudes of the return voyage. They 
only wanted to be at home with their families. The great expectation and 
joy of repatriation, however, turned sour immediately upon reaching the 
borders of Hungary. 
Hungarian communist authorities received them not as innocent 
victims of an oppressive political system, but as criminals who deserved 
everything that had been meted out to them. And the nature and tone of 
this reception accompanied them throughout their lives, right up to the 
collapse of communism, and in some instances even beyond that date. 
Following their return the former Gulag prisoners were officially 
chastised, given a few forints — from five to thirty, depending on year 
and the circumstances of their return — and then sent home. There were 
many who upon reaching home found a house occupied by strangers, with 
their own family members gone. During their absence, some parents and 
spouses died, while others went insane,95 Still others were declared 
Germans [Volksdeutsche] and then summarily deported to West Germany. 
There were also those who found a new partner, and even had children 
with their new spouses. 
This was the direct result of the fact that the Gulag prisoners had 
not been able to correspond with their families for many years. Thus, with 
the passing of years — especially in the case of the convicted political 
prisoners who spent ten or more years in the Gulag — their wives or 
husbands presumed them to be dead. After a number of years they wanted 
some security and some order in their lives. According to the law it was 
the wife who now had to decide with whom she wanted to spend the rest 
of her life. But it was usually the returned prisoner who solved the 
problem: He left and disappeared from the life of the family.96 
Another problem faced by the returned Gulag prisoners was that 
most of them came home with various sicknesses and maladies. They 
received no help from Hungarian communist authorities. In fact, it was 
even difficult for them to get and to hold on to a job. They were viewed 
and treated as dangerous criminals. In many instances the only solution 
for them was to leave their native village or town, relocate to a major 
city, and then try to conceal their past and their true identity. 
Above and beyond this, however, the worse thing from a psycho-
logical point of view was that they could not speak about their horrendous 
experiences. They had to keep everything within themselves. They were 
even denied the possibilities of a spiritual catharsis that would have taken 
place had they been able to discuss their sufferings with their family 
members, their friends, and the community at large. They lived in con-
stant fear of being discovered, and they had to suffer the contempt and 
scorn of the country, which had been the object of their dreams through-
out their captivity. 
Some Conclusions 
The tormented life and often excruciating death of the former Gulag 
prisoners — be they malenky roboters or political prisoners — constitutes 
an important, but mostly forgotten chapter in the history of humanity. 
This is a topic that is little known by the average citizen — be he a 
Hungarian or a member of another nation. Therefore, this topic needs to 
be researched, written about, and taught to people within and outside the 
borders of Hungary, as well as in all countries around the world. 
It is true that since the collapse of communism in 1989, an 
increasing number of publications and documentaries have appeared on 
the Gulag. But compared to the coverage of the other great tragedy of the 
twentieth century — the Jewish Holocaust — people still know very little 
about the history of the Soviet Gulag and of its tens of millions of 
prisoners who lived, suffered, and died in the slave labour camps of 
Leninist and Stalinist Russia. In point of fact, we may even conclude that 
we have hardly made any progress in our understanding of this institution 
of mass extermination since 1944, when US Vice President Henry 
Wallace (1888-1965) visited one of the worst and most brutal Soviet 
penal camps in Magadan, and returned to the West "lauding its sadistic 
commander, Ivan Nikishov, and describing Magadan as 'idyllic'."97 Like 
many other intellectuals and politicians of that period — including the 
Irish playwright George Bernard Shaw (1856-1950) — Wallace was also 
blinded by his mistaken adoration of "Uncle Joe," otherwise known as 
Joseph Stalin. 
It is our hope that with time ignorance about the Gulag will 
gradually disappear, and it will be replaced by a deeply felt consciousness 
and knowledge about this horrendous institution of human suffering and 
death. 
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A Sign that Communism Is Not 
an Inevitable Destiny: 
The Revolution and the Churches 
Leslie Laszlo 
It was a totally unexpected turn of events in Budapest on the 23rd of 
October 1956 when a peaceful street demonstration by students turned 
into violent armed confrontation and a full scale revolution. This could 
not have been foreseen by anyone, though the ground was prepared by 
the increasingly bold groups of intellectuals, such as those belonging to 
the Petofi circle, who were taking advantage of the inner turmoil of the 
ruling Communist party. The denunciation of Stalin by his successor 
Nikita S. Khrushchev at the 20th Party Congress shook the hitherto solid 
edifice of Communist dogmas. This led to questioning the Party's immu-
nity of any criticism whether that concerned its disastrous economic 
policies, or any other aspect of its all-encompassing totalitarian rule of the 
country. With the iron discipline slackened there was a chance that the 
pent up desire for radical change, especially among the young university 
students inspired by recent events in neighbouring Poland, would manifest 
itself in mass street demonstrations as it came to pass on the afternoon of 
October 23rd. 
It has to be stated right at the outset that the Churches as institu-
tions had no role either in the intellectual discussions or group formations, 
nor in the actual demonstrations leading to the uprising, or in the 
political-military events that followed. 
Years of Repression 1948-1956 
The reason for this passivity was very simple. In the past the established 
or "historic" Churches in Hungary — the Roman Catholic to which two-
thirds of the population belonged, the Reformed or Calvinist Church and 
the Evangelical or Lutheran Church — all played an important role in 
society and in the political life of the country.1 However, after the Se-
cond World War, the Communist Party, abetted and mightily aided by the 
Soviet occupation forces, waged a relentless ideological war against all 
dissenters, but especially against religion and the Churches, not refraining 
from brute force if necessary, until by 1950 they had achieved total 
control of the country, including the Churches. 
It does not seem to be necessary to recount here the already oft 
described and by now well-known facts of the ruthless confiscation of 
church property, seizure of denominational schools, dissolution of reli-
gious associations, dispersing the members of religious orders, forbidding 
them to work in schools, hospitals and in various charitable institutions, 
persecuting, even imprisoning and in many instances murdering believers, 
both clergy and lay people, for their faithfulness to God and to their 
Church. Equally disastrous was, however, the subversion, the fostering of 
internal corruption and division within the churches, using intimidation, 
physical/mental torture, blackmail, to achieve this end.2 
Needless to say, all this did not go unchallenged. There was fierce 
resistance. The most notable fighter for the freedom of religion and of the 
Churches was Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty, archbishop of Esztergom, 
Prince-Primate of Hungary.3 This man of steel stood unbendingly by his 
principles, denouncing all abuses of power in frequently issued pastoral 
letters and at mass rallies that attracted hundreds of thousands. For many 
Hungarians, I would dare to say, for the majority of the population, he 
became a national hero, the symbol of resistance to Soviet domination, to 
Communist ideology and politics. Naturally, for the Communists he 
became their bete noir, their arch-enemy. In the government media they 
depicted him as the most vicious foe of the working people, accusing him 
of espionage and treason on behalf of the Vatican and the Western 
"imperialists". The communist-led trade unions brought the workers to the 
street clamouring for the head of Mindszenty. In spite of all the attacks 
the cardinal stood his ground. His fate was sealed: he was to be silenced, 
eliminated. Arrested on Christmas 1948, he was condemned on trumped 
up charges for life imprisonment in February 1949. Similar fate awaited 
many other priests and religious individuals who refused to be silenced 
but spoke up in defense of faith and justice and continued to give reli-
gious instruction to children and youth even after this had been forbidden. 
The Reining in of the Protestant Churches 
To establish control over the Protestant Churches was made easier by two 
factors. Firstly, unlike the Papacy for the Catholics, the Protestants lacked 
a central authority residing abroad, thus outside of the reach of the Com-
munists, and secondly, the large number of lay people in important 
positions of the governing bodies could be easier influenced and manipu-
lated, because of their family, jobs, etc., than the celibate clerical leaders 
of the Catholics. This is not to say that the Protestant Churches submitted 
willingly. In fact, there was much resistance on their part too when the 
Communist seized their schools, their press and dissolved their associa-
tions and interfered with their internal affairs, such as the elections of 
their clerical and lay officials. However, the regime was determined to 
ruthlessly remove any obstacle in the way of its goal of establishing total 
domination over society as a whole, that included the Churches as 
primary targets. 
On April 28, 1948, the most prominent Protestant leader in 
Hungary, Bishop Laszlo Ravasz, chairman of the Ecumenical Council and 
of the National Synod, was forced to retire and Mr. Andor Lazar, Head 
Curator of the Reformed Ecclesiastical District of Budapest was arrested 
by the political police and forced to resign. Intimidation and brute forced 
was used to effect many similar resignations of the "old guard" who were 
replaced with people more willing to collaborate. The ground having been 
thus prepared, on October 7, 1948 the Government announced that 
agreements were signed with the Reformed Church and also with the 
much smaller Unitarian Church. The agreement with the Evangelical 
Church was concluded somewhat later, on December 16, 1948, after 
Bishop Lajos Ordass and Baron Albert Radvanszky, Supervisor General 
of the Evangelical Church, had been arrested. Both were sentenced to 
prison terms under the pretence of black marketing on October 1, 1948. 
In these "agreements" the leaders of the Protestant Churches pledged 
faithful allegiance to the government, full support of its policies, espe-
cially the collectivization of agriculture, and took upon themselves to 
punish those who would oppose or try to sabotage them. In return the 
state offered financial subsidies for the clergy.4 
The "Agreement" of 1950 with the Catholic Bishops 
It was now the time of the majority Catholic Church "to fall into line". 
The bishops continued to resist, claiming that they could not sign any 
agreement without the consent of the Holy See, i.e. Pope Pius XII. In 
response the government ordered the arrest of all monks and nuns, some 
13,000 in number, many of whom were deported under the cover of night 
to selected monasteries. This was followed by not-so-subtle hints that 
their final destination was to be Siberian forced-labour camps. The 
bishops were faced, on the one hand, with this threat to the most faithful 
sons and daughters of the Church, while on the other hand a vociferous 
group of dissident priests, organized by the Communists in opposition to 
the legitimate hierarchy as "Priests for Peace" demanded that the bishops 
come to the negotiating table in order to achieve peace and harmony in 
church-state relations. Under such pressures the bishops finally gave in 
and concluded an "agreement" with the government on August 30, 1950. 
Just as in the agreements signed previously by the Protestant Churches, 
the Catholic bishops too pledged support for the government and its 
policies and promised punishment for the disobedient. As a reward for 
their good behaviour they were given back eight schools, 6 for boys and 
2 for girls from among the several thousands that the Communist confis-
cated in 1948. Also the state promised to grant financial aid in the form 
of subsidies complementing the lower clergy's salary.5 These agreements 
served as the points of reference for the state authorities in their subjuga-
tion of the churches until the very end of the Communist era in 1989. 
However, when the Churches complained of decrees or actions contrary to 
the texts of the agreements, their grievances were ignored. 
After the Agreements 
Contrary to expectations, the signing of the agreements did little to 
improve the situation. The campaign against the Churches continued. 
While the pressure was on also on the Protestant Churches, several of 
their most prominent leaders and a number of their pastors being replaced 
by government favourites, it was the Catholic Church that was the 
primary target. Four bishops, together with an auxiliary bishop, were 
placed under house arrest. Archbishop Jozsef Grosz of Kalocsa, president 
of the Bishops' Conference at the time and signatory of the Agreement, 
was tried as the leader of an "armed group of conspirators" and sentenced 
to fifteen years imprisonment for "counterrevolutionary activities". Indeed, 
the following years, 1951-1953, marked the nadir in the spoliation and 
debasement of the Churches. The Catholic bishops, under the leadership 
of the more malleable Gyula Czapik, archbishop of Eger, were forced to 
issue a condemnation of Grosz and his high-ranking clerical "accompli-
ces". Then on July 21, 1951, all bishops, diocesan vicars, and the superi-
ors of the remaining religious orders had to repair to the presidential hall 
of Parliament, where in the presence of the highest state dignitaries and 
the clicking cameras, they had to swear an oath on the constitution of the 
People's Republic. Instead of a genuine separation between church and 
state that was proclaimed in the 1949 Constitution, the Churches were 
placed under strict government control. To this end a special department, 
the State Office of Church Affairs was created. Government officials 
(nicknamed "mustached bishops") were placed in every chancery. They 
opened the bishop's mail, checked his visitors and were in possession of 
the diocesan seal. In a decree issued on July 3, 1951, appointments to 
bishoprics and all other church offices of importance was made subject to 
government approval. The bishops were forced to assign members of the 
Priests for Peace movement as their chancellors and to fill all other 
influential positions in their diocese from among the ranks of these 
priests. Moreover the government ordered all minor seminaries, together 
with seven of the thirteen major seminaries, disbanded. 
The regime did not stop with crippling the authority of the duly 
constituted church hierarchy, neither was it satisfied with having reduced 
the activities of the Churches within the confines of the church buildings. 
As soon as it succeeded in silencing the Church as a voice of opposition, 
it applied new pressure to turn the Churches into instruments in the 
service of the Communist cause. Prelates, priests, ministers — with the 
threat of all kinds of harassments, prison and torture hanging over their 
heads — were forced to support the Soviet sponsored peace campaign 
with its anti-Western slogans, while the pastoral letters issued by the 
bishops' chancery, instead of teaching the Gospel, praised the govern-
ment's domestic and foreign policies, pleading for the fulfilment of the 
production quotas in industry and giving instruction to the farmers on 
how best to perform the agricultural tasks of the season. The people 
dubbed these the "manuring pastoral letters" (ganajozo pasztorlevelek").6 
Temporary Respite under Imre Nagy 
This pitiful degradation of all that was sacred in the eyes of the believers 
was somewhat alleviated with the death of Stalin in 1953 and the New 
Course of collective leadership that was imposed by his successors. On 
Soviet orders Hungary's dictatorial ruler, the rigid Stalinist Matyas Rakosi 
too had to share power with a more moderate Communist, Imre Nagy 
who dismantled some of the concentration camps, released many prisoners 
and introduced much needed economic reforms. The gravely ill Cardinal 
Mindszenty was transferred from prison to a less severe confinement 
where he was joined by Archbishop Grosz. The latter, however, was soon 
permitted to move to a parish in his archdiocese and, when Archbishop 
Czapik died in May 1956, Grosz was allowed to return to his see of 
Kalocsa and to resume the presidency of the Bishops' Conference, all this 
while his criminal conviction remained standing. 
Unfortunately, Nagy's tenure as Prime Minister was short lived. 
Due to his heart ailment and the constant intrigues of Rakosi who re-
mained the chief of the Party, and also the changes in the Soviet leader-
ship where his patron Malenkov lost out to Khrushchev, Nagy was forced 
within a year to step down as Prime Minister and was expelled from the 
Party. Rakosi triumphed once again, liberalization ended, the screw was 
tightened over an increasingly desperate and restless population. By June 
1956, seeing the discontent and intellectual fermentation in Budapest that 
affected even the Party, the Soviet leadership decided to remove Rakosi. 
However, his replacement by his crony, Erno Gero — who was even 
more hated, if that was possible, than Rakosi — did not improve the 
situation at all. This was then the situation in October 1956. In the tense 
atmosphere only a spark was needed to ignite the fire. The spark was 
provided by the exciting news coming from neighbouring Poland where 
the leaders of the Party in open defiance of Soviet orders and threats of 
military intervention elected the formerly disgraced Gomulka as their First 
Secretary. 
The Days of the Armed Uprising 
By the time of the outbreak of the revolution the Churches, both the 
Catholic and the Protestant, were in a state of amnesia, totally subjugated, 
their voices effectively silenced. To be sure, the clergy and the faithful 
had felt the pain, the oppression and the discontent even more than the 
religiously indifferent, but by 1956 they were disorganized, atomized, 
isolated, thoroughly intimidated, fearful to voice any opinion. They did 
support the revolution, as the great majority of Hungarians did, but not as 
distinct, organized group or groups. 
Still, there were some remarkable deeds of active involvement of 
the charitable kind, such as by the Piarist fathers in Budapest who gave 
shelter in their college not only to the freedom fighters, but also to the 50 
or 60 captive AVO policemen who were brought over from the nearby 
building of the radio station in the wake of the fierce siege during the 
first night of the Revolt. It was the wise and benign intervention of the 
fathers that prevented a possible ugly massacre. At daybreak both the 
armed revolutionaries and also the prisoners were given some breakfast 
while the rector of the college exhorted both sides to practice Christian 
reconciliation and sent them all home in peace.7 Similarly, the kitchen of 
the Central Theological Seminary in downtown Budapest provided food 
for days to a large group of student freedom fighters who held out in the 
adjacent building of the Faculty of Law. When the building was sur-
rounded by Soviet troops, the seminarians cut an opening in a wall so that 
the students could climb over to the seminary. They were even given 
clerical garb to facilitate their escape through some side doors.8 The 
greatest service that the Churches provided was their pastoral care and 
support of those in need during those infernal days. Catholic priests, 
Protestant ministers, seminarians, members of the disbanded religious 
orders, individually, but also in an organized fashion visited the battle-
fields, the hospitals, caring for the wounded, giving solace to the dying. 
According to their unanimous testimony they were well received every-
where, even though many of the young fighters had never been exposed 
to religion before. 
Just as practically everyone, the leaders of the Churches were 
caught by surprise, totally unprepared how to face the gunfire. Individual 
bishops appealed to their diocesan flock to remain calm, to work for 
reconciliation and the restoration of order. On behalf of the government 
the Minister of the Interior, Laszlo Piros phoned archbishop Grosz, the 
president of the Bishops' Conference, to come to Budapest and help to 
restore order. Grosz did not go, but spoke in a short radio address, asking 
the insurgents to lay down their arms and cease fire. This appeal was 
broadcast on the second day of the revolution, on October 24, 7:17 pm. 
Amidst the embittered fight against the Soviet tanks and the machine guns 
of the hated AVO (the Communist Security Forces) such calls remained 
futile.9 
The Churches' inactivity, seemingly passive behaviour underwent 
a radical change with the arrival on the scene of Cardinal Mindszenty. 
Actually, given his stature and enormous popularity just a few years 
before, it is surprising that during the initial days of the revolution there 
was scant mention of him in the various demands and petitions drawn up 
by the insurgents.10 All that time he was still kept in captivity in a se-
cluded mansion in Felsopeteny, a relatively short distance north of 
Budapest. As he later described in his Memoirs, first he was kept in 
darkness about the goings-on in the outside, but on the 29lh his jailers 
tried to take him to an undisclosed destination, presumably across the 
nearby border to Czechoslovakia. The Cardinal physically resisted their 
efforts, just as he refused the pleas of the head of the State Office of 
Church Affairs who arrived from Budapest to arrange for his transport. 
By late afternoon the villagers of Peteny penetrated the mansion, setting 
him free, while from a nearby base a detachment of the Hungarian army 
offered him their services and on the morning of the 30th they accompa-
nied him on his triumphant return to Budapest. On their way he was 
stopped at every village and town by jubilant crowds, asking for his 
blessing.11 
There was joy in Budapest too, but also some anxiety as to what 
would his message be, into what direction would he influence the still 
fluid political situation. Remembering his uncompromising character, 
there was real fear that Mindszenty would oppose the new government of 
Imre Nagy, a longtime Communist, thus undermining the precarious calm 
and stability that had been achieved after days of fierce fighting.12 To a 
great sigh of relief, while not giving his unconditional approval and 
loyalty to Nagy, he did praise the heroism of the Hungarian people rising 
in revolt. At the same time, he did ask in dignified and measured voice 
for the Church's freedom and for the restoration of its forcibly seized 
institutions.13 
Actually by the time he had the chance to address the nation via 
the radio on Saturday night November 3rd, it was too late to have any 
impact on the course of events. A few hours later, in the early morning of 
November 4th, the Red Army attacked Budapest with overwhelming force. 
Cardinal Mindszenty was forced to flee and took refuge in the sanctuary 
of the U.S. embassy. 
The Soviets then arrested Imre Nagy and his loyal entourage, in 
spite of the safe conduct promised them, and installed their obedient 
puppet Janos Kadar as prime minister of Hungary. 
Thanks to the modern ways of communication, especially the 
television, the events in Hungary were watched by the whole world with 
admiration mixed with horror. There were sympathy demonstrations with 
the Hungarians in Western Europe and the Americas and condemnation of 
Soviet brutality by the United Nations. Pope Pius XII expressed his joy at 
the time of Cardinal Mindszenty's liberation. The joy turned into sorrow 
in his subsequent encyclicals in which he addressed the people of 
Hungary and the world, pleading for freedom and peace for the oppressed 
everywhere.14 
The Impact of the Revolution on the Churches 
As already stated, the Churches as institutions played no active role in the 
armed revolt.15 One can still ask the questions, how did the revolution 
affect them, and in what way did the sudden political changes influence 
their policies. Their first reaction, quite naturally, was to throw off the 
shackles imposed on them by the Communist rulers. Regaining their 
freedom meant first of all an opportunity to put their house in order, to 
cleanse their leadership of the collaborators, the so-called "peace priests" 
who were installed in all churches by the civil, i.e. Communist, authorities 
with no respect for the churches' canonical constitution. One of the first 
acts of Cardinal Mindszenty was the suspension of 11 prominent "peace 
priests" from all their priestly functions, ordering them to take leave of 
Budapest immediately. Even from his subsequent asylum in the U.S. 
embassy, he was still able through instructions to his Episcopal vicar Imre 
Szabo as late as early 1957 to transfer a number of peace priests to 
faraway village parishes. The other diocesan bishops followed the Pri-
mate's example and cleansed their diocese of known collaborators. 
Almost simultaneously Rome also stepped into action and moved against 
the illegally appointed clerics. Thus in January 1957 a further 21 persons 
were removed from their offices of vicar general, or chancellor. In 
another decree in July 1957, the Vatican forbade priests to accept political 
office and ordered those already sitting in parliament to resign within a 
month. In response the Kadar regime suppressed the publication and 
execution of Rome's order, invoking the ancient royal privilege of i'us 
placetum. Upon this Rome excommunicated the three disobedient priest 
deputies of parliament. 
Similar cleansing process was also initiated in the Protestant 
Churches, both in the larger Reformed (Calvinist) Church and in the 
smaller Evangelical (Lutheran) Church there was wholesale resignation, 
voluntary or forced, of the leadership, making place for the return of the 
pre-Communist leaders, or some newly elected ones who had the confi-
dence of the congregations. Thus Bishop Laszlo Ravasz, the leading 
personality of the Reformed Church during the interwar and early post-
war years — but was forced out of office in 1948 and by 1953 had to 
retire into complete silence — was now recalled to reoccupy his formal 
position as the presiding bishop of his church. Similarly Bishop Lajos 
Ordass of the Evangelical Church whose imprisonment in 1950 caused 
world-wide protest, had emerged from isolation and assumed the leader-
ship of his Church again. 
The Aftermath 
One has to remember that while the revolution was effectively crushed by 
the second Soviet attack on Budapest on Sunday, November 4th, after 
which there were only sporadic flare-ups of fighting here and there in the 
capital and in the countryside, still the political situation remained ex-
tremely fluid for weeks. Janos Kadar himself proclaimed to lead a 
government of workers and peasants, different from the previous Rakosi 
regime, and was willing to negotiate with the representatives of the 
Revolutionary Workers' Councils, promising them certain democratic 
reforms in the hope of inducing the striking populace to return to work. 
To placate the Churches and receive their cooperation in the restoration of 
order and stability, certain concessions seemed in order. Thus at the end 
of the year the universally hated State Office of Church Affairs was 
abolished, or rather its functions transferred to a section of the Ministry of 
Education. 
The Churches continued their internal housecleaning and restruc-
turing. The bishops reasserted their rights to govern their dioceses without 
outside interference, the "peace priests" were assigned to jobs where they 
could do no more harm. When on December 18th the President of the 
State Office of Church Affairs, Janos Horvath, visited Archbishop Grosz 
in Kalocsa telling the prelate that his office considers the removal of the 
peace priests "illegal", Grosz explained to him that from the Church's 
point of view their appointments by the civil authority was illegal and that 
they have to obey their bishops. Horvath suggested new negotiations 
between representatives of the Conference of Bishops and delegates from 
the government's side. The archbishop did not object to that, however 
already the next day he informed his fellow bishops about his talk with 
Horvath and set down in eleven paragraphs those demands that the 
Church should insist on should such negotiations take place. These 
included, among others, the freedom of bishops to exercise their authority 
in church governance, unhindered communication with the Holy See, 
restoration of the Catholic press and publishing houses, permission for the 
members of the dispersed religious orders to reassemble and work accord-
ing to their vocation, freedom for religious instruction of children and 
youth, freedom to form religious associations and movements.16 
In the Reformed Church where practically all bishops were 
removed or resigned under the threat of the Revolution, the temporary 
leadership was assumed by a three member team of National Administra-
tive Committee with Bishop Ravasz, Janos Kardos, former Superinten-
dent, and Laszlo Pap, the dean of the reformed theological academy in 
Budapest and the only leading personality of the Church of those years 
who was not tainted with collaboration with the Communists. This 
Committee on November 13th sent a circular letter signed by Ravasz to all 
the congregations nationwide asking them to decide by democratic vote 
whether they wanted to join the Movement of Renewal that was launched 
by the thoroughly cleansed leadership of the Church.17 This Movement 
aimed at reasserting the true mission of evangelization of the Church, to 
that end they demanded the freedom from any kind of political interfer-
ence. Within a short time the great majority of the congregations, more 
than 900 in number indicated their approval of the goals and their enthu-
siastic adherence to the Movement of Renewal. 
It is interesting to note that in the much smaller Evangelical 
Church the movement for greater freedom and independence from politi-
cal interference had predated the Revolution and achieved better results 
than in the larger Reformed Church. Already during the summer months 
of 1956 on various occasions of regional meetings there had been loud 
demands on the part of both the clergy and laity for reform. On October 
9th, i.e. two weeks before the actual outbreak of the Revolution, the senior 
bishop, Lajos Veto, announced that there would be far-reaching reforms 
introduced in the church governance. At about the same time Bishop 
Ordass, in 1948 condemned to prison and in 1950 deprived from his 
office by his Church, was now rehabilitated both by the state and by his 
Church's authorities.18 Ordass decided to resume his teaching at the 
Theological Academy and announced his first lecture for October 24lh. On 
that day gunfire prevented him from lecturing; instead, he was called 
upon to take over the leadership of his Church, since Bishops Veto and 
Laszlo Dezsery resigned in haste. On November 3rd Ordass presided over 
a wide reaching conference where decisions were made regarding the 
cleansing of the Church of the political appointees in the leadership, and 
on launching a new era of stricter adherence to the Church's mission. 
These resolutions were later presented to the congregations and won 
widespread acceptance. 
Revenge and Repression 
Kadar's promises of a new era of greater tolerance, "Socialism with a 
human face", did not last long. Within a few months of the Soviet 
suppression of the Revolution the smooth talk gave way to the policy of 
"iron fist". Waves of arrests, executions, struck terror into the hearts of 
the population, while the structures of the former dictatorship, dismantled 
during the Revolution, were rebuilt once again. Tens of thousands armed 
"Workers Guards" were given military training, while everybody was 
spied upon by the ubiquitous informers. 
The Churches were no exception. Those priests and religious 
persons who had been freed from prison by the "freedom fighters" and 
did not flee the country with the waves of refugees before the borders 
were sealed again, were now re-arrested and incarcerated, soon to be met 
with numerous newly arrested brothers and sisters. Then a most ominous 
Edict was issued in March 1957 which prescribed the need for permission 
from the Ministry of Education for staffing of all church offices, prelates, 
teachers of theology, pastors of parishes, etc., their appointment, transfer, 
removal, etc. This law had a retroactive clause to October 1st, 1956. In 
other words, all those who assumed office in the wake of the Revolution 
could be removed — and this was done during the spring of 1957 — 
while the Churches could not elect or appoint anybody without the 
political authorities who, in fact, were more often than not the initiators of 
the appointments, transfers, etc. 
Finally, in June 1959 the State Office for Church Affairs that was 
never really abolished, only its functions were transferred to another 
ministry, was now reinstituted with all its formal power.19 
Simultaneously with the imposition of control over church admi-
nistration and personnel, a vigorous indoctrination campaign was launched 
with the avowed aim to extirpate religion and inculcate atheism, espe-
cially in the youth. Registration for religious instruction, which in 1957 
embraced 80 and 90 per cent of the pupils in all elementary and high 
schools, was substantially reduced through administrative trickery, cou-
pled with intimidation of students and parents, to under 10 per cent. 
While religious belief was ceaselessly assaulted and the Churches perse-
cuted, the leaders of all religious denominations were called upon to 
praise the Government and thank it for its generosity towards the Chur-
ches — exactly as they were wont to do under the Stalinist regime of 
Maty as Rakosi before the 1956 revolution. The intimidated and by now 
thoroughly conditioned church leaders complied with abject servility. 
They gave public blessing to the forcible collectivization of the country-
side, took active part in the so-called peace campaign, praising the great 
Soviet Union as the defender of peace while denouncing the U.S.A. as an 
aggressive imperialist power. In short, by 1960 the pre-revolutionary 
status quo was fully restored, the Churches were reduced once again to 
impotence and subservience vis-a-vis the government. 
The Search for National Consensus. 
The initial phase of Kadar's attempt to rebuild the shattered Communist 
power structure in Hungary was accompanied by a vicious campaign 
against the "counter-revolutionaries" and "revisionists", culminating in the 
judicial murder of Imre Nagy and his associates in June 1958. This was 
followed by a thorough purge of Stalinist "dogmatists", as the loyal 
followers of the former party boss Rakosi were now labelled. The task of 
crushing both leftist and rightist "deviationists" thus accomplished, his 
enemies out of the way, the workers' councils suppressed, the peasants 
safely locked into the kolkhozes, Janos Kadar, secure in Khrushchev's 
unequivocal support, quite unexpectedly embarked on a new policy of 
national reconciliation, best expressed in his famous slogan first enunci-
ated in December 1961: "Whoever is not against us is with us." 
The "new" Kadar, who now became benignly tolerant toward his 
subjects' ideologically not always correct preferences in tastes and mores, 
was pursuing moderate "centrist" policies and visibly courted popular 
acceptance. The unprecedented freedom permitted artists and intellectuals, 
just as the daring economic innovations under the sign of "goulash 
communism", were designed to make his regime palatable and help 
people to forget its terrible birth amid treachery and blood. 
As an integral part of his policy of achieving a true "socialist 
national unity" Kadar made new peace overtures towards the Churches 
calling for improvement in church-state relations and the solution of all 
outstanding questions "in a mutually acceptable way, namely, with full 
respect for the laws and legal order of the State, but also taking into 
consideration the internal laws and order of the Church."20 A real depar-
ture from earlier practice became manifest when the Hungarian Govern-
ment approached the Vatican offering to negotiate. It should be recalled 
that the last Papal Nuncio to Hungary, Msgr. Angelo Rotta had to leave 
the country on Soviet orders in the spring of 1945, and that the "Agree-
ment of 1950" was forced upon the bishops without allowing them to 
consult the Pope and obtain his consent. Why then this dramatic turn-
around? 
It seems that the regime was prompted towards rapprochement 
with the Vatican by both domestic and foreign policy considerations. On 
the domestic scene Kadar must have realized that any genuine reconcilia-
tion with the Catholic clergy and faithful whose support he was now 
actively seeking would be impossible without papal approval. At the same 
time, parallel with his efforts of gaining popular endorsement for his 
policies at home, Kadar expended great effort to convince the interna-
tional community of his regime's legitimacy. Following the brutal sup-
pression of the 1956 revolution the "Hungarian question" was raised year 
after year in the United Nations, while the validity of the Hungarian U.N. 
delegation's credentials remained in dispute. Western and some Third 
World Governments ostentatiously shunned Hungary in their diplomatic 
dealings. 
At the time when in the neighbouring Communist states the U.S. 
diplomatic missions were raised to the ambassadorial level, the United 
States legation in Budapest was headed by a mere charge d'affaires: a 
pointed reminder of Washington's displeasure with Kadar's Hungary. 
Under such circumstances to open up negotiations with the Church and 
win recognition from the Holy See must have seemed a good way for 
Kadar to show the world that the situation in Hungary had returned to 
normalcy and the regime was gaining international respectability. 
The timing for an attempt of rapprochement was propitious in that 
with the death of Pius XII in 1958 and the election of John XXIII there 
came a certain mellowing of attitudes toward Communism in the Vatican. 
His successor Pope Paul VI sent an emissary, Monsignor Agostino 
Casaroli to Budapest in 1963 to open talks. The negotiations that begun 
with hopeful expectations could proceed only after both sides agreed to 
side-step the issue of the fate of Cardinal Mindszenty who was still 
holding out at the Budapest U.S. embassy and refused to leave Hungary 
without certain conditions he set for the Government.21 In the end, after 
one year and a half of negotiations, a partial agreement was signed on 15 
September 1964, by Monsignor Agostino Casaroli, Under-Secretary of the 
Sacred Congregation of Special Ecclesiastical Affairs, and by Jozsef 
Prantner, Chairman of the State Office of Church Affairs in Hungary. 
This agreement was hailed as a historic breakthrough, since it was 
the first such document between the Vatican and a Communist-ruled state. 
By mutual consent only a part of the document was made public. This 
included, first of all, the appointment of new bishops — an all important 
matter, since at the time only three of the eleven dioceses had ordinaries 
(the rest were Governed by apostolic administrators). Secondly, a section 
of the Hungarian Academy in Rome, housing the Hungarian Papal 
Institute, was once again placed under the jurisdiction of the Hungarian 
Bishops to enable eight priests each year to continue their education in 
Rome. The unpublished part of the document contained a list of problems 
to be discussed in the future. Both sides agreed to meet twice a year, 
alternately in Rome and in Budapest. 
In the follow-up negotiations the Hungarian side continued to 
insist on giving priority to questions of personnel in the apparent hope 
that the new appointees selected jointly by Rome and Budapest would 
more willingly cooperate with the government than the older prelates. 
Between 1946 and 1980 twenty-six persons were appointed as bishops or 
auxiliary bishops. In spite of the fact that these appointments were the 
results of strong arm tactics from the state authorities leading to compro-
mise, the Vatican regarded the restoration of the hierarchical leadership in 
the Church as a step forward. Similarly, the participation of several 
Hungarian bishops in the closing session of the Second Vatican Council 
in 1965 was greeted as a sign of the reintegration of the Hungarian 
Catholic Church into the mainstream of the Universal Church. On the 
other hand, most of the pastoral problems were unresolved and remained 
on the agenda of the seemingly unending series of meetings, about which 
Msgr Casaroli — bishop from 1967, cardinal from 1979 — himself 
admitted that they produced only meagre results.22 He gave his autobi-
ographical account of the negotiations with the Communists states the 
title, The Martyrdom of Patience,23 
The Kadar regime went out of its way in publicizing the newly-
found good entente with the Vatican. Commentators praised the signifi-
cance of the event and pictures showed the papal emissary surrounded by 
happily smiling Government officials. While the Communists thus created 
the impression that the rapprochement with the Church corresponded to 
their most sincere wishes and expressed satisfaction over the successful 
signing of the agreement, that same policy unexpectedly landed them in a 
quandary as to the proper ideological 'line' that could be understood and 
followed by the rank and file of the Party. Apparently there was some 
confusion among the Party cadres, quite a number of whom, seeing the 
Government's friendly gestures toward the Vatican and the Churches, 
accepted the loud pronouncements about the freedom of religion at face 
value and concluded that religion had been 'rehabilitated'; everybody was 
now free to go to church and enroll his child for religious instruction at 
school. An editorial entitled "The Ideological Offensive of Marxism" in 
the monthly Tarsadalmi Szemle (Social Review) took up the cudgel 
against this erroneous view, reminding the readers of the party's contin-
ued commitment to the eradication of religion and to education along 
strictly atheistic lines. In the words of the editorial: 
Recently there has been confusion in some of the party organi-
zations regarding this question. This happened because in some 
places — where they can conceive the fight against religion 
only in a simplistic fashion — they misunderstand the normali-
sation of relations between the State and the Churches, certain 
changes in the Vatican's stand, the recently concluded agree-
ment between our State and the Vatican... This is why the 
conference on ideology deemed it necessary to recall to atten-
tion: religion remains a retrograde world-view also in our days, 
and the ideological fight against religion continues to be the 
daily task in our ideological work.24 
Actually, the regime's response to the challenge of ideological erosion 
was twofold: on the one hand, a stepped up ideological campaign, includ-
ing greater stress on atheistic materialism in all school curricula and, on 
the other hand, a return to terroristic methods against churchmen and 
believers who were bold enough to test the sincerity of the Government's 
policy of religious toleration. In the years following the signing of the 
partial agreement scores of priests were arrested at almost regular inter-
vals and charged with conspiracy. Their trials were invariably held in 
camera, but enough transpired to show that their true "crime" consisted of 
spreading religious views, distributing devotional literature, and having 
given religious instruction for the young "illegally", although this was 
often done at the explicit request and always with the consent of the 
parents. The house searches, arrests and various other harassments of 
priests, seminarians, former monks and nuns, were apparently designed to 
intimidate, to render harmless those who otherwise could become the 
most likely avant-garde of the Church Militant, who would zealously 
proselytize for God and combat atheism. It is significant that, unlike the 
show trials under Rakosi, these post-revolutionary acts of terror received 
but scant publicity. Kadar did not want to create martyrs. The man on the 
street knew only that the Churches supported the Government and in turn 
received money for their sustenance. All they could see was open collabo-
ration, while the moral courage of the persecuted remained behind the veil 
of silence. 
Restoration of the status quo ante in the Protestant Churches 
The Protestant Churches did not fare better. In less than a year the leaders 
of both the Reformed and the Evangelical Churches who were elected 
during the 1956 Revolution were forced to resign and were replaced with 
their discredited predecessors, plus some newer regime favourites. 
The subservience of the Reformed Church to the Communists 
became especially evident in that their bishops played a prominent role in 
the political arena, in Parliament, the Presidential Council, Patriotic 
Peoples Front, National Peace Council, World Union of Hungarians, etc. 
Janos Peter, the leading bishop of the Church, resigned his ecclesiastical 
post and became the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Kadar's Hungary, The 
lower clergy and the congregations were reduced to mute spectators of the 
widely publicized political activities of their bishops. The theology taught 
and practiced has been reduced to the diakonia, i.e. that the Church is 
there to render service to the people in various forms of charitable works. 
No wonder that the post-1956 decades of the life, or rather the lack of 
life, in the Hungarian Reformed Church had been described by an 
observer as being in the state of "frozen immobility" (megdermedt egy-
haz).25 
For a while the much smaller Evangelical Church experienced less 
interference in its internal affairs. In the summer of 1957 they even 
received permission to send a six member strong delegation to the Fifth 
Lutheran World Conference in Minneapolis where Bishop Lajos Ordass 
was asked to give the opening address on August 16. He choose to preach 
about the seed that has to be buried in the earth in order to bear fruit. (Jn. 
12, 24). On the last day of the Conference Ordass was elected into the 
Executive Committee of this world-wide organization. This did not 
prevent the Communists to find ways to side-line Ordass and, after 
various devious manoeuvres, force him into complete retirement and 
silence.26 This happened in November 1958, two years after Soviet troops 
crushed the Revolution. The Gleichschaltung of the Christian Churches of 
Hungary was now complete. 
The End Years of the Babylonian Captivity 
The first signs of a subtle change in attitudes appeared only in the mid-
seventies. By then the Communists apparently discovered that religion is 
not only an annoying superstition of the elderly and ignorant — who, 
incidentally, can be quite decent people and good workers — but that 
religion might provide man with a code of ethics based on moral values 
that were sorely needed also in a supposedly "Socialist" society. In a 
widely distributed study State Secretary Imre Miklos, chairman of the 
State Office for Church Affairs, admitted that 
...the Church can also carry out a positive role within socialis-
tic society, such as the defence of peace, in the promotion and 
encouragement of national unity with socialist content — for 
which the development of trust is especially important — in 
defining societal and personal property, in spreading the ideas 
of humanism, in love for the people, in the fight against crime, 
in the promotion of the progressive traditions of the national 
inheritance and of cultural values... 
Moreover, according to Miklos, it would be wrong to underestimate the 
influence of religious faith "in the private life of individuals, in inter-
personal relations, in the defense of certain moral norms and critical view 
of other norms."27 
In a similar vein there was a remarkable dialogue in 1975-76 
between the Party's chief ideologue and cultural czar, Deputy Premier 
Gyorgy Aczel and the Bishop of Pecs, Msgr. Jozsef Cserhati. There is no 
place here to go into details of their widely publicized exchanges; suffice 
to say that to Aczel's invitation to the religious believers to join in the 
task of defending world peace and of building of socialism, Bishop 
Cserhati replied that if the regime wanted sincere cooperation it should 
stop offending the feelings of the believers by its constant attacks, and 
even ridicule, of their most sacred convictions. Why not, asked the 
bishop, end the deeply humiliating treatment of the believers as second 
class citizens subject to various kinds of harassment and discrimination. 
Instead the government should aim at restoring their pride and self-esteem 
that is so necessary for the good performance of any job, by openly 
acknowledging the positive value of ethics and morality that Christian 
believers contribute to society. This would, of course, necessitate also the 
granting of greater freedom to the Church in its mission to strengthen 
those values among the adults and inculcate them in the children in 
teaching them the catechism of Christian faith and morality.28 
Bishop Cserhati's challenge was not ignored or rejected outright, 
as it would have been in earlier years. There were some musings on the 
government side about the possibility of some positive role for religion 
and the Churches. For example, Professor Jozsef Lukacs, the foremost 
philosopher of atheism in Hungary, the editor of Vilagossag, lecturing on 
"Churches and Religiousness in Socialist Hungary" at the political 
Academy of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, conceded that reli-
gion could perform a useful social function. It is by no means a negligible 
social force that "preserves certain moral principles," especially in the 
realm of human and family relations.29 
The Ills of a Socialist Consumer Society 
One might suspect that this change in perception and attitudes toward 
religion might have been due, at least in part, to some cold statistics that 
were brought to light by the new breed of sociologists, growing bolder 
every year in their research,30 Their findings called attention to the 
shocking social ills that were in stark contrast to the picture of an ever 
more just and better life painted by the Communist propaganda. During 
the late 1960's and early '70-ies when Kadar's Hungary after many years 
of penury, helped by huge loans from the Western capitalist countries, 
entered a degree of prosperity, and when many of the shackles restricting 
the acquisition of private property were removed by the New Economic 
Mechanism (NEM), parallel with the decline of religion a vulgar material-
ism took hold of large segments of the populace whose chief goal in life 
became material possessions and la dolce vita. Few of them, however had 
striven to realize their dream by hard work. Popular belief, based on 
observation of easy-to-find notorious examples, says that there are better 
and quicker ways to success and riches. Corruption, greasing of palms, 
cheating on the job, embezzling, and stealing of public property had 
become so wide-spread that it was almost accepted as normal behaviour 
for "smart folk". At the same time those who couldn't make it, sunk into 
the stupor of alcohol, absented themselves from work, ended up on skid 
row, or committed suicide. The picture that the newly emancipated 
sociologist discovered and showed to the public in journals and even in 
daily newspapers, was truly shocking and certainly beyond anything the 
Party and the Government cared to admit even to themselves. After all, 
no country, and even less one that called itself socialist, would brag about 
such sorry records as having the lowest birthrate, but the highest rate of 
suicides in the world, and probably the worst problem of alcoholism: it 
was estimated that between half a million to a million men and women 
were severely affected by alcohol, while about 150,000 could be regarded 
as alcoholics proper, among whom the male-female ratio was 5:3. Work 
discipline was almost non-existent and productivity was abysmally low. 
These were symptoms of a seriously ill society, even if to the outside 
world Kadar's Hungary presented the show window of the Communist 
world, with its happy-go-lucky people, considerable degree of individual 
and artistic freedoms, and fully stacked magazine shelves, which even its 
critics described as "the merriest barracks in the Soviet camp". 
While the Party in the '70-s and '80-s relaxed somewhat the 
overall control on the population, and also made occasional conciliatory 
gestures toward the Churches — Janos Kadar was the first Communist 
Party and Government chief to visit the Vatican and received by the Pope 
in private audience in 197731 — the oppression of the Churches continued 
to the very end of the era, i.e. 1989. The biggest stumbling block in the 
way of true reconciliation between the Communist regime and the 
Churches was the claim made by both sides over the winning of the mind 
and the soul of the youth. There the Party's attitude had not changed at 
all: hands off the young people! Although Janos Kadar addressing the 12lh 
Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers party in 1980 himself 
complained about those young people who "have negative attitudes, such 
as indifference, in the case of some people even cynicism, and the ten-
dency to seek an easy life", there was no admission of failure, nor a call 
for help addressed to the Churches. The Communists stubbornly and 
desperately clung to their faith that it is they alone who should mould the 
young mind. If anything, the shackles on religious instruction were 
tightened even further while Communist indoctrination was intensified. 
Thus, in spite of the official assurances about the satisfactory church-state 
relations in Hungary, a muted tug-of-war for youth continued to the end. 
One can summarize the church policies in the last years of the 
Kadar regime by saying that even though the long-term goal of the Com-
munist to promote the disappearance of religion and eliminate the 
Churches from society remained valid, their methods toward achieving 
that goal were somewhat adjusted. Outright terror, creating martyrs, gave 
way to more subtle policies. There were no more waves of arrests and 
torture of priests, nuns and religion teachers. Compliance with the politi-
cal line by the clergy was now enforced by the State Office for Church 
Affairs through direct pressure on the bishops whose job it became to 
discipline the "disobedient" priests by transferring them to little obscure 
villages, forbidding them to preach, etc. As a result of these changed 
policies the public at large had no awareness of the true situation in 
which the Churches had to struggle for mere survival, how the bishops 
were constrained to temper, even silence the apostolic zeal of their best 
priests, how religious instruction was made nearly impossible by intimida-
tion and constant harassment of the parents and the instructors, etc. 
Repeated requests for permission to resume work by the surviving 
members of the banned religious orders were ignored, nor were the severe 
restrictions on religious publications lifted. 
The State Office of Church Affairs continued to function until the 
very end of the Communist era, and the media continued to publish 
reassuring statements from government and church authorities about the 
freedom of religion and the harmonious relationship between Church and 
State in Hungary. It was not just foreigners who were deceived by this 
insidious propaganda, but most, if not all, Hungarians too. Any visitor to 
Hungary in the '80-ies could meet many people who would show genuine 
surprise, if asked about oppression of religion or of the Churches. Oh, but 
that is the thing of the past, gone long time ago, would have been the 
likely answer. 
This general acceptance of the muzzling of the Churches and the 
resulting quasi-disappearance of religion as an integral part of people's 
life and interest, could be scored as one of the greatest successes of the 
Kadar regime. 
What was the True Significance of the Revolution for the Churches? 
In conclusion, one could say that while the radical changes that occurred 
during those heady days of the end of 1956 and the first months of 1957 
had been successfully reversed in the retribution that followed, so that in 
the following three decades Communist policies were fully restored, still 
the Revolution remained a sign that the Marxist-Communist system is not 
an inevitable destiny for mankind as its followers tried to force people to 
believe. There will be, eventually a chance to escape. While in Hungary, 
being a small satellite of the mighty Soviet Union, the 1956 Revolution 
was officially renamed counter-revolution and everything was done to 
erase its memory, the world at large did not escape the impact of that 
heroic event. The Communist parties of France and Italy which at that 
time were considered capable of seizing power, were fatally weakened by 
the bloodshed in Budapest, and even in the Soviet Union and in its 
satellites the events of 1956 could not be ignored. Thus the Hungarian 
Revolution definitely contributed to the final implosion of Communism 
and the disintegration of the Soviets' "evil empire". This way, by the end 
of 1989, with the dismantling of all the odious restrictions on their 
freedom, the Churches of Hungary could again enjoy the freedom they so 
sorely lacked for over four long decades. 
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That Was The Week That Was 
(October 30 - November 4, 1956): 
Comparison of the Economic Platforms 
of the 1956 Parties 
Susan Glanz 
The Great Depression and the two world wars created an atmosphere 
where both politicians and the public saw direct government involvement 
in the economy as the only way of preventing the repetition of these 
destructive events. The involvement of the state in the post World War II 
economy increased everywhere in Europe. For example, in both France 
and Great Britain, railroads, banking (both the Bank of England and the 
Bank of France), domestic energy (coal in England, electricity in France) 
were nationalized and placed under the jurisdiction of semi-public direc-
torships. Health care and transportation were nationalized in England. In 
France, nationalization was accompanied by state planning. The view that 
planning and nationalization are important for the smooth running of the 
economy became the accepted European norm. 
Hungarians felt the same way about the role of government. A 
public opinion poll conducted in 1945 found that 67% favoured national-
ization of factories and 75% favoured nationalization of banks.1 The 
eleven years that passed between 1945 and 1956 did not change these 
sentiments and none of the parties in the coalition government formed in 
October 1956 demanded reversing the process. 
The economic background 
In 1992 the University of Groningen's Growth and Development Centre 
created a database which estimated the per capita GDP for most countries 
from 1950s on. 
Table 1. Per Capita Real GDP between 1950-1956, in Selected 
European Countries. (In 1990 US$ -converted at Geary-Khamis PPPs) 
Year Hungary Czechoslovakia Poland Austria West 
Germany 
1950 2,480 3,501 2,447 3,706 4,281 
1951 2,695 3,524 2,510 3,959 4,651 
1952 2,762 3,598 2,521 3,967 5,046 
1953 2,786 3,544 2,618 4,137 5,439 
1954 2,850 3,652 2,715 4,555 5,797 
1955 3,070 3,922 2,794 5,053 6,431 
1956 2,906 4,110 2,864 5,397 6,839 
Source: http://www.ggdc.net/maddison [accessed April I, 2005] 
Economists measure economic well-being and economic growth 
by looking at the growth rate of the per capita GDP. Based on the num-
bers in the table, Hungary's economic growth between 1950 and 1955 
was 23.8%. Economists also warn that this can be a misleading number, 
because a. when products are low quality and not durable, then people 
will have to buy them again and again, b. as GDP doesn't measure the 
sustainability of growth. A country may achieve a temporary high GDP 
by over-exploiting natural resources or by miss-allocating investment, and 
c. quality of life is determined by many other factors besides 
physical goods. 
Today we know that the lack of choices for consumers and produ-
cers, the low quality of the products, and the over-allocation of invest-
ments funds to heavy industry existed in the Hungary of the times. We 
also know that the pervasive atmosphere of fear made life difficult for the 
population. 
To make these numbers meaningful, let us compare them to 
prewar data. Hungary's per capita GDP in 1935 was $2,471 and Austria's 
was $2,907.2 That is, Hungary reached its 1935 GDP only in 1950, while 
by then Austria had surpassed her 1935 GDP by 27.5%. 
A somewhat different data set was published by Ivan Peto and 
Sandor Szakacs, and is summarized in Table 2.3 
Table 2. Per Capita Real Income in Hungary, 1950-1956 (1949=100) 
Year Per Capita Income for 
Workers and Employees 
Per Capita Consumption by 
Peasants* 
1950 102.8 112.7 
1951 97.8 118.8 
1952 87.5 106.6 
1953 91.0 100.6 
1954 115.0 111.0 
1955 121.8 124.5 
1956 129.3 131.2 
Though both data sets, in Tables 1 and 2, show 20+% growth 
between 1950 and 1955, table 2 shows that this growth was not con-
tinuous. Standard of living fell between 1950 and 1952, and in 1953 it 
was still below the 1950 level. According to Peto and Szakacs's calcula-
tions, as table 3 shows, real wages in Hungary fell between 1951 and 
1953, and in 1955 were only slighly above the 1949 level. 
Table 3. Real Wages in Hungary between 1950-1955 (1949=100) 
Year Real wages of workers and 
employees 
Real wages of workers in 
manufacturing 
1950 101.3 107.4 
1951 89.7 94.1 
1952 82.3 84.5 
1953 87.0 87.9 
1954 102.3 103.9 
1955 106.0 107.1 
Berend's calculations show similar results; namely that by 1953, 
the prices of consumer goods were nearly 100% higher than the 1949 
price level, meaning that real wages had fallen nearly 20% below the 
1950 level.4 
What do these statistics really indicate? Table 4 below shows the 
average monthly wages in Hungary in 1956 and 1957. According to 
calculations of the Trade Union Council quoted by Peto-Szakacs, the 
minimum wages necessary to support a family of three was Ft. 1440, and 
for a family of four was Ft. 1900. Such wages were not sufficient to 
provide for a minimally acceptable living standard. "According to the 
Ministry of the Interior," as quoted by Peto-Szakacs: 
a worker could afford a new winter coat (Ft 1,000) every ten 
and a half years, a wool suit (Ft. 870) once in every two and a 
half years, and a pair of shoes (Ft. 260) once a year; his wife a 
new wool suit (Ft. 400) every three years and a cotton dress 
(Ft. 150) and a pair of shoes (Ft. 200) once a year... a new 
winter coat (Ft. 1,000) every ten years, and a pair of stockings 
(Ft. 45) every six months. For their child they could buy 
clothing... every six months, every three and a half years a coat 
(Ft. 400) and a pair of shoes (Ft. 90) every six months.5 
Table 4. Monthly Average Wages (Ft.) 
1956 1957 
All workers and employees 1,235 1,445 
Industrial workers 1,234 1,486 
Construction workers 1,152 1,512 
Employees of central government, health-care, etc. 1,338 1,560 
Employees of local government, health-care, etc 1,136 1,238 
Source: Peto-Szakacs (1985, 314) 
Political events leading to October 1956 
The death of Stalin in 1953 began a thawing process everywhere in 
communist-controlled Central Europe. In 1955 the debate club of the 
Union of Working Youth, (DISZ - Dolgozo Ifjusdg Szdvetsege, the youth 
organization of the Communist Party) the Petofi Circle, was formed. At 
first the Circle's goal was to organize public debates about how the deci-
sions of the XXth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party applied to 
Hungary. Later discussions were held on topics ranging from the freedom 
of the press, to economics, history, education, and philosophy. The 
leadership of each circle was composed of young communists. The Petofi 
Circle's two economic forums of May 9th and June 20lh, 1956, focused on 
two problems, the lack of statistical information, both domestic and inter-
national, and lack of knowledge of the planning process. Similar circles 
were formed all over the country and their meetings were widely atten-
ded. 
Khrushchev's revelations about Stalin at the XXth Congress of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in February 1956, caused a 
political earthquake which was felt everywhere in Eastern Europe. At the 
end of June, Polish workers in Poznan went on strike and demanded 
increased wages, payment for overtime work, the abolition of piecework 
and the roll-back of fuel and food price increases. The revolt was crushed, 
the workers did not achieve their goals but some political changes did 
occur. For example, Wladyslaw Gomulka, Zenon Kliszko and General 
Marian Spychalski were rehabilitated and readmitted into the Party.6 
In Hungary, Communist Party chief Matyas Rakosi announced 
already in March that the miscarriage of justice against Laszlo Rajk7 
would be rectified.8 On July 18, 1956 the much-hated Rakosi resigned. At 
the end of the summer events speeded up. Towards the end of September, 
when the first of the trials of the workers who had been involved in the 
strikes in Poznan, had started, members of the Petofi Circle called for a 
solidarity demonstration with the Polish workers. Even before these de-
monstrations could be organized, after Rajk's October 6lh ceremonial re-
burial that had been promised by Rakosi in the spring, students marched 
through Budapest shouting anti-Stalinist slogans. 
On October 13, 1956 Imre Nagy was readmitted to the Hungarian 
Workers' Party.9 The Washington Post deemed Nagy's return as "a big 
step toward liquidating the remnants of Stalinism by formally announcing 
that ex-Premier Imre Nagy has been restored to party membership."10 
Three days later a meeting of about 1,600 undergraduates in Szeged 
founded League of Hungarian University and College Students (MEFESZ 
- Magyar Egyetemistak es Foiskolasok Szdvetsege), a students' organiza-
tion independent of the Union of Working Youth, (DISZ - Dolgozo 
Ifjusag Szdvetsege) and the H W P (Hungarian Workers' Party - Magyar 
Dolgozok Partja). Thei r action was followed in several universi t ies and 
col leges. On October 22nd the demands of the students at the Building 
Industry Technological University in Budapest were published and widely 
circulated.1 1 Of the 16 demands, f ive dealt with economic issues. These 
were: 
6. We demand a re-examination and re-adjustment of Hungar-
ian-Soviet and Hungarian-Yugoslav political, economic and 
intellectual relations on the basis of complete political and 
economic equality and of non-intervention in each other's 
internal affairs. 
7. We demand the re-organization of the entire economic life of 
Hungary, with the assistance of specialists. Our whole eco-
nomic system based on planned economy should be re-exam-
ined with an eye to Hungarian conditions and to the vital 
interests of the Hungarian people. 
8. Our foreign trade agreements and the real figures in respect 
of reparations that can never be paid should be made public. 
We demand frank and sincere information concerning the 
country's uranium deposits, their exploitation and the Russian 
concession. We demand that Hungary should have the right to 
sell the uranium ore freely at world market prices in exchange 
for hard currency. 
9. We demand the complete revision of norms in industry and 
an urgent and radical adjustment of wages to meet the demands 
of workers and intellectuals. We demand that minimum living 
wages for workers should be fixed. 
10. We demand that the delivery system should be placed on a 
new basis and that produce should be used rationally. We 
demand equal treatment of peasants farming individually. 
D e m a n d number 5 was the reestablishment of a multiparty sys tem: 
5. We demand general elections in this country, with universal 
suffrage, secret ballot and the participation of several Parties for 
the purpose of electing a new National Assembly. We demand 
that workers should have the right to strike. 
The call for multiparty elections was a new e lemen t in the s tudents ' 
demands . The demands of the Wri ters ' Union publ ished the fo l lowing day 
did not go as far as the students; it insisted on f ewer economic changes . 
3. The country's economic position must be clearly stated. We 
shall not be able to recover after this crisis, unless all workers, 
peasants and intellectuals can play their proper part in the 
political, social and economic administration of the country. 
4. Factories must be run by workers and specialists. The pres-
ent humiliating system of wages, norms, and social insurance 
conditions must be reformed. The trade unions must truly 
represent the interests of the Hungarian workers. 
5. Our peasant policy must be put on a new foundation. Peas-
ants must be given the right to decide their own future freely. 
Political and economic conditions must, at last, be created to 
allow memberships in co-operatives. The present system of 
deliveries to the State and of taxation must be gradually re-
placed by a system ensuring free socialist production and 
exchange of goods.12 
That the Writers ' Union memo voiced some of the d e m a n d s that w e r e just 
under the surface is shown by the report of the H W P . In D o c u m e n t No. 
21, Record of Conversat ion between Yurii Andropov and Erno G e r o on 
October 12, 1956 reports that Gero blames "ant i-Soviet p ropaganda" on 
three economic issues.13 These were: 
b. Protests against the selling of [former] German properties as 
a form of Hungarian payments to the Soviet Union; 
c. Protests against the alleged short selling of Hungarian ura-
nium to the Soviet Union (even though the country received a 
Soviet loan before shipping [the raw materials]... 
d. Complaints that Hungary is involved in unfavourable trade 
relations with the Soviet Union. 
In the same document Andropov blames the 
economic hardships, ...to a great extent on the fact that our 
[Hungarian] friends have lately given up keeping an eye on the 
national economy. Several questions concerning industrial 
production are pending, most of them are not being taken care 
of at all. ... It is worth noting that while lately the Hungarian 
comrades are constantly receiving advice from the CPSU 
leadership on various issues, and even when they agree with 
these suggestions, afterwards they are too feeble when it comes 
to enforcing their execution. 
The first Soviet a rmoured units entered Budapest at the early 
dawn of October 24. A few hours later on the same day , the HWP's 
Central Commi t t ee confirmed E r n o Gero in his post as First Secretary of 
the Communis t Party and Imre Nagy as Pr ime Minister. 
T w o days later a delegation of workers f rom Borsod County met 
Pr ime Minister Nagy and presented to him a list of demands . Imre Nagy 
agreed with the demands and promised to fu l f i l them. T h e economic 
components of the demands that Nagy agreed with were: 
the publication of foreign trade agreements, the use of uranium 
to the benefit of the Hungarians, the raising of base wages, the 
abolition of hidden price increases, the lowering of retirement 
age, the raising of family support and retirement payments, the 
abolition of the childlessness tax, introduction of train trans-
portation subsidies, increased construction of apartments, and 
subsidization of private housing construction. The reorgani-
zation of agriculture should be voluntary, based on the interests 
on the peasantry. 
Both the demands and Nagy ' s support for the demands w e r e read on the 
national radio stations.14 
On October 28 the L a w Faculty of Eo tvos Lorand Universi ty in 
Budapes t founded the Revolutionary Commit tee of the Hungar ian Intel-
lectuals ( M a g y a r Ertelmiseg Forradalmi Bizottsaga). T h e economic 
demands listed in their Appeal were published later that day and were 
similar to the d e m a n d s published by the s tudent groups and the Writers ' 
Union, namely: 
2. The Government should abrogate all foreign trade agree-
ments which are disadvantageous to the country. It should make 
public all foreign trade agreements concluded in the past, 
including those relating to uranium ore and bauxite. 
4. Factories and mines should really become the property of the 
workers. We shall not return the factories and the land to the 
capitalists and to the landowners. Our factories should be 
managed by freely elected workers' councils. The Government 
should guarantee the functioning of small-scale private industry 
and private trade. 
5. The Government should abolish the exploiting "norm" 
scheme. The Government should raise low wages and pensions 
to the limit of economic possibilities. 
6. The trade unions should become genuine workers' organiza-
tions representing the workers' interests, with their leaders 
freely elected. The working peasants should form their own 
organizations to safeguard their interests. 
7. The Government should ensure the freedom and security of 
agricultural production by supporting individual farmers and 
voluntary farm co-operatives. The hated delivery system, by 
which the peasants have been robbed, should be abolished. 
The call for multiparty elections was again included in the s ta tement : "We 
demand general elections with secret ballot. T h e people should be able 
freely to nomina te their candidates."1 5 
The United Nations Report of the Special Committee on the Prob-
lem of Hungary published in 1957 summarized the economic demands 
represented in the earliest resolutions and mani fes tos as the demand for 
openness.1 6 
The demand for the publication of the facts about foreign trade 
and Hungary's economic difficulties, publication of the facts 
about uranium, reforms in connection with factory management 
and trade unions, the "norm" system and other working condi-
tions, and a revision of agrarian policy, especially in regard to 
agricultural co-operatives and compulsory deliveries.... The 
economic objections showed a deep seated resentment of 
Hungary's dependence on the Soviet Union and the uncritical 
copying of Soviet economic system.17 
On October 28 lh, Imre Nagy announced on radio " the Hungarian 
government agreed with the Soviet government , the Soviet t roops will 
begin immedia te withdrawal f rom Budapest ." In the s ame speech he 
promised that " the new government will work on a new broad-based 
program, in which we hope to solve the jus t i f ied demands of workers." 
Nagy enumera ted the "justif ied demands" that his government will work 
on to include the question of wages of work norms, the raising of 
min imum pay in the lowest wage brackets, and of the smallest pensions, 
and the raising of family allowances. To help resolve the housing crisis, 
the government promised the support all state, cooperate, and private 
construction of homes and apartments. He applauded the establishment of 
workers' councils. He also promised to work on a plan to increase 
production by agricultural cooperatives and by individual farms.18 
On October 30lh at 2.28 p.m. Imre Nagy, as Prime Minister, 
announced on national radio that "in the interest of the further democ-
ratization of the country's life, the Cabinet abolishes the one-party system 
and places the country's government on the basis of democratic coopera-
tion between the coalition parties, reborn in 1945. In accordance with this 
decision an inner cabinet has been formed within the coalition govern-
ment, whose members are Imre Nagy, Zoltan Tildy, Bela Kovacs, Ferenc 
Erdei, Janos Kadar, Geza Losonczy and a person to be appointed by the 
Social Democratic Party."19 The four coalition parties were the Small-
holders' Party (represented by Zoltan Tildy and Bela Kovacs), the Natio-
nal Peasant Party (represented by Ferenc Erdei), Hungarian Workers' 
Party (represented by Janos Kadar and Geza Losonczy) and the Social 
Democratic Party. 
Hungary's multiparty democracy was short lived; it lasted for six 
days, from Tuesday, October 30th, 1956 to Sunday, November 4th, when 
the second Soviet invasion of Hungary began. After the initial announce-
ment several political parties immediately started to reorganize. Due to the 
short time they could function, the parties did not have time to develop 
full platforms. 
The economic platforms of the coalition parties 
On Wednesday, October 31st Radio Kossuth reported, and street posters 
announced that the Smallholders' Party (Kisgazda Part) was re-formed.20 
The Party's much maligned (by the Communists) Secretary-General Bela 
Kovacs was understandably reluctant to assume a leadership role.21 He 
took on the post of president only after much convincing. A radio reporter 
and several papers quote him as saying "no one should dream of the old 
days. The days of the aristocrats, bankers and capitalists have ended 
forever. Those, today, who think in terms of 1939 or 1945, are not real 
smallholders."22 
Because the Smallholders', just like the other parties, never had 
the time to develop comprehensive economic platforms, we are forced to 
evaluate the demands voiced by the publications of var ious local Smal l -
holder and other party organs and draw our conclusions based on these 
pronouncements . 
T h e recurring demands that were voiced by d i f ferent Smal lholder 
party cells did not go beyond the demands of the students in M E F E S Z or 
those of the intellectuals. The poster published by the party cell of the 
12th district of Budapest on October 31st asserted that " the economy of the 
nation cannot be run by any dogma. . . . " 2 3 It then went on: 
13. Election of new union leadership. The right to strike.... 
19. Small crafts, services, students and artists should receive 
subsidies from the state; and factory workers should receive a 
share from the profits of their factories.... 
27. All war indemnity payments and deliveries to the Soviet 
Union must be reexamined. While this reexamination is contin-
uing, the deliveries must be stopped. 
28. The just demands of the peasants should be satisfied by the 
Provisional Government. 
A m o r e detailed pla t form was published by the Provisional Execut ive 
Commi t t ee of the Smallholders ' Party of Gyor-Sopron County.2 4 The i r 
circular, also published on October 31st lists eight economic demands , 
namely: 
1. The acceptance of the principle of private property. 
2. The unity of peasants. 
3. The dissolution of state owned retail and service sector and 
the return of these establishments to private ownership. The 
acceptance of the idea of the sanctity of private property. 
4. Unconditional support for private enterprise. Only self ini-
tiated cooperatives, esp. to take advantage of large scale pur-
chases and sales, should be allowed, and only if it is beneficial 
to members. 
5. Full compensation to those who suffered because of forced 
collectivization. 
6. Reopening of the denied pension applications, and the raising 
of all pensions to the level of providing decent living standards. 
11. A new wage system that allows households with one wage 
earner to support a family. 
12. The economic platform of the central Smallholders' Party 
cannot go against these demands. 
Another appeal, addressed to railroad workers, in addition to the above-
listed demands, included demands for a five-day, forty hour work-week 
and for the abolition of the norm system. The appeal also stated that "land 
should belong to those who work it and the demand that the issues 
relating to the wage and family support systems be solved immediately."25 
Istvan Varga, an economic adviser to the party, in an interview on 
November 3rd added the call for the releasing by the government of 
economic and trade data to the aid the process of rational decision-
making.26 
The party's support for a market-based system in small industry, 
farming and retail trade, is clear. Priority was placed on reforming the 
pension and wage systems, and redressing past economic injustices. The 
termination of the forced collectivization was also demanded. 
The Smallholders' Party ceased its legal activities on November 
4th. A Provisional Executive Committee met occasionally until the early 
spring of 1957.27 
Representatives of the National Peasant Party (Nemzeti Paraszt-
part) met on October 31 at Vajdahunyad Castle, in Budapest's City Park. 
Since in the past some party leaders had been viewed as communist 
fellow travellers, and to indicate a break with this tradition, the Party 
adopted a new name, the Petofi Party, after the poet Sandor Petofi, a hero 
of the March 15, 1848 revolution.28 The formation of the National Peasant 
Party, and its name change to Petofi Party, were announced on Thursday, 
November 1st on the radio.29 The Party did not publish a platform, but its 
program is implied in interviews given and reports written by its leading 
members. Of the Party's local organizations, the one in Szabolcs-Szatmar 
County reorganized the fastest, probably because this county had been the 
Party's stronghold after 1945. The most detailed program proposal was 
given in an interview by Sandor Varga, the secretary to this Szabolcs-
Szatmar County organization. The economic program outlined by Varga 
was the following: 
...the respect for private property is the basis of party policy, 
and the party will fight for free choice in production and free 
choice in sales... 
The 1945 land reform was legitimate and we will not 
return land owned by peasants. But, we find it necessary to 
demand the review of all those unlawful acts that were insti-
tuted against small peasant landholdings from 1948 on, ... 
Respecting the freedom of sales choices for peasants until 
healthy peasant cooperatives are organized, we want to main-
tain the cooperatives, but not as monopolies, but as a buyer of 
the products at market prices that peasants cannot deliver to the 
cities.... 
...the organization of politically independent peasant 
interest groups.... 
We demand the immediate review of the tax system, 
as the current system places undue burden on the peasants.... 
We demand the reevaluation of the wages of peasants 
working on state farms and in state forests, the immediate abo-
lition of the piece work systems and the introduction of a prog-
ressive compensation system, where these agricultural emplo-
yees receive a greater percentage of their wages in-kind and 
receive a small share of their income, sufficient to finance 
small purchases, in money twice a month. 
We demand the reevaluation of the restrictions on 
keeping animals by the employees of state farms, the permis-
sion of keeping a cow and the abolition of the restrictions of 
keeping pigs, chickens and other small animals. 
We demand the reevaluation of the social insurance 
and social health care system, and the provision of support for 
peasants identical to those of industrial workers. We demand 
the expansion of the social health care system to individual 
farmers who wish to do so. 
We demand the immediate reorganization of agri-
cultural machine industry to permit the production of machinery 
profitably employable on small farms, and that these machines 
also be made available on credit.30 
T h e speech outlined the party 's goal of representing peasants, and 
achieving pari ty for state fa rms and forestry workers with industrial 
employees . T h e goal of terminating forced collectivization is listed as a 
priority, as is the need to include peasants in the national social insurance 
and heal thcare system. 
Fe renc Farkas, the Secretary General of the Petofi Party, empha-
sized on Hungar ian Radio on November 3rd, that all parties in the coali-
tion government want to maintain the socialist successes achieved to date 
that can be used by an independent, f ree and democratic socialist country. 
This meant the acceptance of nationalized industry and bank ing system.31 
On the same day in an interview published in Jasz -Nagykun-
Szolnok C o u n t y ' s People's Daily (A Nep Lapja) the party representat ive 
was asked about the re-organized party's platform. His answer was "that 
the final program is being worked on, but our goals are already clear. We 
want to build strong ties with the Peasant Alliance and with the Small-
holders' Party. We will continue to fight for land to be owned by those 
who work it."32 
One of the most influential Hungarian thinkers of the period was 
Istvan Bibo. He was serving on the executive committee of the newly 
reconstituted Petofi Party when he was appointed Minister on November 
3, one day before the second Soviet intervention. On the morning of 
November 4lh, Bibo continued typing in his office in the national parlia-
ment while Soviet troops occupied the building and he stayed in the 
Parliament building for another two days.33 On November 9th Bibo wrote 
"A suggested solution for the Hungarian problem."34 The economic solu-
tions listed in the memo are: 
c) Hungary's social structure is based on the principle of 
prohibition of exploitation (socialism) which means: 
(i) to maintain the 1945 land reform with a maximum of 20 to 
40 acres; 
(ii) to maintain nationalization of mines, banks, and heavy 
industry; 
(iii) to maintain the existing social ownership of factories 
through workers' management, workers' shares, or profit-shar-
ing; 
(iv) the possibility of free individual or cooperative enterprise, 
with guarantees against exploitation; 
(v) freedom of private ownership within the guarantees against 
exploitation; 
(vi) general social insurance. 
d) Reparation for those economic and moral injustices which 
have been committed shall by no means involve restoration of 
the status quo ante. All compensations shall be made according 
to the principle prohibiting exploitation and only in respect of 
ruined homes or loss of property earned by labour. 
The Bibo plan reiterated the goals of maintaining the "achievements" of 
1945, the land reform and nationalized large industry. Yet Bibo suggests 
that public ownership can be more "profitably" maintained by either 
worker management, by employee stock ownership plans or by creating 
profit sharing plans for workers. He advocated an all-inclusive social 
insurance sys tem and reparation payments to compensa te those people 
whose homes or property had been expropriated by the state. 
The December meeting of the Provisional Executive Commi t t ee 
of the Hungar ian Socialist Workers ' Party ( H S W P ) was preparing a new 
government program and on December 8, Bibo and other leaders of the 
Petof i Party prepared and signed the so-called "Declaration abou t the 
Fundamenta l Principles of the State, Social, and Economic Sys t em of 
Hungary and about the Ways of Overcoming the Political Crisis."3 5 They 
asked K. P. S. Menon , India 's Ambassador to M o s c o w who w a s then 
visit ing Budapest , to convey its contents to the Soviet leaders.3 6 This 
document reiterates the previously listed economic demands. 
2. The country's social and economic order shall be based upon 
social ownership of the decisive majority of the means of 
production. In accordance with this, the mines, factories, banks 
and other large enterprises that were in state ownership on 
October 23, 1956 must remain in social ownership. 
3. The land ownership rights established by the 1945 land 
reform shall not be interfered with, but the upper limit of 
private ownership of land shall be determined by the area that 
can be cultivated by a family without regular recourse to 
outside labour. 
4. The peasantry, craft industries, and all economic activity in 
general, must be guaranteed the right to form economic activi-
ties, on a voluntary basis, in order to secure the advantages of 
large scale production. 
5. Private enterprise shall be allowed within the limits imposed 
by professional qualifications and planned direction of econo-
mic life. The number of persons employed by private enterprise 
must be restricted by law. 
6. The freedom of workers and employees to form trade unions 
on a voluntary basis, and the right of trade unions to make 
collective agreements and to act in defense of their members' 
interests, must be secured by law. The peasantry, craft in-
dustries, small traders and the self-employed should also have 
the freedom to form organizations appropriate for defending 
their interests. 
7. The workers of state enterprises must be guaranteed in law 
the right to participate in the management of their enterprises 
through the workers' councils, and also the right to share in the 
material success of the enterprises' operations. 
8. Compensation for economic damages resulting from the 
illegalities committed in the past must not lead to the restora-
tion of the former property and income of those who suffered 
losses, and especially not to any possibility for the restoration 
of exploitation.... 
Goals 3 to 8 were not included in the new HSWP party platform. The 
Petofi Party ceased to exist in January I960.37 
The Social Democratic Party (SZDP, Szocialdemokrata Part) 
was reconstituted on October 30th in the editorial offices of the Nepszava 
(People's Voice), the party's paper.38 The Party's past president, Anna 
Kethly, was reelected as president.39 Gyula Kelemen, the Party's Secretary 
General, summarized the recent past of the Party as "hundreds of our 
leaders were imprisoned, and thousands were deported."40 The following 
day the provisional leadership of the party was elected.41 Initial emphasis 
was on party reorganization and due to the brief time period of legal 
existence no platform was published. The work on the platform was 
postponed for after the Socialist International meeting in Vienna, which 
was to begin on November 1, where the party president and deputy-
secretary travelled to, to represent the Hungarian party. 
Anna Kethly, in her editorial on the front page of the November 
1 issue of Nepszava wrote: "we must protect the factories, mines and land 
as those must remain in the people's hand."42 In an article that appeared 
on November 2nd, Gyula Kelemen called on the Party's peasant members 
to "save their strength for the fight to make it impossible to return the 
large estates."43 
Most party announcements dealt with reorganizing the Party 
rather than its program of action. The latter were just hinted at. A poster 
published by the Party's Heves County branch emphasized typical social 
democratic goals:44 
Unions should be true representatives of workers. 
Abolition of the unfair and exploitative piece-work wage sys-
tems and bonus systems. 
Raising of wages to the extent it is bearable by the country and 
immediate reevaluation of low wages. 
We demand a market based small industry (service) and market 
based retail trade. 
The same county's party cell's November 1 stated in a proclama-
tion that "our party's goal continues to be the raising of the living stan-
dard of the whole working population." The poster also called for "the 
protection of peasant interests; peasants who got land grants should not 
suffer, but with reasonably rational production techniques, while serving 
the whole nation's interests, should serve their own."45 Another of the 
Party's posters stated that "the Party welcomes the service workers and 
will fight for the independent functioning of the service industry."46 
The Party's president, Anna Kethly, did not return from the 
Vienna meeting to Budapest after the second Soviet invasion. The Party 
ceased functioning; several leaders left Hungary; some left-wing members 
and union leaders eventually joined the Kadar regime, and were rewarded 
with high positions. 
From the Hungarian Workers' Party to the Hungarian Socialist 
Workers' Party 
On Oct. 24th the HWP felt that it could control the events. Imre Nagy in 
a radio address stated that the "peacefully demonstrating Hungarian youth 
were misled by enemies.... The Hungarian government will not allow 
itself to be pushed off the road of democratization, which is in the interest 
of the Hungarian population, a program discussed and agreed upon with a 
large segment of the public."47 But next day, on the 25th, Nagy was less 
confrontational. In his radio address he talked of "the public's despair 
over the serious political and economic mistakes... Shortly after the 
restoration of peace, parliament will meet. I will submit a detailed and all-
encompassing reform plan which will cover all important questions..."48 
On the 26th the radio anchor reading from the Szabad Nep (Free People, 
the Party's paper) reported the emergence of a new party leadership under 
Janos Kadar, Ferenc Donath and Gyula Kallai, all previously imprisoned 
by the Rakosi regime.49 
Nagy, in his previously mentioned radio address, on the October 
28th stated, that 
. . .we wish to solve the old and justified demands of workers to 
the their satisfaction; amongst them the issue of wages and 
norms, the raising of the lowest bracket of the minimum wages 
and lowest pensions by calculating them based on years work-
ed, and raising the family subsidies. To solve the extremely 
grave apartment shortage, the Government will support to the 
utmost state, cooperative and private construction of buildings. 
The government, to solve the desperate apartment shortage will 
support state, cooperative and private construction.50 
The government applauds the workers' initiatives of 
expanding a factory-based democracy and approves the forma-
tion of workers' councils. 
The government will immediately end the illegalities 
committed while farming agricultural cooperatives, ... [and] 
will develop a plan to increase agricultural productivity, to 
increase production by agricultural cooperatives and by individ-
ual farmers,... The government will put an end to the serious 
illegalities which were committed in the name of agricultural 
cooperatives.51 
The New York Times succinctly evaluated the events and state-
ments as "Politically, Premier Imre Nagy's concessions amount to nothing 
less than surrender to the will of the people. He and his Cabinet Ministers 
have now promised free elections and the end of the one-party dictator-
ship. They have announced the end of the hated collective farm system."52 
On October 30lh Hungarian radio announced that the reorgani-
zation of The Hungarian Workers' Party and its reemergence as the 
Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP, Magyar Szocialista Munkas-
pdrt) on November 1. Janos Kadar's speech on the radio that day indi-
cated that this was just another political party campaigning to achieve 
electoral victory. He stated the Party's goal as "Workers, peasants and 
intellectuals! The new Party, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, is 
prepared to do its share in fighting for the consolidation of independence 
and democracy.... We turn to the newly-formed democratic parties — 
first of all... to the Social Democratic Party — with the request that they 
help consolidate the government and thereby overcome the danger of 
menacing countries and intervention from abroad...."53 
On November 4th, in an open letter read on the radio, the forma-
tion of the new Kadar-led government was announced.54 This new govern-
ment was called the Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Govern-
ment (Magyar Forradalmi Munkas-Paraszt Kormany). Its economic plat-
form was summarized on a poster as: 
2. The government program is to protect our popular people's 
democracy and socialist system from ail attacks. The protection 
of our socialist achievements, and the continued movement on 
the socialist path. 
6. The rapid and significant raising of the living standards of ' 
the employees- especially of the workers. More apartments for 
workers. We must make it possible for factories and companies 
to build apartments for their workers and employees. 
7. The adjustment of the five-year plan, charging the economic 
leaders to take into consideration the country's economic 
conditions in order to raise the living standard of the population 
as fast as possible. 
8. The termination of bureaucracy and the spreading of democ-
racy for the employees. 
9. Worker management must be built on broad based democ-
racy in factories, on shop floors and in enterprises 
10. The development of agricultural production, the termination 
of compulsory delivery systems, and provision of aid to indi-
vidual peasants. 
The government will terminate all illegalities that were commit-
ted during forced collectivization. 
12. Support of small industry and retail trade. 
In this poster Kadar explained the need for his new government by 
blaming "the weakness of the Imre Nagy government and the counter-
revolutionaries whose increasing influence threatened our socialist 
achievements, people's democracy, the worker-peasant power and the 
existence of our nation."55 
On another poster also dated November 4th, a more detailed expla-
nation was given for the takeover by the new government. In addition to 
Nagy's weakness it states that "on the October 23rd a popular movement 
began whose noble goal was to correct the crimes committed by Rakosi 
and his cronies against the party and the public...."56 
The HSWP's program did not go as far as the Nagy government's 
program. It did not talk of wage and pension reform or about changes in 
the family support system. 
Other political organizations or parties 
The book, 1956 and the Political Parties, edited by Istvan Vida, reported 
that documents indicated that 31 parties, or party-like organizations or 
attempts to organize parties existed during this period.57 These were: 
1. Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart), 
2. Hungarian Social-democratic Party (Magyar Szocialdemokrata Part), 
3. Smallholders Party (Fiiggetlen Kisgazdapart), 
4. Petofi Party - National Peasant Party (Petofi Part - Nemzeti Paraszt-
part), 
5. Hungarian Revolutionary Youth Party (Magyar Forradalmi Ifjusagi 
Part), 
6. Democratic Popular Party (Demokrata Neppart), 
7. Christian Democratic Party (Kereszteny Demokrata Part), 
8. Catholic Popular Party (Katolikus Neppart), 
9. Christian Hungarian Party (Kereszteny Magyar Part), 
10. Christian Front (Kereszteny Front), 
11. Hungarian Freedom Party {Magyar Szabadsag Part), 
12. Hungarian Independence Party (Magyar Fiiggetlensegi Part), 
13. Party of Justice (Igazsag Part), 
14. Hungarian Democratic Union (Magyar Demokratikus Unid), 
15. National Revolutionary Party (Nemzeti Forradalmi Part), 
16. National Organization of the Unaffiliated (Partonkiviiliek Orszagos 
Blokkja), 
17. Christian National Party (Kereszteny Nemzeti Part), 
18. Hungarian Life Party (Magyar Elet Partja), 
19. Hungarian Popular Party (Magyar Neppart), 
20. Hungarian Radical Party (Magyar Radikalis Part), 
21. Party of the Nation's Defenders (Honvedok Partja), 
22. Christian Popular Party (Kereszteny Neppart), 
23. Christian Socialist Party (Kereszteny Szocialista Part), 
24. Christian Democratic Popular Party (Kereszteny Demokrata Neppart), 
25. Party of Hungarian Unity (Magyar Egyseg Part), 
26. National Uprising Party (Nemzeti Felkeles Partja), 
27. Hungarian Christian National Party (Magyar Kereszteny Nemzeti 
Part), 
28. National Radical Party (Nemzeti Radikalis Part), 
29. National Camp-Independent Hungarian Socialist Party Movement 
(Nemzeti Tabor-Fiiggetlen Magyar Szocialista Partmozgalom), 
30. Bourgeois Democratic Party (Polgari Demokrata Part). 
31. Arrow Cross Party (Nyilaskeresztes Part), 
According to Robert Huckshorn's definition "[A] political party is 
an autonomous group of citizens having the purpose of making nomina-
tions and contesting elections in hope of gaining control over govern-
mental power through the capture of public offices and the organization 
of the government."58 To act as a party, a party must register its name, 
elect temporary party officials and have a constitution or by-laws. Several 
of the above listed parties had only one or two members (13-16), some 
showed no activity (17-20); thus were not real political parties. Others 
organizations never got off the ground (21-31). Of the 31 parties, there-
fore, only the first twelve would meet the definition of a functioning 
political party. These were the: 1. the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, 
2. the Hungarian Social-Democratic Party, 3. the Smallholders' Party, 4. 
the Petofi Party, 5. the Hungarian Revolutionary Youth Party, 6. the 
Democratic Popular Party, 7. the Christian Democratic Party, 8. the 
Catholic Popular Party, 9. the Christian Hungarian Party, 10. the Christian 
Front, 11. the Hungarian Freedom Party, and 12. the Hungarian Indepen-
dence Party. 
The economic platforms of the four coalition parties have been 
discussed above. The platforms of the other eight parties are summarized 
below. 
The economic goals or platforms of the other parties 
The economic goals listed on the poster announcing the formation of the 
Hungarian Revolutionary Youth Party59 stated: 
3. We want to develop an economic and political system that 
will eliminate the depressive feelings stemming from the 
uncertainties of tomorrow, and at the same time eliminate the 
country's economic uncertainty.... 
5. We want to fight for the rights of workers so that they can 
become the owners of factories and with that their standard of 
living will rise commensurate with increased production. 
6. We will protect the rights of the peasants gained in the 
revolution. 
7. We want to provide to the head of households a wage that 
allows him for carefree provision for his family and permits 
him to satisfy cultural and other demands. 
8. We support the initiatives of Hungarian small industry, retail 
trade. 
9. We will soon offer solutions to solve the housing crisis.... 
11. We will protect the achievements of the revolution with all 
our might. 
On another poster this Party demanded "the raising of the standard of 
living and the upholding of the achievements of the revolution."6 0 
Late in the evening of November 1, Denes Farkas announced on 
radio the reorganization and the platform of the Democrat i c Popular 
Party. H e posit ioned the party as an opposit ion party, by stating "that the 
par ty ' s program is its old program. W e will support the government in 
mainta in ing order, protecting property and l i fe . . . . As in the past we are 
not wil l ing to participate in any coalition."61 The old par ty platform in 
1945 had been based on maintaining private property, though "supported 
the nationalization of those industries that are for the publ ic good."6 2 
In the par ty ' s application for permission to funct ion three of the 
stated party goals are economic , namely:6 3 
2. We believe that there is a unique Hungarian democratic 
socialism. We want to protect the socialist achievements of our 
nation, primarily the land reform, including the break up of 
church property; and the public ownership of banks and other 
large enterprises. 
3. We support private initiatives limited only by public goals, 
especially in small scale manufacturing, in retail trade and 
service industries. 
4. We support independent unions and the right to strike. 
Six of the 16-point program of the Christian Democrat i c Party 
dealt with economic issues.64 These were: 
5. Immediate acceptance of foreign economic aid and grants 
without any economic and political preconditions.... 
9. Our whole economic policy must be reorganized with the 
help of the revolutionary workers, youth, peasants, service 
employees and intelligentsia to meet their interests. A fair tax 
system must be developed, so that the tax burden falls equitably 
on small and large economic units. Tax rates must be public. 
All national - natural and intellectual - treasures must be used 
only to serve Hungarian national interests, (uranium, bauxite) 
Immediate payment of the unfairly withdrawn pensions, reeval-
uation of the pension system, and compensation for those 
whose pensions were denied. Reevaluation of new pensions.... 
11. Land-reform for the working peasants, the right to form 
cooperatives voluntarily; aiding of the individual peasants by a 
fair tax system and long-term credit. The distribution of collec-
tively held agricultural machinery in accordance with the 
decisions of the peasants.... 
13. Independent unions.... Placing the publicly held factories 
and wholesale outlets in the hand of workers' councils. 
14. The return of the nationalized small-scale manufacturing 
and retail trade within reason, or as decided by the revolu-
tionary unit. 
15. Compensation for all who suffered unfair and illegal eco-
nomic disadvantages between 1945 and 1956. 
In another document , the Party emphas ized that " w e are against 
the return of large property, but we want land reform, as the current 
situation is chaot ic and unfa i r to the Hungarian peasants. W e want private 
property! End to state-capitalism. Factories should be run by workers ' 
councils."6 5 
On the evening news on November 1, the radio announced the 
formation of the Catholic Popular Party.66 This party a lso saw itself as 
an opposit ion party which became clear when the party p rog ram was read 
on the radio. T h e statement said, "we can not work together with the 
government , . . . until the compromised member s of the cabinet are ex-
posed. W e insist on maintaining the social achievements of the post 1945 
period, in fact we demand their expansion."6 7 
T h e Christ ian Hungarian Party published its platform on 
November l .6 8 Its economic demands were: 
3. No government interference in agriculture, industry and 
trade. Abolishing all import and export duties and following the 
example of Switzerland of free economic life with abolishing of 
currency regulations. 
4. Immediate return of all one family houses. 
5. The return to previous owners of all small- and medium 
sized trading companies and land up to 50 holds (28.76 hec-
tares or 71.05 acres)69 from reserve land. 
6. Creation of a wage level for men so women would not be 
required to leave the family hearth. 
7. Renting those factories, not using domestic raw materials or 
other preconditions for profitability, to foreigners. The pay 
scale should match that of the home country. 20% of the output 
can be sold to the Hungarian state at cost and no more than 
10% of employees may be foreigners. 
8. All state owned enterprises should be converted to stock 
companies, with 75% of the shares held by employees, and 
25% by the state. 
9. The introduction of the maximum 40 hour work week, with 
36 hours in mining. The minimum wages should be Ft. 1,500. 
10. Both agriculture, and retail trade and small scale industry 
should have access to loans with 20 year repayment schedule; 
and the establishment of savings banks in villages to provide 
these loans. 
11. A one year moratorium on all loans. 
12. 80% of construction projects by the state should be building 
apartments, where priority should be given to young couples 
and homeless people. 
13. The abolition of exploitative system of norms, and work 
competition. 
The leaders of the Christian Front were released from prison in 
October 30, 1956, and immediately began organizing.70 The poster 
announcing the formation of the Party emphasizes that "our leaders were 
released from prison only 24 hours ago," and that they see the Party as an 
umbrella organization for all Christian parties, "there can be only one 
Christian Party, we do not commit to supporting individuals, but to the 
success of our program."71 Their program dealt with political reorganiza-
tion of the country. They advocated the restoration of the monarchy and a 
two chamber parliament. From this statement it is clear that this Party 
also saw itself as an opposition party. Its leaders called for a "class-free 
society,... for a Christian socialist state."72 To achieve their goal of a 
"true Christian classless society they did not want to reverse the achieve-
ments of socialism, approved of previous distribution of land, the nation-
alization of factories, banks and mines." They advocated limited return to 
private property."73 
The Hungarian Freedom Party summarized its goals in its 
motto "the dual motivators in the world are family and property."74 Its 
demands included: 
The imposed industrialization changed the composition of 
employment. The majority of the population is still agricultural, 
and this is the backbone of the nation. 
Back to land. Let the population love the land as before. We 
will not let the achievements of the land reform be destroyed.... 
We will help individual peasants, by providing cheap loans to 
rebuild destroyed buildings and machinery. Special attention 
will be paid to restocking the animal herds. 
We understand the goals of cooperatives.... There is no need 
for those money losing cooperatives that must be supported by 
public financing. 
Hungarian industry must be proud of its past.... The opening of 
the borders mean strong competition, which can be met by 
cheaper and better consumer goods. 
Our workers should be the real owners of the factories, should 
receive parts of the profits.... Norms should be abolished,... 
They should have the right to organize freely. 
Small scale industry was an important pillar of the nation's 
independence, ... 
We want to support individual initiatives,... 
We want to restore the chambers of commerce. 
We will abolish the unfair premium reward system, which was 
most often given to undeserving individuals. Satisfactory wage 
system will result in satisfactory work. As above, we emphasize 
that workers must receive a share of profits above his wages. 
We mean to provide healthcare for all. 
We must create an old-age pension system worthy of a civi-
lized nation. 
The Hungarian Independence Party 's application for formation 
referred to the Party's 1947 platform. Two economic concerns were listed 
in their platform of six issues:75 The "Sanctity of private property," and 
the "Reduction of the tax burden to a level where it is sufficient to 
support the public infrastructure and is bearable for an individual." 
With the second entry of the Russian army on November 4th the 
various political parties ceased their activities. 
The January 7, 1957 issue of The New York Times reported, based 
on a Hungarian radio broadcast, "...that the Government intends to 
conduct talks with various factions of public life, whether members of 
parties or not, who are willing to fight against the counter-revolution and 
for the maintenance of social achievements...."76 Over a month later, The 
New York Times again reported, "based on a 'usually reliable' source", of 
Kadar "... having forecast the "liquidation" of the Social Democratic 
Party" in a speech made at Ujpest on February 9, 1957.77 Kadar "also 
predicted that negotiations would begin with two other non-Communist 
parties, the Smallholders' and Petofi Parties, at an unspecified future date, 
to broaden the present all-Communist Government."78 The promised 
multi-party talks never took place. 
Conclusions 
Of the twelve political parties active during the Revolution only four — 
the Hungarian Revolutionary Youth Party, the Christian Democratic Party, 
the Christian Front, and the Christian Hungarian Party — were new 
parties, all the others had their start in the post-1945 period or even 
before. The Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party was a new party in name 
only, it was the Hungarian Workers' Party reorganized under a new name. 
Only two parties, the Social Democrats and the Smallholders', had existed 
before the war. The Peasant Party had been established before the war, 
but it did not function during it. Between 1948 and 1956 only eight years 
had passed, so the parties and their programs were still alive in the 
public's mind. Based on the historic roles the parties played, Vida placed 
the parties on the left to right spectrum as in the following Table 5.78 
Table 5. Political Parties in 1956 
Left Centre Right 
HSWP (1) Smallholders (3) Catholic Popular (8) 
Social Democrats (2) Petofi (4) Christian Hungarian (9) 
Christian Front (10) 
Democratic Popular (6) 
Hungarian Freedom (11) 
Hungarian Revolutionary Youth (5) 
Christian Democratic (7) 
Hungarian Independence (12) 
However, an examination of these parties' the economic platforms shows 
that their views were more homogenous. 
Due to the short time that the parties were allowed to function 
openly, they did not have time to develop comprehensive platforms. With 
the exception of the Hungarian Independence Party, all parties directly or 
indirectly mentioned the maintenance of the land reform, public owner-
ship of large industries and the return to some form of private ownership 
in the service and retail industries and in agriculture. The Nagy Govern-
ment's program did not mention land reform and nationalization of 
industry and banking, as these were cornerstones for building socialism. 
Only the Christian Hungarian Party mentioned converting state ownership 
into employee ownership of the factories through stock conversions. 
According to Anthony Downs' rational-efficient political party 
model, each party's political activities are centred "around the parties' 
electoral activities, at the expense of virtually all other functions" as 
winning elections is the goal of each party. "Voters also act rationally, 
using the information provided by the party candidates to make selections 
that will benefit them personally."79 The promise of improving the 
standard of living is always central to all political parties. As the tables 3 
and 4 show the majority of Hungarians lived near poverty. The slight 
increase in real wages from 1954 was still below what was necessary to 
support a family. 
To improve the standard of living, the members of the coalition 
government, the Revolutionary Youth Party and the Christian Hungarian 
Party promised to raise wages, and/or to raise minimum wages. Only the 
Social Democrats, the Petofi Party, the Christian Hungarian Party and the 
Hungarian Freedom Party promised to abolish the hated norm system. 
This is interesting as all published pre-revolutionary demands, and the 
program of the Nagy Government, included the demand to abolish this 
payment scheme. Until October 1956, 67% of workers were paid on piece 
work, but from November on, nearly all enterprises switched to paying 
hourly wages.80 Worker management and profit sharing was mentioned by 
the Petofi Party, the Christian Democratic Party, the Hungarian Freedom 
Party, Hungarian Revolutionary Youth Party, Christian Hungarian Party, 
the Smallholders and the HSWP. (Worker management and profit sharing 
were to be achieved through the Worker Councils. The councils were 
terminated by the Kadar regime on November 1 1, 1957.)81 Another tool to 
strengthen workers' role in the economy was the support independent 
unions, and was promised by the Social Democrats, Smallholders, 
Democratic Popular Party, Christian Democratic and Hungarian Freedom 
Parties. The expansion of the health-care and social insurance system was 
promised by the Petofi Party — agricultural workers and peasants had 
been excluded from the then existing system — specifically mentioning 
their constituent base, while the Hungarian Freedom Party talked of 
expanding coverage to all. 
Another issue, the need to increase housing construction, was 
raised by several groups before the revolution and by the Nagy govern-
ment, but was mentioned only in the platform of the HSWP, Hungarian 
Revolutionary Youth and Christian Hungarian parties. 
To attract past and new members they most frequently listed the 
most common complaints of Hungarians, thus party platforms on the 
surface were similar. 
Bibo explained the support for these similar programs the best: 
We must not forget that the aversion for an orthodox capitalist, 
reactionary, anti-communist restoration is the concern not only 
of the Soviet Union and the communists, but also of the young 
people, workers, and soldiers who carried out the revolution 
and shed their blood for its victory. The majority of them were 
not communists but the great majority consider themselves 
socialists. It is morally inadmissible and also, from the stand-
point of Hungarian internal politics, impossible, that the forces 
of reaction should profit, thanks to the votes of the older 
generation, from the freedom bought by the blood of young 
revolutionaries.82 
Other possible explanations for the similarity of the platforms are 
the facts that a., the majority of the political actors spent time in Rakosi's 
prisons and were probably leery of proposing radical departures from 
existing socialist norms lest they would get into trouble for doing so; b., 
the pre- and post 1945 and 1947 elections were fresh in their memories; 
c., they probably did not know how much they could trust the Nagy 
government — after all martial law had been imposed on October 24th, 
and the "uprising" was labelled "counter-revolutionary" until October 28lh; 
so to the participants the change in terminology to "revolution" and the 
opportunity to organize came suddenly and they wanted to proceed with 
caution. This argument is supported by statements of the Christian Front, 
Catholic Popular and Democratic Popular Parties, which declared them-
selves "opposition" parties — yet they proposed solutions similar to those 
called for by the non-opposition parties. 
Postscript: economic changes brought about by the Revolution 
1957 was a year of political repression and the beginning of a less rigid 
economic system. To prevent the repeat of the uprising, the Kadar regime 
introduced economic changes to improve the standard of living thereby to 
assuage popular discontent. The new regime appointed an Economic 
Committee (Gazdasagi Bizottsag), a group of reform-minded experts, to 
propose ways of revising Hungary's economic system. The committee's 
report marked the first step on Hungary's road to economic reform. Of the 
many changes introduced, only list a few will be listed. The introduction 
of hourly wages in November, mentioned above, was not reversed.83 In 
1957 companies were allowed to experiment with various wage schemes. 
A plan was drawn up to lease up to 6% of small retail outlets and restau-
rants to private individuals. To encourage private ownership in the service 
sector, tax rates were lowered.84 The hated obligatory delivery system for 
peasants, which was initially abolished by the Nagy government, was 
never re-instituted. Over 60% of the peasants left the cooperatives during 
the revolution and many started or restarted their private farms. In 1957, 
Kadar to appease the party hardliners — both at home and in Moscow — 
restarted the collectivization of agriculture, but allowed peasants to keep 
some land private. In 1957 social insurance was extended to members of 
agricultural cooperatives.85 
The result of all the changes was that between 1957 and 1960 
consumption grew more rapidly than national income. Per capita real 
income was 50 percent higher in 1960 than it had been in 1950. (Accord-
ing to the University of Groningen data the Hungarian per capita GDP in 
1960 was $3,649, a 47% increase compared to the per capita GDP of 
$2,480 in 1950.) 
Hungary began to make its own goulash (communism), though 
for the time being there was little meat in the stew. 
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The Revolution and Industrial Workers: 
the Disintegration and Reconstruction 
of Socialism, 1953-1958 
Mark Pittaway 
Just over three weeks after the arrival of Soviet troops in Budapest to 
remove the revolutionary government of Imre Nagy in November 1956, 
the party newspaper for the industrial county of Komarom-Esztergom, 
announced to local miners that "the workers' councils (the revolutionary 
organs in the factories) had been given responsibility for the economic 
life of the country." In negotiations with the new Soviet-imposed govern-
ment of Janos Kadar, the authorities signalled a willingness to make 
marked concessions the demands of miners, a key group within the work-
force of the county. The "restoration of certain old privileges" like "the 
annual coal entitlement, rent-free accommodation and lighting, the re-
integration of factories that had belonged to the mining enterprises with 
the mines" and "an expansion in family house-building" featured on the 
agenda of such discussions.1 Talk of such concessions occurred against 
the background of a miners' strike that supported the political goals of the 
Revolution and which paralysed the Hungarian economy. In Tatabanya, 
the centre of the largest of the county's two coal fields, the Revolution 
had been ignited by a combination of a sympathy strike of the city's bus 
drivers with the demonstrators in Budapest and a major demonstration led 
by younger miners. While the local party in the city and the mines did 
not collapse to the same extent as in the rest of the country, the implosion 
of the regime at national level allowed the demonstrators to seize control 
of the mines locally, set up anti-communist workers' councils, and 
effectively organize a strike in support of the political demands of the 
Revolution. Though they returned to work for three days in early Novem-
ber, believing the political demands of the Revolution to have been 
accomplished, the Soviet invasion provoked a protracted miners' strike, 
which dragged on for a full two months, causing coal shortages that 
closed schools and undermined medical services into early 1957.2 
The targeted use of repression was at least as central to breaking 
the strike in the coal fields, as was the promise of concessions. Yet, 
repression often proved to be counter-productive; in Tatabanya the local 
police were forced to concede that the operations of the reconstructed 
state security agencies throughout December had not only provoked open 
demonstrations, but had in fact bolstered support for the strike.3 Where 
local state security forces intervened to arrest the organizers of demonstra-
tions and strikes it was forced to legitimate their actions. When in 
December, one attempt to arrest such organizers provoked an explosion of 
armed conflict in one of the city's neighbourhoods, the party newspaper 
found it necessary to argue that the members of the new state security 
agencies were ordinary mine-workers dedicated to meet the demands of 
the "people" who "wanted to live in peace and quiet".4 As the post-
revolutionary regime was consolidated, it was forced to build on the 
fiction that no "honest" worker had anything to fear from repression; only 
groups of "counter-revolutionary" agitators. The myth, projected by the 
Kadar regime, of the events of late 1956 as a "counter-revolution", in 
which anti-socialist agitators, "reactionaries" and "agents of imperialism" 
had stirred up discontent in order to overthrow socialism, had its local 
counterpart.5 In Tatabanya the overwhelmingly working-class character of 
the Revolution posed problems for the "revolutionary government of 
workers' and peasants". Therefore the local myth of the "counter-
revolution", underpinned by the most significant political trials, sought to 
attribute the events to the most anti-communist activists in the factories 
and more significantly to local professionals, who, despite holding key 
positions in the city's revolutionary committee, were in reality either 
marginal or had been unable to control the consequences of the explosion 
of working-class anger.6 
While repression was far from successful as a tool for consoli-
dating the regime, the wave of working-class anger was beaten back 
through other means. The fear, rather than the fact, of political retribution 
had encouraged many of those who joined the demonstrations in the city 
to leave Hungary outright. In Tatabanya's Mine No. XI, at the end of 
January 1957, only 60 percent of those who had been employed the pre-
vious October continued to work there; some had left for other parts of 
the country, others had joined the flight from Hungary.7 Furthermore, 
forms of moral coercion deployed by the regime about the effects of 
shortages of coal, that were products of the miners' strike, on schools, 
hospitals and the economy in general, proved highly effective in 
mobilizing those who remained.8 These were often backed by more naked 
forms of blackmail — in December 1956 the county party paper warned 
that "if there is no coal, then Tatabanya's food provision will be in 
danger."9 The failure of protest to remove the regime and intensifying 
economic hardship provided the central motivating factor for miners to go 
back to work.10 Yet breaking the strike alone did not translate into support 
for the regime; a sullen mood in the mines in early 1957 masked a 
climate of deep-seated, but silent anger, which occasionally broke 
through, carried in rumours of imminent strikes and protest.11 
The regime consolidated its authority in Tatabanya, and among 
the working class nationwide by following through promises of addressing 
directly the material grievances of workers. Most miners expected the re-
imposition of socialist rule to lead directly to the return of despotic poli-
cies of plan-based mobilization in the workplace and those that had 
produced goods shortage and penury before the Revolution outside it. 
During the year following the Revolution the apparent openness of the 
party to working-class opinion in the city generated "surprise".12 Measu-
res like the large increases in wages, the initiation of a housing construc-
tion programme, and other welfare measures underpinned this at national 
level; while more locally, unpopular systems of remuneration at the coal-
face were abolished, and certain benefits-in-kind were restored.13 Through 
such measures a year after the end of the strike, party officials were able 
to record, displaying some surprise, a degree a cautious optimism; "it 
seems", commented one, "that there is trust in the party and the govern-
ment".14 This popularity was conditional and to some extent belied the 
fact that few accepted the official arguments about the nature of the 
Revolution, when questioned by propagandists about their attitudes to 
what had happened in 1956 while miners began referring to it by calling 
it the "counter-revolution", they often slipped into describing it "a 
revolution". Most took the stance that "you should give us an honest 
wage, I 'm not bothered with the rest."15 
The defeat of the Revolution and the consolidation of the Kadar 
regime in Tatabanya, as in other working-class communities across 
Hungary, presented an ambiguous picture of an event defeated through the 
highly selective, rather than the very widespread use of force. Moral and 
economic coercion played a larger role, upon which were laid substantial 
concessions in the workplace and the community. While this produced a 
degree of popularity and support for the Kadar regime by the end of 
1957, it co-existed with profound awareness of the regime's deeper illegi-
timacy, as government imposed through force-of-arms by the armies of a 
foreign power. This outcome points to the need to look at the 1956 
Revolution in a new and different way. It was certainly not "the first 
domino", which led irreversibly to the decay, decline and collapse of state 
socialism thirty-three years later as many have suggested.16 While the 
revival of the memory of the 1956 Revolution played a fundamental role 
in the events of 1989 in Hungary, because of the way it symbolized the 
regime's illegitimacy, in the short and medium-term its defeat led to the 
regime's consolidation; yet this consolidation occurred on the basis of a 
very different pattern of socialist governance to that which had charac-
terised its rule during the early 1950s, and which drew lessons from the 
outbreak of the 1956 Revolution.18 Given that the Kadar regime was a 
"post-1956" regime,19 it is not surprising that in its dynamic of construc-
tion, consolidation, decay and collapse it embodied many of the ambi-
guities that were visible during the outcome of the Revolution. 
The paradoxical co-existence of the stability of the Kadar regime 
with perceptions of its deeper political illegitimacy was enabled, in part, 
by the fact that the Revolution and its outcome demonstrated definitively 
to Hungary's anti-communist majority that the country's post-war political 
order was not going to be dismantled either immediately, or easily. The 
collapse of the country's pre-war regime, German occupation and then 
Soviet occupation at the end of the Second World War, created a society 
that was deeply divided. Fear of communist dictatorship among the 
conservative majority, and a parallel fear of the right among the left-wing 
minority polarized Hungarian society during the immediate post-war 
years, creating the social roots of eventual dictatorship.20 On the political 
right, many believed in the inevitably of conflict among the wartime 
allies, and that only an effective demonstration of anti-Soviet sentiment in 
Hungary would bring military intervention from Britain and the United 
States, in the interests of "liberating" the territory from the clutches of the 
Red Army. During preparations for the first post-war elections in autumn 
1945 in conservative regions like the north-western county of Gyor-
Moson local opinion held that if the country "votes for the Smallholders' 
Party (the main party of the centre-right — M.P.) then the Soviets will 
leave the country, if they vote for the Communists they'll stay forever."21 
With the creation of overt socialist dictatorship in the similarly conserva-
tive south-west of the country, growing political control led many to 
believe that the new socialist regime's days were numbered, as it would 
be removed as the result of an imminent war between the superpowers.22 
As the dictatorship intensified its politics of confrontation and social 
transformation, especially through agricultural collectivization campaigns 
in rural areas, the belief in imminent western intervention to end socialist 
rule motivated explicit resistance. In villages on the north-western border 
in August 1950, smallholders refused to pay taxes or deliver foodstuffs to 
the authorities on the grounds that "the English were coming".23 These 
expectations of deliverance through foreign intervention encouraged many 
to interpret the aggressive propaganda of western radio stations and other 
propaganda actions, such as the balloon campaigns, launched by similar 
bodies, as a promise of "liberation".24 
In this context the defeat of the Revolution and its failure to spark 
foreign military intervention against the Soviets produced a feeling of 
hopelessness and a gradual acceptance of the relative permanence of the 
socialist regime. Belief in the imminence of foreign intervention was 
conspicuous in anti-regime rumour during 1957 by its absence.25 The deep 
seated climate of resignation was expressed by an engineer in one Fejer 
county factory in March 1957; "only a third world war can help us, which 
will break out sooner or later; in the meantime it will be difficult, but 
afterwards the system will disappear."26 While one immediate popular 
response to this "culture of defeat"27 among anti-communists was to 
retreat into the domestic sphere, into alcoholism or religiosity,28 it laid the 
foundations for the tacit acceptance of the reality of Kadarism by many of 
its opponents, particularly its rural and urban middle-class ones, and thus, 
their integration into the system during the 1960s.29 While the notion of 
the "culture of defeat" explains many of the paradoxes of the post-1956 
period among those who always opposed Hungary's post-war socialist 
order, as well as the behaviour of those left-wing intellectuals, who 
initially supported socialism, but turned to Imre Nagy and notions of a 
reformed socialism in the mid-1950s, it does not explain dominant 
working-class attitudes and patterns of behaviour. Hungary's industrial 
workers were not homogeneous politically to be sure, but as the case of 
Tatabanya shows, their awareness of the illegitimacy of the Kadar regime, 
co-existed with an extraordinary popularity among many that was gained 
at a very early date. By 1958, the government's popularity was clearly 
discernible among workers in a number of different sectors and geog-
raphical locations.30 This is especially surprising given the extensive 
participation of workers in the events of the Revolution. This, in turn, 
points to the need to consider the role of workers in the Revolution in 
greater depth, in order to explain their behaviour afterwards and thus tease 
out the nature of the relationship between the socialist state and working 
class in the Hungarian context. 
Despite the speedy consolidation of the Kadar regime in working-
class communities, the party leadership remained deeply shocked at the 
extent of worker participation in and support for the Revolution. In early 
1957 party officials commented with dismay that among the thousands 
who left the western county of Gyor-Moson-Sopron for Austria, there 
were many "workers from traditional working-class families."31 With the 
regime's consolidation party officials underplayed the role and extent of 
working class discontent in the Revolution, arguing that the majority 
simply remained "passive" in the face of "counter-revolutionary" mobili-
zation. This was because "the working class was primarily disappointed in 
the party leadership and did not see the party as the true representative of 
their class."32 The notion of industrial workers as "passive" during the 
Revolution was, however, a myth, but so too was the party's collective 
notion of what constituted the "working class". In general terms, the 
party's use of the term "working class" tended to subsume all wage 
workers into an imaginary and homogeneous entity, which universally 
shared the values of those of the skilled, urban, male elite of the work-
force who had supported the labour movement pre-1948. This 
underpinned notions — prevalent in the discussions among leading party 
officials after 1956 — of the "working class" as a social body that would 
act as the bulwark of the regime.33 These were underpinned by a hegemo-
nic discourse of the working class outside the party leadership that 
stressed the pre-eminence of the male, skilled elite and subordinated other 
more peripheral groups — this discourse of the working class had 
structured hierarchical relationships between workers in workplaces and 
communities since the end of the nineteenth century. It was embedded in 
the practice and common-sense of the labour movement, and came to 
represent a pattern of relationships and cultural practices that shaped the 
contours of working-class identity by the mid-twentieth century. 
The industrial and labour policies of Hungary's socialist regime 
after 1948, caused a fundamental breach between industrial workers and 
the "new" state. In the workplace the regime attacked the privileges of the 
skilled through the introduction of labour competition, new wage forms 
and different management structures. At the same time they expanded the 
workforce aiming to subvert the hierarchies of gender, generation and 
those based on distinctions between the urban and the rural. Their econo-
mic policies produced endemic income insecurity, widespread penury and 
severe shortage, while they responded to the tensions these produced with 
repression. These policies caused the crumbling of working-class support 
for the regime during the early 1950s, but the patterns of relations in the 
workplace caused by the chaos produced by the state's industrialization 
drive, allowed hierarchical relationships to reproduce themselves under 
new circumstances. Skilled workers, though profoundly alienated from the 
regime, continued to sit at the apex of modified hierarchical relationship 
in which greater numbers of working-class youth, women and those from 
rural areas were cast to a discontented periphery.34 
Considerable working-class anger alone was insufficient to pro-
voke widespread mobilization — between 1953 and 1956, the initiation of 
the "New Course" under the government of Imre Nagy, followed by ever 
more bitter struggles within the party, led to the fragmentation of the 
authority of the regime. These were met, in turn, by a greater expression 
of the considerable working-class discontent that persisted in Hungary's 
factories, mines, and on its construction sites, that were never successfully 
alleviated by any of the protagonists in the struggle within the party. The 
onset of the revolutionary events in October 1956 was met with a social 
explosion in which many working-class Hungarians, particularly those 
young workers cast to the periphery, provided the most militant sections 
of the working-class crowds which drove forward the Revolution in the 
country's towns and cities. Different groups within the working class, 
especially the skilled, the young and rural workers, participated in the 
Revolution in highly distinctive ways. The re-construction the regime's 
authority was underpinned by different processes within different groups 
but, given the cultural power, employed by older, urban, skilled male 
workers within hegemonic discourses of the working class, it was the 
regime's ability to repair its relations with this group that was fundamen-
tal to the consolidation of its authority. 
The Politics of Gradual Collapse: From Reform to Rebellion, 1953-6 
The spring and early summer of 1953 was a period of intense worker 
protest across East-Central Europe that demonstrated the tensions, which 
socialist rule had created. In May workers in the tobacco plant in Plovdiv 
in Bulgaria rioted as a result of unfavourable changes made to work 
norms. In Czechoslovakia a currency reform was introduced in the same 
month cutting into wages and eliminating savings, which resulted in 
generalised revolt in Plzen. In the German Democratic Republic decisions 
to tighten work norms led to a wave of demonstrations and strikes on 17th 
June 1953 across the country.35 Whilst the events in the GDR did not lead 
to open mass protest in Hungary, they had an electrifying effect in 
workplaces. The notion that a population could express its discontent 
openly in a socialist state began, albeit slowly, to lift the lid on a well of 
discontent. Industrial workers in Budapest stated openly that "the 
Hungarian party can learn from the German party that it is not correct to 
apply pressure all the time through the norms." In a neighbouring factory 
one party member called for the smallholders to be given back land that 
had been "donated" to agricultural co-operatives.36 
Against this background of growing social upheaval and under 
instruction from the Kremlin the Hungarian leadership modified their 
course. The country's effective dictator, Matyas Rakosi was forced to 
relinquish his position as Prime Minister, though not, crucially as secre-
tary of the ruling party. His successor as head of government, Imre Nagy, 
launched a policy that suspended collectivization drives in rural areas and 
placed the problem of working-class material discontent at the centre of 
government action.37 The announcement of the "New Course" led to both 
the growing public expression of working-class discontent,38 and official 
attempts through the press to address the neglect of workers' "legitimate 
concerns" by the authorities in workplaces across the country.39 More 
concretely it was met through a policy of concessions; the state moved to 
permit smallholders to leave agricultural co-operatives, fines and criminal 
penalties for work discipline infringements were revoked, an amnesty was 
granted to political prisoners, a higher priority was given to the imp-
lementation of protective legislation in the workplace, and wages were 
raised.40 
In terms of their impact on the working class "New Course" 
policies had two effects. On the one hand they failed to transform deci-
sively the material conditions of industrial workers, except the skilled 
elites in some sectors. On the other, they strengthened many of the 
hierarchies that had reproduced themselves under the circumstances of the 
shortage economy of the early 1950s. This reinforcing of hierarchy was 
the product of the effects of different policies on different groups of 
workers, and these shaped the political attitudes of these groups towards 
Nagy's reformist project. Among groups on the periphery of the work-
force, Nagy's project attained most popularity among anti-communist 
rural workers. This was not due, however, to the program's effect on 
industry, but on agriculture, as many felt the "New Course" heralded an 
end to agricultural collectivization. Some had greeted its announcement by 
attempting to quit their jobs and return to agriculture; at Moson-
magyarovar's aluminum smelter the 250 workers, who owned land, tried 
to quit the moment the program was announced. Their attempts were 
blocked by the plant director. Though this resulted in an explosion of 
discontent, only 100 departed illegally.4' As local party bodies and state 
authorities fought a rearguard action to prevent the dissolution of 
agricultural collectives and implemented more informal policies of 
administrative restriction against farmers,42 this illusion dissipated. Despite 
this, however, the post-1953 period was a relatively good one for many 
rural workers, especially for those who belonged to a household with a 
farm that could produce for the market, as the incomes of individual 
smallholders rose faster, albeit from a much lower base, than those of 
industrial workers.43 Though such workers had never accepted the legi-
timacy of the socialist regime, favourable policies towards agriculture did 
allow Nagy to win a degree of personal popularity in the rural milieux in 
which such workers lived. In one village in western Hungary Nagy's 
relaxation of the collectivization drive was compared to "the liberation of 
the serfs in 1848".44 Yet the rising incomes of some rural workers and 
continuing problems of food shortage in urban areas exacerbated the 
unpopularity of such workers, with many urban residents, especially in 
Budapest, who argued that the "New Course" was a "peasants' policy" 
rather than a "workers' policy" — a sentiment which legitimized the 
casting of rural workers to the periphery of the workforce.45 
The climate of the "New Course" reinforced the peripheral posi-
tion of other groups within the workforce that had been generated by the 
reproduction of hierarchy within the working class during the early 1950s. 
This was especially the case with women, where Nagy's arrival in office 
accompanied attempts to implement protective legislation in the work-
place, which it reinforced. This tended not to protect women in unhealthy 
and low-paying jobs in traditionally feminized sectors, but instead acted to 
remove women from those traditionally regarded as male, and high-
paying, where they had gained a toe-hold as a consequence of the affir-
mative action campaigns of the early 1950s.46 Working-class youth, inclu-
ding young skilled workers, remained in a relatively marginal position in 
workplaces across the country. Their peripheral positions and consequent 
low wages led to considerable discontent that in turn drove many of them 
to seek better paid employment in neighbouring establishments.47 Placed 
in a peripheral position and deeply alienated, and often influenced by 
propaganda in western radio broadcasts many rejected the socialist system 
absolutely; in the Tatabanya mines one young miner urged a work-mate 
to "go to the West where at least you are valued for as long as you can 
work, here you are just treated like a dog to whom they occasionally 
throw a bone so you don't starve."48 
The hardening of reproduced hierarchies in the workforce was 
driven, in part, because Nagy's relaxation of despotic policies in the 
workplace had led to an intensification of informal bargaining that favo-
ured the older, male, skilled elite. Often sympathetic party members, 
union officials and lower-level managers had participated actively in 
opening the floodgates to a wave of bargaining in late 1953 that enshrined 
considerable informal control over remuneration by the skilled elite in 
everyday workplace practice.49 Often, despite state intentions and although 
they often complained about their "inadequacy",50 the wage increases 
mandated by the Nagy government in late 1953 further boosted the 
position of experienced skilled workers.51 In some sectors, especially coal 
mining the increases in skilled workers' wages were substantial, as they 
were linked to a premium system, which ensured that when it was intro-
duced in late 1953 face-workers' wages increased by 22.3 percent in a 
two-month period, when production fell by 4 percent.52 Wage increases of 
this order generated a degree of satisfaction among miners, which went 
some way to defuse discontent.53 
Yet, despite the reinforcement of their position within the work-
force as a result of the policies of the Nagy government in the workplace, 
the skilled elite as a whole were far from satisfied — something that was 
in part a product of economic chaos during 1954, when shortages 
intensified and power-supply problems forced industry into short-time 
working during the winter months.54 Yet, it was also fed by a perception 
that in a climate that was relatively permissive to agriculture and to trade, 
urban workers were losing ground in income and prestige; a sentiment 
that led them to eventually welcome Nagy's dismissal in 1955.55 It would 
take Imre Nagy's fall, and the policies pursued after his removal, to 
persuade the skilled elite of his merits. The turn away from reform, 
fronted by Nagy's successor, Andras Hegediis, installed by Rakosi, who at 
the helm of the party had never accepted the "New Course", was 
prompted by the continuing economic chaos that gripped the country 
during 1954 and early 1955, and aimed to return to policies of renewed 
socialist industrialization and collectivization. Young workers, whose 
peripheral position had been barely touched under Nagy, remained 
profoundly antagonistic to the regime. Rural workers were infuriated by 
the renewed collectivization drives in rural areas, although anti-rural 
sentiment remained strong among their urban colleagues.''6 The skilled 
elite were confronted with the regime's attempts to hold down the wage 
bill — their attempts to increase production norms in heavy industrial 
sectors and to limit the impact of the premium system in the coal mines, 
that had guaranteed higher wages provoked enormous opposition. This 
opposition was indeed greater in many factories than it had been to 
equivalent measures in the early 1950s — in some heavy engineering 
factories skilled workers were no longer frightened, and refused to work 
until the older, abolished norms were re-instated.57 The tightening of the 
premium system in the mines provoked a storm of complaints often 
supported by local unions and party cells.58 
The pattern of reform, followed by clampdown, had antagonized 
most of the working class, and crucially its skilled elite. It also ensured 
that the experience of restrictive policies in 1955 created a popular hunger 
for further reform, in a context in which the authorities faced a workforce 
that would not be cowed as easily as it had been in the early 1950s.59 
This provided an explosive social background for the crisis of the socialist 
regime during 1956. 
The year of upheaval began in February with Nikita Khruschev's 
denunciation of Stalin, the purges and the cult of personality to the Twen-
tieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. The speech had an electri-
fying effect in Hungary,60 as it weakened fatally the confidence of many 
working-class party members in the regime. When Khruschev's denun-
ciation of Stalin was revealed to closed party meetings across the country, 
working-class Communists reacted with total incredulity. In Sztalinvaros 
party members in the factories questioned the local leadership asking 
them: "Stalin led the party for thirty years, how can it be that his mistakes 
have been discovered now?" and "What is the current situation in 
Hungary with the cult of personality? Was Rajk wrong?" alongside more 
mundane questions: "I own a copy of Stalin's complete works and have 
read them all. What do I do with them now?"61 In Budapest's United 
Lighting and Electrical Factory the Khruschev speech soon became an 
open topic of conversation. Workers maintained that "the cult of persona-
lity was just as marked here (in Hungary) as in the Soviet Union, especi-
ally among the top leadership."62 
As the year progressed, the growing militancy of the debates in 
the Petofi kor, the intellectual debating forum of the opposition to Rakosi, 
especially its debate on press freedom increased the boldness of workers, 
especially those among the skilled elite, in expressing their views — it 
also underlined growing support for major political change among all 
sections of the working class. In the United Lighting and Electrical 
Factory, workers argued that "the leadership is destroying the national 
economy. The people no longer believe anything they say and they have 
no role anymore."63 The news of the riots in Poznari and the mounting 
political crisis in Poland contributed to the snowballing of politicized 
discontent among the skilled elite; for many "the riots broke out in 
Poznari not because of the enemy and foreign spies, but because twelve 
years after the end of the war living standards remained low."64 As Rakosi 
was removed as party leader and replaced by Erno Gero in July, the loss 
of regime control became more obvious as did the spread of open popular 
opposition. Workers complained not about Rakosi's removal from power, 
but the method by which it was achieved, arguing that it demonstrated 
Hungary's lack of national sovereignty. Furthermore there were growing 
signs of belief in the effectiveness of collective action; in the Ikarus bus 
plant it was argued that "under pressure from the masses the leadership 
has abolished the peace loans, if we exert even stronger pressure we will 
be able to force new measures to raise our living standards."65 The effect 
of the combination of a loss of confidence within the party in its ability to 
govern and rising discontent was enormous; by September there was "a 
real feeling of panic" among members of the apparatus in Budapest.66 
By summer 1956, the crumbling of the regime was met with 
greater political assertiveness from among the working class, particularly 
its urban, skilled, male elite. They were often supported by some factory 
and union committees who joined their rebellion. This climate was fuelled 
by an obviously worsening economic situation. In Budapest's Duclos 
Mining Machinery Factory in August 1956 the factory party committee 
issued a statement demanding that "the rights of the workers be secured" 
in disputes with management; that workers were right "to demand a just 
wage system" and that the overly "formal monthly production meetings" 
be replaced with true forums of factory democracy.67 Within other work-
places working-class anger was directed at the autocracy and arrogance of 
management, and the official functionaries of the party, union and youth 
organization. In the Chinoin Pharmaceuticals Factory, skilled workers 
complained in spring 1956 that "the cult of personality manifests itself 
inside the factory, particularly among the middle and upper level 
economic cadres. It has been common for workers not to criticize, or 
make suggestions just because they were scared of the management."68 
Generalized rebellion among oil workers at the Lovaszi Oil Drilling Plant 
in July 1956 was provoked by what workers saw as the "unjustified" 
payment of large plan fulfilment premiums to management, at a time 
when workers' wages had fallen. Most complaints concerned low wages 
and social provision, the focus of their attack was on management. Karoly 
Papp, the director of the plant, was attacked openly for promoting a "cult 
of personality" around himself, and using factory property to celebrate his 
birthday lavishly.69 
As part of this wave of criticism, the skilled demanded greater 
democracy in the factories. One fitter in the Duclos Mining Machinery 
Factory complained in August that "it is useless complaining to the party 
and factory committee because they can't do anything. What happens here 
is basically what the director says." He saw the only remedy as being "to 
give the trade union a greater role."70 By September the factory press 
began publishing similar complaints. One former trade unionist wrote in 
the paper of Budapest's Danube Shoe Factory that 
in the period following the liberation old, committed trade 
unionists were promoted to become managers. We should say 
clearly that later these comrades became detached from the 
workers, they became one sided and didn't speak up sufficiently 
for their interests... new people filled the trade union and the 
beginnings of the co-option, not the election of the (new) 
leaders (of the unions) began... the union leaders regarded 
anyone who stood up for their interests as the enemy, and dealt 
with them in this manner.71 
Yet as the mood for change in workplaces gathered pace, the regime was 
close to collapse. The growing thaw in relations with Yugoslavia, the re-
burial of Laszlo Rajk on the 6th October, the retention of power by Gero, 
discredited by his Stalinist past, and the lack of any clear leadership from 
the regime pushed the situation to crisis point. When the Revolution 
began on the 23rd October, with student demonstrations in Budapest, 
industrial workers would play more radical roles than they had done 
beforehand. 
The Power of the Working-Class Crowd: October-November, 1956 
In the prison camp attached to Mine No. XVIII in the geographically 
isolated, western Hungarian mining town of Oroszlany, many of the 
prisoners, who worked in the mines under sentence, concluded in mid-
October that "they wouldn't be shut inside for much longer". As students 
prepared to demonstrate in Budapest to secure political change, at noon 
on 23rd October the prisoners attempted to overpower the guards at the 
mine entrance and break out. The factory guard was only able to restore 
order by firing on the prisoners, killing three. When three days later, the 
local Revolution was launched by a crowd of around 500 young workers, 
who marched through the town shouting "Work! Bread! Rakosi to the 
Gallows! (Munkat! Kenyeret, Rakosinak kotelet)", they were motivated as 
much by solidarity with the prisoners as with demonstrators in Budapest. 
After the leaders of the demonstration delivered their demands to the local 
radio station, around 150 proceeded to Mine No. XVII where they freed 
the prisoners, after the guard refused to fire on the demonstrators.72 
While much of the historiography of the revolution has tended to 
see revolutionary mobilization as being sparked by the events in Budapest 
on 23rd October, the opening of the archives and research into the "local 
revolutions" has qualified this Budapest-centred account, unveiling evi-
dence of much unrest, just as in Oroszlany, that took place before or as 
the events in Budapest got underway.73 Student mobilization in provincial 
centres such as Debrecen, Miskolc and Szeged was marked, while the 
authorities were made aware of the simmering discontent and strained 
patience of industrial workers in their cities.74 Even where the explosion 
of revolution occurred in response to the events in Budapest, as in many 
of the capital's working-class suburbs, or in Tatabanya as was discussed 
above, the signs of political mobilization were present prior to the 23rd 
October, while local events themselves were driven by dynamics parti-
cular to their location.75 
The Revolution, right across the country, involved a rapid re-
location of political power from the party and regime to the revolutionary 
crowd, which during the last week of October and the first days of 
November acted as the locus of political legitimacy. In cities across the 
country, the crowd, organized through initially peaceful demonstrations, 
assumed the role as the representative of the "will of the people", 
demanding a change in the political order.76 Crowds played a central role 
in the "cleansing" of public space, through the deliberate and at times, 
almost theatrical removal of monuments and artifacts associated with 
either the Red Army or the socialist regime.77 The frequent incidents 
where representatives of either the army or state security services fired on 
initially non-violent crowds after 23rd October, both radicalized the revolu-
tion and underlined the illegitimacy of the regime.78 Such acts of violence 
against revolutionary crowds bolstered their claim to act in the name of 
the people as a whole. Furthermore, they could and frequently did confer 
their legitimacy on revolutionary organs set up during the Revolution, 
while they played a role in supervising the actions of other organs that 
displayed an ambiguous attitude towards the will of the revolutionary 
crowd.79 
Though the revolutionary crowd appeared as the unified embo-
diment of the will of the nation, the crowds were far from homogeneous 
either politically or socially. In many towns, like Zalaegerszeg, secondary 
school students and industrial workers provided the core of the demons-
trations that ignited local revolutions, which attracted members of other 
occupational groups to join vocal demands for change.80 Workers played 
a central role in the demonstrations in urban centres right across the 
country, and often were over-represented among the dead and injured 
when crowds were fired upon; of those killed when the state security 
agencies fired on demonstrators in Mosonmagyarovar on 26 October 
workers made up 65.15 percent.81 Workers were not the only people in 
the revolutionary crowds, though they played a crucial role in many, but 
the different groups within the workforce played very different roles 
either within the crowd; had very different relationships to the crowd; or, 
participated in crowds in different locations from many of their work-
mates. Working-class youth were the most radical group in that they 
drove political change, and were most likely to participate in armed 
groups during the Revolution. The skilled were the most split politically 
and participated most actively in the struggles for control of the factories, 
while rural workers tended to return to spread the Revolution to their 
villages, and largely sought the reversal of agricultural collectivization. 
The role of young workers in providing a group of militants who 
were prepared to drive forward the Revolution was fundamental. In Buda-
pest, younger workers were frequently drawn to the initial demonstrations; 
played a central role in radicalizing those demonstrations, and then in 
spreading disturbances back to the industrial suburbs. One second-year 
industrial apprentice in the United Lighting and Electrical Factory, I.M., 
was working on 23 October when "I heard that there was a demonstration 
in Budapest in Stalin square." Immediately catching the tram and trolley-
bus into central Pest he was forced to get off some way short of the 
square, because "the crowd was so big, that the trolleybuses stood in a 
jam and everyone went on foot."82 Often youth participation in the early 
stages of the Revolution resembled lower-level and less political forms of 
youth disorder in industrial communities.83 One group of young working-
class males on hearing the demonstrations determined to go to the hostel 
for local student nurses, and "take the girls off to the demonstration" in 
Budapest. Once they discovered that the director of hostel had locked the 
inhabitants in, they began to shout "Russians go home, Rakosi to the 
gallows" until the police arrived.84 
Outside the capital, young workers played a central role in the 
first demonstrations in many communities. In Tatabanya, while striking 
local bus drivers provided the catalyst for the local revolution, they joined 
younger workers in seeking to transform their strike into an occupation of 
public space, as apprentices from the mining technical school and young 
miners from the workers' hostels provided the core of initial demonstra-
tions. The spontaneity of the demonstrations was demonstrated by the 
confusion of different slogans — some shouted the old, socialist slogan of 
"bread! work!" while others sang the himnusz — Hungary's national 
anthem — as they marched.85 As the number of participants in the 
demonstrations increased, young workers took key roles in the "cleansing" 
of public space of monuments associated with either the Soviets or the 
socialist regime; in Nagykanizsa, those who pulled down the Soviet war 
memorial in the town were led by a twenty-six year old worker, whose 
working life had been filled through a series of jobs in the mining and 
construction sectors.86 The activities of working-class youth extended not 
merely to violence against the symbols of the socialist regime, but they 
played a direct role in violence against those they perceived to be 
representatives of the regime. They frequently acted as the "agents" of the 
revolutionary crowd in carrying out demands for removing Communists 
from the head of public institutions. In Ujpest's Danube Shoe Factory, the 
belief of the crowd that "the workers' council was in the hands of the 
Communist director", led to four armed young workers, led by the son of 
one factory employee, deciding they would storm the factory and "arrest" 
the director, as part of a process through which the workers' council 
would be purged.87 
The issue of violence raises the question of the process by which 
working-class youths within demonstrations armed themselves and formed 
themselves into armed groups. The boundaries between these armed 
groups of young workers and the informally-organized "national guards", 
that nominally served local revolutionary committees answerable to the 
crowd was a fluid one. In Tatabanya, a small section of the official 
demonstration successfully laid siege to the local police station freeing 
prisoners and gaining access to weapons. These were supplemented by 
those given to them after laying siege to a local army barracks. While 
some of the radical, armed demonstrations went to join the "fight" in the 
capital, a core of around thirty remained to form a "national guard" 
detachment, to guarantee the local revolution.88 In Budapest, where 
peaceful demonstrations were fired upon, and with the subsequent inter-
vention of Soviet troops, young workers who had joined the demons-
trations moved to arm themselves, by demanding the weapons that were 
stored in factories for civil defense purposes. During the early hours of 
24th October, young workers joined other demonstrators in raiding 
factories for weapons — not all were undefended; in some, remembered 
one young worker "the porter on the door was already armed with a 
machine gun."89 In some factories, armed bands made up of young 
workers, and factory security guards engaged in gun battles at factory 
gates; in some cases, workers reporting for the morning shift were caught 
and injured in the cross-fire, though in the vast majority of cases the 
authorities were able to repel these attacks.90 
The attempts of the authorities to retain control over both fac-
tories, and more broadly, working-class communities foundered on the 
breadth of support among workers for the overthrow of the regime; even 
though many workers were less radical than their younger workmates. In 
factories in Budapest suburbs like Ujpest, the student demonstrations 
provoked considerable sympathy among workers on 23rd October; in one 
meeting in the Chinoin Pharmaceuticals Factory "a university student 
spoke and read out their demands expressed as a series of points... some 
of the points were met with enthusiastic applause."91 On the morning of 
the same day the "sixteen points" — the demands of the Budapest student 
demonstrators92 — were circulated among the workers of the 
neighbouring United Lighting and Electrical factory, where they had "a 
considerable impact".93 In the Chinoin the mood had only been defused 
by the director urging workers to "await the view of the party of the 
demonstration".94 The denunciation of the demonstrators as "counter-
revolutionaries" by Erno Gero in his radio broadcast, the consequent 
demonstrations in front of the headquarters of national radio and the firing 
on crowds by the state security services there, followed by the news of 
the intervention of Red Army troops overnight turned the mood in the 
capital's industrial suburbs into one of fury. In the United Lighting and 
Electrical factory the following morning two-thirds of the workers arrived 
at work, but during the morning the skilled workers in the tool workshop 
and in the vacuum plant stopped work to organize a mass meeting of all 
workers that launched the strike and decided to remove the red star from 
above the factory gate.95 With the spread of the strike a large number of 
workers took to the streets to demand political change; over the course of 
the morning there "were many people in front of the State Department 
store, and leaflets were distributed from a black car. They shouted and 
told me that we were all on strike."96 The crowd destroyed the Soviet war 
memorial; its more radical wing turned on the local police station, yet a 
majority remained at the site of the war memorial and as a result of local 
activists addressing the crowd they chose a body of people to represent 
them and thus take over public administration. Thus the crowd delegated 
a local "revolutionary committee" through chaotic acclamation, rather than 
election as such.97 
The dynamic of a strike in support of the Revolution, providing 
the spark for the creation of the working-class crowd through demons-
trations was one which was replicated in other industrial areas across the 
country. In Nagykanizsa, the work stoppage began in the Transdanubian 
Oil Mining Machinery Factory where strikers called for support "for 
Budapest University students", on the "Russians to go home", "the 
introduction of a multi-party system", "the removal of Communist leaders 
and managers", "withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact" and "the removal of 
the Gero government".98 Joined by workers from other workplaces and 
carrying national flags the demonstrators removed the emblems of the 
peoples' republic from public buildings as they passed, converging on and 
demolishing the town's Soviet war memorial.99 The "election" of revoluti-
onary organs was conducted under the same kind of chaotic circumstances 
as with the revolutionary committee in Ujpest; though the election of the 
revolutionary organ in Tatabanya was to be conducted by a meeting of 
representatives of the city's factories and mines, it was chosen in 
confused circumstances and effectively drew its legitimacy from the fact 
that it represented the crowd that had assembled in the city the previous 
day.100 
The confusion in which revolutionary organs were created to 
oversee local public administration, and their problematic role given that 
their legitimacy was located in the revolutionary crowd, was replicated 
inside enterprises. As many striking workers left to take to the streets; 
new organs inside workplaces — the workers' councils — were created. 
Their ambiguous position was not only generated, as the example of the 
machine plant of Tatabanya's Coal Mining Trust shows, by the chaos in 
which they were created, but also by the fact that they could be used by 
local Communist cells as part of an attempt to maintain control of their 
enterprises. The election in this plant took a disorganized form: "they 
shouted out names, and the workers replied whether they agreed to their 
election or not. The first to be elected was L.I., the party secretary, then 
me, then F., and then the others."101 The first workers' council in an 
enterprise, that of Ujpest's United Lighting and Electrical Factory, was 
organized by the factory party committee, precisely with the intention of 
ensuring that "trustworthy people would be elected." This attempt was 
unsuccessful.102 Before revolution convulsed the whole country, the 
creation of workers' councils had been endorsed as a strategy by both the 
party and the official trade unions as means of controlling the economy in 
the circumstances of outright revolution.103 In the Gheorgiu-Dej Shipyards 
the plant's party organization used its workers' council as cover to 
prevent local revolutionary activists empowered by the territorial revolu-
tionary committee from gaining access to the site.104 
Even among the workers' councils where the party's attempts to 
influence the elections had foundered, and a coalition of skilled workers 
and engineers was able to take control, the councils were less radical than 
those elected on the streets — at least until the very end of October. In 
the forty-eight hours that followed the election of the United Lighting and 
Electrical Factory's Workers' Council, it re-made the institutions of the 
factory. The factory's managing director and one production director were 
removed; the managing director was replaced with the president of the 
workers' council. It announced that it saw itself as provisional, existing 
only until full elections could be held. It abolished the Personnel 
Department which under Rakosi had been used as the representative of 
both the party and the state security agency within the management of the 
factory. It further announced that the strike would be maintained and full 
wages would be paid, whilst low paid workers would be given a 15% 
wage rise and other workers 10%. It began the process moreover of more 
fundamental reforms to factory administration, beginning administrative 
de-centralisation and the elimination of bureaucracy, an overhaul of the 
payment-by-results wage system in the factory, and called for the 
establishment of a 71 member general workers' council and for the 
creation of shop workers' councils under it.105 The skilled worker majority 
whose thinking dominated the changes instituted by the workers' councils 
made their philosophy and distrust of centralization clear at a meeting of 
all the councils in Ujpest on 29th October; "the mistakes of recent years 
show that we have to build from below, we have to solve problems using 
our own strength." Yet, they also underlined their distrust of the 
radicalism of bodies like the territorial revolutionary committee in Ujpest 
that drew their legitimacy from the crowd; "it seems that the power that 
has been paid in the blood of our young people is falling into the hands 
of different, fractious elements."106 
The skilled elite that dominated the early workers' councils built 
on the calls for factory democracy that preceded the Revolution, forcing 
radical transformation of structures of management and working condi-
tions. But politically they tended to be more moderate than much of the 
crowd; in the words of the newspaper of the workers' council of the Ganz 
Carriage and Machine Factory "with the help of Imre Nagy, we have 
already been able to start out on a road that will bring about the realiza-
tion of our other demands.... But.. . we aren't going to demand the imme-
diate implementation of demands for which time is needed."107 This 
stance, coupled with the knowledge that many Communists continued to 
participate in workers' councils, brought them into conflict with the 
revolutionary crowd and its delegated representatives. Distrust could 
deteriorate into conflict; on 29th October an incorrect statement on 
national radio that 1,500 workers reported for work at the United Lighting 
and Electrical Factory provoked demonstrations against the workers' 
council, whom they accused of sabotaging the Revolution, despite the fact 
that the workers' council stated clearly that it "will not re-start work, until 
Soviet troops leave the country."108 The failure to pay wages to strikers at 
the neighbouring Duclos Mining Machinery plant provoked similar 
demonstrations at the factory gates,109 provoking complaints from the 
more radical workers in the crowd that this was because there were many 
"who did not represent the workers' interests" on the workers' council, 
leading to demands it be purged of Communists.110 The growing radica-
lization of the crowd, and the consolidation of the authority of territorial 
revolutionary committees, restricted the room for manoeuvre of many of 
the workers' councils, especially those which were more weakly led. In 
Ujpest, largely against the will of many of the workers' councils, 
especially that of the United Lighting and Electrical, the local revoluti-
onary committee decided that all the district's workers' councils were 
"provisional", and that "persons who had been functionaries could not be 
elected.'"11 
In many of the workers' councils the removal of former Com-
munist functionaries provoked a marked radicalization of their policies. In 
the Chinoin Pharmaceuticals Plant, the Ujpest revolutionary committee 
succeeded in re-constituting the workers' council. The Revolution inside 
the factory was instantly radicalized, moving further politically than 
earlier workers' councils, by banning Communists from organizing but 
allowing the newly re-founded Smallholders' Party to set up a work-based 
cell, and forcing the director to resign after he refused to renounce 
Communism.112 In workplaces where the influence of skilled workers and 
a labour movement tradition was weaker workers' councils tended to be 
more radical from the start. At the Nagylengyel Oil Drilling Plant, a 
workplace that was relatively new and located in a rural area, the forma-
tion of the workers' council took a very different direction to those in 
Budapest. On 28th October, the local official union organization attempted 
to call workers together to elect a workers' council — when the head of 
factory-level union began his speech by addressing the assembled workers 
as "Comrades!" he was shouted down by workers who responded with 
"your time is up!" An anti-communist workers' council was elected as a 
result of the meeting, whose president proclaimed that "the time of the 
Stalinists is over; we have to wipe them out." The mass meeting sacked 
most of the management, and crucially those responsible for setting 
norms.113 
While the democratic socialist vision of the urban, skilled elite 
that was implicit in the early workers' councils was eclipsed by the 
growing radicalism of crowds, and was largely absent in workplaces in 
which this group was less well-represented, worker-peasants focused 
rather on joining a rural revolution directed against agricultural collectivi-
zation. Among Komlo's miners there were many who "regularly went 
home for the weekend. So when the real Revolution came and the work 
was stopped, most of the people went home and did not return to Komlo 
for several weeks."114 While long-distance commuters melted away 
returning to their home villages, in areas where there was substantial 
commuting from villages to industrial establishments on a daily basis, the 
Revolution in urban, working-class communities ignited Revolution in 
rural areas. In the village of Vargesztes, on the fringes of the Tata 
coalfield, all but 6 of the 97 households had members working outside 
agriculture in 1956, virtually all in mining. News of revolutionary events 
in neighbouring Oroszlany fed growing anger in the village that, in turn 
led to the overthrow of the local council, and its replacement by a 
national committee elected by the crowd.115 In rural areas, the largest local 
industrial enterprise and its worker-peasant workforce played a crucial 
role in spreading revolution to the villages. In Bazakerretye after demons-
trators destroyed the Soviet war memorial, worker-peasants comman-
deered the trucks owned by the local oil drilling plant and used it to 
spread the revolution to their home villages, where they proclaimed that 
"there has already been a demonstration in Bazakerretye, it is time to burn 
the portraits of Stalin and Rakosi, and all red flags too."116 
In rural communities dominated by worker-peasants, issues of 
agricultural land ownership figured prominently, together with demands 
for Soviet withdrawal and anti-communism. Worker-peasants were as 
likely to join the anti-collectivization revolt as were other village 
dwellers; in the mining village of Vertesszollos, next to Tatabanya, 
demonstrators demanded the break-up of the local collective farm and the 
return of land to its previous owners."7 In Domefold, in the far south-
west, the degree to which anger, even among rural dwellers with jobs in 
industry or mining was directed against those responsible for implemen-
ting the regime's agrarian policies was underlined. The first acts of the 
worker-peasant revolutionaries were to break into the offices of the 
village council and burn the paperwork connected with the local collective 
and the taxation of farmers.118 In nearby Becsehely, worker-peasants 
joined with individual landholders, in demonstrations against the local 
collective farm, demanding its dissolution and the distribution of its 
property, though failed to achieve their goal in the face of resistance from 
the members of the collective.119 
The Fragmentation of Resistance and the Dynamics of Post-
Revolutionary Consolidation, November 1956-June 1958 
During his trial for "participation in a movement that aimed at the 
overthrow of the peoples' democratic order" in September 1957, Imre 
Kovacs, who had led the anti-communist workers' council in the Tata-
banya Mining Enterprise machine plant during the strike that followed 
Soviet intervention in November 1956, defended himself in part by 
denying his anti-Soviet stance. Yet, he also did so, by arguing that the 
demands of revolutionary bodies in Tatabanya that he had supported had 
"been largely met by the Kadar government" since the Revolution.120 In 
making this rather strange defence, Kovacs put his finger on the split 
opinion of many urban, and especially skilled workers of the government 
that the Red Army had brought to power; they felt, on the one hand, that 
many of their material aspirations were met, though they still continued to 
be fearful and mistrustful of the regime that ruled them. In the Domestic 
Worsted Mill in the capital, most workers in June 1958 spoke of the poor 
economic situation "before 1956", and the better one "after 1956", 
arguing that "the counter-revolution played a definite role in the 
improvement of the situation."121 The deep-seated distrust of the regime, 
and perceptions of its illegitimacy were revealed in the working-class 
reactions to the execution of Imre Nagy in the same month. In the Csepel 
Works, many compared it openly to the show trial conducted against 
Laszlo Rajk in 1949 and wondered how long it would take the party to 
"re-habilitate" him. Others argued that "Imre Nagy died a freedom-
fighter", while some maintained that "had the trial not been held in secret, 
then Imre Nagy's supporters would have hindered his execution."122 
Yet this split opinion did not emerge overnight with Soviet 
intervention, nor was it shared by all workers, but emerged slowly over 
the course of the eighteen months that followed the arrival of Soviet tanks 
in many industrial communities in the days following their attack on 
Budapest on 4th November 1956. The overthrow of Imre Nagy and the 
attempt to replace him with Kadar initially met with the same kind of 
explosion of working-class anger that had ignited the Revolution twelve 
days before. In Tatabanya's new town, remembered one local journalist, 
"there was a large telegraph pole with a loudspeaker, which carried the 
news from the miners' radio; one evening — Wednesday 7th November 
— they announced that the city's Soviet commander was speaking to the 
city's population. The crowd, with their bare hands, brought down the 
pole, broke it completely, and smashed up the loudspeaker when it 
crashed to the ground."123 One other local miner spoke of the "blind 
rage" which greeted Soviet intervention and fuelled the strike. "Everyone 
was stunned that their independence, their neutrality was over," he 
remembered, "the people were most happy about neutrality.... There was 
Austria as an example, because they were neutral. The Russians went, 
they became neutral, and their living standards just went up. . . . Because of 
that neutrality was very important."124 
The motivations of working-class crowds were complex, but 
behind the political demands lay deep seated fury at the material poverty 
experienced by many workers under Rakosi. The role of penury in 
fuelling political protest presented the regime with both a problem and an 
opportunity. It offered the difficulty that without addressing material 
grievances successfully it would be unable to consolidate its authority; but 
it offered them a possibility, that if they succeeded in offering material 
improvement, combined with selective repression, they could encourage 
enough of the working class to forget their political demands and aspira-
tions and accommodate to the situation. Yet, workers were also far from 
united about the extent to which they accommodated to the new regime, 
or, indeed, resisted it. 
Armed resistance on the streets, in which working-class youth 
were over-represented was effectively smashed within days of the Soviet 
intervention. The armed guerrilla groups in the capital continued to resist 
before they were overwhelmed by superior Soviet firepower on the 8th 
November.125 In Csepel armed resistance lasted for a further three days, 
falling to the Soviets on the 11th November.126 It is very difficult to 
estimate the total casualties of the street fighting; official statistics that 
almost certainly underestimate the number of casualties give an indication. 
They show that in Budapest some 16,700 were injured and 2,502 were 
killed. Of those killed, a majority were under thirty and were industrial 
workers.127 In the provinces resistance was more sporadic; in Tatabanya 
news of the Soviet intervention was greeted with anger, though many 
believed that armed resistance would be futile and the revolutionary 
bodies resisted calls to arm angry youths with petrol bombs to stop the 
advance into the town.128 In Sztalinvaros this was not the case; as news 
of the Soviet intervention spread "at least 80 percent of the male 
residents" prepared to fight Soviet tanks with petrol bombs. Aware of the 
preparations being made, the Soviets held back until the 7th November 
attacking the town initially by air and then by land. In the ensuing battle 
eight were killed and thirty-five wounded before the town was overrun.129 
In the factories the immediate reaction to the news of the Soviet 
intervention was one of furious shock. The result was an immediate and 
solid strike against the new government and its Soviet patrons. In the 
capital this strike remained solid for up to a week. In the United Lighting 
and Electrical Factory, the moderate workers' council backed the strike, 
not allowing workers into the factory until the 12lh November. Even then 
due to reduced electricity supplies work was unable to start, while the 
workforce remained deeply distrustful and fearful.130 More generally in 
Ujpest "a mood behind the strike" remained,131 while the radical territorial 
Revolutionary Committee struggled to master a situation over which, 
following the Soviet intervention, they had no real control. With the drift 
back to work they attempted to seize the initiative. Renaming themselves 
the Ujpest Revolutionary Workers' Council, they threw down a challenge 
to the Kadar government. Proclaiming that "every worker in Budapest 
wants to see order in the capital. Of course we do not wish to see any 
sort of order, but revolutionary order, one which is based on the 
realization of the demands of the Revolution." In order to achieve this 
aim they invited representatives of all factories in the capital to Ujpest's 
town hall, in order to found a Budapest workers' council.132 
In response to the move the Kadar government and its Soviet 
allies adopted a two track strategy. It issued a decree allowing the 
workers to elect legal Workers' Councils within three weeks of returning 
to work.133 At the same time they attempted to prevent the Ujpest 
meeting taking place. Soviet tanks surrounded the town hall and the 
members of the Ujpest Revolutionary Workers' Council were arrested.134 
The meeting was postponed and held the next day under the auspices of 
the more moderate United Lighting and Electrical Factory's Workers' 
Council, which established the Budapest Central Workers' Council. The 
new council was split between relative moderates, who argued for a 
political compromise with the Kadar regime, and members of anti-
communist workers' councils who demanded that the Soviet-imposed 
government not be recognized.. The workers' representatives were much 
more militant, and it was only one of them, Sandor Bali from the 
Workers' Council of the Standard factory who gave the new body a clear 
strategy; to refrain from recognising the Kadar government but to 
negotiate with it.135 The new council called for the introduction of a 
mutli-party system, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and 
greater democracy in the Hungarian workplace. It negotiated with the 
government, though relations between the Workers' Council and the state 
were tense and by the beginning of December agreement seemed to be 
highly unlikely. Furthermore, it continued to be dogged by splits between 
moderates and radical anti-communists over both strategy and tactics.136 
At the same time that it became clear there was no basis for 
agreement between the council and the government, the body was 
becoming a de-facto national workers' council, and thus a focus of 
opposition to the Kadar government.137 Taking these factors into 
consideration Kadar shifted from a policy of negotiation to one of 
repression. On 5th December some two hundred activists in the workers' 
council movement and the former intellectual opposition were arrested. 
This and the active prevention of plans to call a meeting to found a 
National Workers' Council and growing government intransigence led to 
a serious stand-off between the Budapest Central Workers' Council and 
the state. The Council called for a two day general strike on the 11th and 
12th December and was immediately outlawed. Its members were gradu-
ally arrested over the next few days and by the morning of the 11th with 
the arrest of the two leaders of the council, Sandor Racz and Sandor Bali, 
the government succeeded in effectively eliminating its most dangerous 
adversary.138 Following the removal of the Budapest Central Workers' 
Council state policy moved to one of explicit repression. Fear of 
retribution created a situation in which factory-level workers' councils 
refused to heed the strike call on 11th December, though much of the 
workforce did. Arrests of workers' council members continued throughout 
December.139 On the 13th December the government banned strikes and 
demonstrations, a position that was to be strengthened in January 1957 
when the government decreed that striking or incitement to strike be made 
a capital offence.140 
Yet Kadar's turn to repression was informed by a knowledge that 
by early December industrial workers were becoming ever more weary of 
strike action, in part because they came to see the eventual victory of 
Kadar as inevitable, but largely because of the effect of the collapsing 
economy on their incomes and the food supply situation. The Budapest 
party committee noted that "in the first half of November at a decision of 
the Workers' Council without any sign of resistance the factories would 
stop" yet "by the second half of November they (the Workers' Councils) 
tried to find better justifications for work stoppages: wage demands, 
solidarity, strike" yet even at this stage "the desire to work is growing."141 
On the first day of the forty-eight hour general strike — the 11th 
December — in Ujpest in most of the factories no work was done. In the 
Magyar Pamutipar cotton factory, however, work began as normal on the 
morning shift and only when the news of the arrests of the leaders of the 
Greater Budapest Central Workers' Council arrived, did workers walk out. 
Despite this on the 13lh the Workers' Council in the plant vowed that it 
would re-start production and take greater care over the maintenance of 
work discipline. By this point, however, it was not merely a recognition 
of the defeat of the Revolution or growing fear of police retribution that 
was deterring workers from resorting to the strike weapon, but the 
growing fear of unemployment given the crisis ridden state of the 
economy and the lack of strike pay.142 
Despite the gradual breaking of the strike, and the elimination of 
revolutionary organs in cities and villages alike, the situation in industrial 
communities remained tense well into 1957. Many younger workers had 
fled the country, while worker-peasants remained in their villages for 
months afterwards. Among urban and skilled workers a culture of protest 
simmered. During the early part of the year anti-regime leaflets were still 
being circulated throughout the United Lighting and Electrical. One leaflet 
stated that "Kadar still keeps the Rakosite Antal Apro, out with the 
swindler Marosan, bring Imre Nagy into the government, out with the 
Soviet Army, declare Hungarian neutrality, why is the Kadar government 
scared of arming the peasants and workers? Perhaps they are fascists".143 
On the national holiday of 15,h March anti-government leaflets circulated 
in the Stalin Steel Works.144 On the first anniversary of the outbreak of 
the Revolution, 23rd October 1957, rumours — "they are striking in 
Csepel," or "in Ujpest there were demonstrations" — were widespread.145 
In the United Lighting and Electrical Factory some of the workers enga-
ged in a deliberate act of sabotage to commemorate the Revolution by 
destroying the electrical box that supplied power to light the red star on 
the front of the building, thus ensuring that during the week following the 
23rd October it did not light up.146 
Yet, during the first half of 1957, what was marked, was the way 
in which even urban workers underlined their distrust of the government, 
through support for cultural practices and institutions associated with anti-
communism, even though they had not done so in the Rakosi years. One 
of the concrete manifestations of this was the growth of popular religious 
observance following the suppression of the Revolution. In the capital in 
1957 the population was considerably more assertive about its perceived 
right to celebrate Christmas than it had been in previous years. For 
midnight mass and for the Christmas day services the churches in many 
working-class districts of the capital were full, according to one party 
official "there hasn't been such attendance (at church) for years."147 In 
contrast to the pre-Revolution years when church congregations in the 
capital had been made up of elderly women, during Christmas 1957 in 
one industrial district 25 to 30 percent of the congregations were aged 
between 18 and 20. In another similar district some 60% of those 
attending the Christmas morning service were male manual workers. 
During 1958 it was noticed that a significant minority of manual workers 
in one district spent ten minutes in their local church before and after 
work each day. Furthermore in schools in the same districts, the parents 
of 38% of children from worker households opted for religious 
education.148 
This was combined with a retreat from the public realm entirely, 
which was especially marked among the young, and among worker-
peasants. Alienation from official political activity could be seen among 
younger workers who tended to develop more individualistic and exclusi-
vely material aspirations. One young female commuter who worked in the 
Zalaegerszeg Clothing Factory illustrated the attitudes of this group. She 
was described as "exhibiting passivity" as far as political questions were 
concerned, and refused to participate in any political organization 
established in the factory, and her sole ambition was reported to be 
becoming a skilled worker.149 These attitudes fed through to the newer 
skilled workers; another party brigade that spoke to three newly trained 
skilled workers in 1958 found them uninterested and uninformed about 
politics at all. In many cases interest in things material was strong.150 
Furthermore one other symptom of withdrawal from the public realm after 
1956 that was particularly pronounced among male workers was the 
increase in the already high number of alcoholics and in alcohol related 
domestic violence as a consequence.151 
It was in a climate dominated by withdrawal and distrust of the 
government, that the Kadar government offered tangible material 
improvements - improvements that met working-class hunger for better 
economic circumstances for their own households; something which had 
lain behind the anger that stimulated working-class mobilization during 
the Revolution. By the end of 1957 as a result of wage increases the 
average income of a working family in Budapest was 18 percent higher 
than it had been a year previously.152 In Ujpest in 1958 there was much 
greater satisfaction with wage rates than there had been several years 
earlier, though workers felt that not all problems with wages had been 
solved.153 In the Zalaegerszeg Clothing Factory Kadar's policies had a 
similar effect; in 1952 the average wage of workers in the factory had 
stood at 703 Forints per month, by 1957 the average wage level had risen 
to 1,147 Forints per month. The problems of the wage system for the 
workers on the production line changed little. Though the intensity of 
work was reduced, and the situation with raw material provision impro-
ved, as wages were raised many of the problems of the wage systems 
remained.154 The visible improvements in living standards had led to the 
development of a degree of trust between the government and industrial 
workers by early 1958 in Budapest, as in other working-class areas.155 
It would be a mistake to overestimate this degree of trust, how-
ever. The memory of the 1956 Revolution was never far below the sur-
face in 1958. Many workers attributed their improved financial situation 
as due in a large part to the 1956 Revolution. Workers, furthermore, 
remained to some extent distrustful and were uncertain as to what extent 
the increases in living standards were a kind of temporary phase before 
the wage increases were withdrawn and the state reverted to Stalinism. In 
Ujpest "the influence of old, bad experiences still has a big impact on 
people, fluctuations in earnings, even the slightest falls in wages that are 
pretty frequent cause disquiet, discontent and distrust among the 
workers".156 The reconstruction of socialism after 1956 and its limits in 
Hungary's industrial communities bore the imprint of both socialism's 
decay and its outright collapse in those areas before and during the 1956 
Revolution. Though in the short and medium-term this reconstruction 
paved the way for the consolidation of socialist rule in Hungary, its 
ambiguous nature would come back to haunt the regime during its 
eventual and final collapse in the 1980s. 
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The Impact of 1956 on the 
Relationship between the Kadar Regime 
and the Peasantry, 1956-1966 
Zsuzsanna Varga 
Nothing illustrates better the strength, political maturity and on occasion 
the wisdom of the Hungarian peasantry than the fact that it was able to 
realize its aspirations and satisfy its interests during the Kadar Era. From 
the second half of the 1960s on, it was customary in Hungary to brag 
about the achievements of Hungarian agriculture. The politicians who did 
this, however, failed to mention the decisive role that was played in the 
attainment of this success by the demands the peasantry voiced in 1956 
and the gradual though reluctant granting of these by the Kadar regime. 
The compromise that had come about between the Communist Party and 
the peasantry in this period had dramatic precedents. 
For us to arrive at a realistic assessment of the Kadar regime's 
agrarian policies we must make a brief survey by way of comparison of 
the principal elements of Hungary's pre-1956 agrarian politics, the 
peasantry's grievances and the demands that arose from these during the 
autumn of 1956. 
The regime and the peasantry during the first half of the 1950s 
The tactless and forceful attempt at the sovietization of Hungary's count-
ryside and agriculture during the first half of the '50s left a deep mark on 
the practices and especially the mentality of the country's peasantry. This 
should not surprise us as the Rakosi regime's decisions impacted on every 
aspect of the peasants' existence. We can outline these decisions only in a 
cursory manner.1 
The regime continued and even expanded the system of compul-
sory deliveries that had prevailed during the war. The hardship this 
system placed on producers increased from one year to the next. The tax 
burden on private farmers, especially the better-off ones, was increased 
exponentially. Disregarding all local precedents, the regime embarked on 
the establishment of large collective farms on the pattern of the Soviet 
kolkhozes. This process brought with it the consolidation of the cultivated 
fields that usually involved the expropriation of the lands of peasants who 
had not joined the collectives. These peasants were compensated with 
fields elsewhere, similar in size but often inferior in quality — and 
scattered at greater distances from the settlements. This practice created 
uncertainties for the producers and undermined the peasantry's sense of 
the sac redness of private property. Already during the early '50s, these 
and other measures resulted in the increase of incidents of traditional legal 
practices being violated. Moreover, in the establishment of the collectives 
the authorities began resorting increasingly to the use of physical vio-
lence. Thousands of peasants, especially the well-to-do ones, the so-called 
kulaks, were deported to internment camps, or were imprisoned — and 
their property confiscated. 
The subjugation of village residents to unprecedented arbitrary 
measures did not result in open resistance but its negative consequences 
grew by leaps and bounds: hundreds of thousands abandoned agricultural 
work, more and more land went uncultivated, agricultural output declined 
— as did the productivity of the land. In the meantime tension grew 
throughout the countryside. 
The changes that followed Stalin's death in March 1953 served to 
arouse expectations of better times and resulted in a declining chance of a 
violent explosion of resentment. In Hungary these changes were associ-
ated with the person of Imre Nagy. The "New Course" he announced in 
July 1953 involved a re-assessment of Stalinist agrarian policies and their 
partial "correction". The subsequent directives of Nagy's government 
significantly reduced the peasantry's tax burdens and compulsory deliver-
ies. They also decreased the uncertainty involved in agricultural produc-
tion. What was even more important, they allowed peasants to leave the 
collectives. 
Hungary's population welcomed these changes, especially in the 
countryside where their impact was more direct and immediate. Soon it 
became obvious however that the rejoicing was premature. Hardly two 
years passed when in the spring of 1955 Nagy was forced from office as 
Hungary's Stalinist dictator Matyas Rakosi regained power. He and his 
supporters returned to the policies that had prevailed before 1953. In the 
agrarian sector this meant increase in taxes and deliveries, as well as the 
resumption of campaigns to drive people into the collectives. The new 
turn of events caused huge disappointment for the people of the country's 
villages. 
As we mentioned, in the years before 1953 the individual and 
collective grievances of the peasantry did not lead to open rebellion. 
Active resistance did not manifest itself after the re-establishment of the 
old Stalinist order in 1955 either. Instead, the peasants availed themselves 
of various means of protesting at an individual level.2 They made their 
deliveries late and failed to fulfil them completely. They resisted with re-
newed determination the demands that they enter the collectives. Even if 
they signed the declaration of intent to join, they kept postponing the act 
of joining for months and when they became members, they did every-
thing possible to avoid collective work. In the summer of 1956, further-
more, in Hungary's western counties (especially in Zala, Vas, Baranya, 
Somogy and Gyor-Sopron), where agriculture was traditionally more 
productive, attempts to leave the collectives multiplied.3 Recent research 
suggests that during the first half of 1956 despair and hopelessness kept 
increasing in the villages and a serious crisis was in the making.4 
The revolution and fight for independence started on October 
23rd with student demonstrations and the subsequent armed clashes. The 
revolution arrived in Hungary's villages after a few days of delay. In just 
about every settlement in the country, without any coordination from 
above, revolutionary activity started. This manifested itself in the estab-
lishment of new political organizations: national councils, revolutionary 
committees, national assemblies, etc., and in the election of new leaders. 
These new forums of authority defined the areas of their concern about 
which they expected the national government to take action. It speaks to 
the gravity of the accumulated tension that they did not compile sugges-
tions and requests but presented demands. 
It is enlightening to examine the documents that the assemblies of 
the villages drew up and accepted during the end of October and the 
beginning of November. If we compare these, the similarity of their 
contents is striking — despite the fact that these villages were often far 
from each other and they did not communicate with each other. 
The demands of the villages can be divided into two categories. 
To the first of these belong those demands that coincided with the 
Revolution's fundamental goals. There are three basic demands that can be 
found in every document that hails from the villages. Namely, that Soviet 
troops leave the country, the strong arm of the communist dictatorship 
(the hated secret police or Allamvedelmi Hatosag) be disbanded, and that 
political parties be allowed to function freely. Among the second category 
of demands were those that emanated from the grievances of the peasants. 
When we examine these, we see that they called for the wholesale rejec-
tion of Stalinist agrarian policies. There were differences in emphasis, in 
the phrasing of these demands, but in essence they were the same. They 
demanded the end of forced collectivization, the restoration of the expro-
priated lands, the abolition of compulsory deliveries, and sharp reductions 
in taxes.5 
It was this unanimity of demands that the Kadar regime, which 
had been established with Soviet help in November, had to consider and 
understand. This was not an easy task. In the rest of this study we plan to 
outline this process and the increasing inclination toward a compromise 
with the peasantry in the years after 1956. 
The fate of peasant demands after the revolution's defeat 
The tragic fate of the 1956 revolution had taught definitive lessons to 
both society and the regime in Hungary. The Hungarian people realized 
that they couldn't count on the West to achieve their aspirations and that 
their country had to remain a part of the Soviet bloc. At the same time 
Hungary's new leadership realized that they not only had to avoid repeat-
ing the excesses of their predecessors but that they had to make funda-
mental changes. The most important lesson the leaders of the Hungarian 
Socialist Workers' Party (MSzMP) drew from the revolution was that the 
"building of socialism" could not come at the expense of the living 
standards of the country's masses. As Janos Kadar pointed on at the Dec. 
2, 1956 meeting of the Party's Provisional Central Committee, "In connec-
tion with the solving of the [country's] economic problems, our policy is 
that, whenever we face a decision as to where the proceeds from produc-
tion should go, the first priority should be the gradual increasing of the 
working people's living standards." 
While the authorities from the close of 1956 on dealt with their 
enemies through the harshest of measures, they also sought the means of 
compromise with Hungarian society. In this respect the most effective tool 
proved to be the policies pertaining to the standard of living.7 This was in 
contrast to what prevailed before 1956 when the forced development of 
the heavy and military industries was predicated on the low production of 
consumer goods. 
The realization of the new policies regarding living standards in 
the early years of the new regime — and for some time even after — 
depended on the supply of foodstuffs, since the population spent much of 
their income on the buying of food.8 This is not surprising as the bulk of 
Hungarian society subsisted on little and often not very nutritious food 
not only before 1945 but in the 1950s. As a result, during the early Kadar 
era, people became interested in improving their nourishment. 
The importance of supplying food to the masses made the impro-
vement of agricultural output a significant goal for the regime. This 
involved giving incentives to the private producers who had the greatest 
potential for increasing overall agricultural production. To improve the 
relationship between the authorities and the agrarian sector of society the 
communist party first had to reduce the tensions that its previous policies 
had created. In this the regime found an effective tool in the emergency 
program that had been developed by the Agricultural Department of the 
Party's central organization. A draft of this program, through a historical 
coincidence, had come up for discussion with the representatives of the 
agricultural committees of the party's county leadership, on 22 October 
1956, the day before the Revolution broke out.9 In this meeting existing 
agrarian policies were heavily criticized. This is indicated by some of the 
statements that were voiced: "Unfortunately the majority of the coopera-
tives produce less than the private peasants, they sell less, make less profit 
and they have to deal with more bureaucratic obligations."10 This conclu-
sion was known at the time to statisticians, still its acknowledgement in 
public was very important. To this had to be added the following radical 
observation. "In the future we must not follow unthinkingly the experi-
ence of the Soviet Union in the establishment of kolkhoses but we have to 
take into consideration our own peculiar conditions... our traditions with 
cooperatives."11 
The participants in this meeting agreed that both the cooperatives 
and private producers had to be assured that they could carry on with 
their operations without arbitrary interference and that they would be 
allowed to profit by them. "In order to assure the producers that their 
work would be rewarded the present pricing system had to be revam-
ped,... and the regime of compulsory deliveries abandoned."12 
The Kadar government's very first directive regarding the agrarian 
sector redressed the greatest grievance of the peasantry by abolishing 
compulsory deliveries. 
The government program announced on the t of November had 
already promised the ending of the deliveries. This momentous decision 
was brought about by certain circumstances. The government of Imre 
Nagy, recognizing the most important demand of the peasantry, on the 
30th of October had proclaimed the abolition of compulsory deliveries. 
Kadar's Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government did not dare to 
reverse this decision. The peasants were in the midst of gathering the 
harvest and were in possession of the produce, at a time when industrial 
production was at a halt because of the general strike in the country. To 
provoke a conflict with the peasantry under these circumstances could 
have had grave and unforeseen consequences. 
Under these conditions the Kadar government not only did not 
rescind the decision of the Nagy government, but it wanted to create the 
impression that it was responsible for the abolition of compulsory deliver-
ies. This is indicated by the fact that the order of the Presidential Council 
of 12 November, made the abolition of the deliveries retroactive to the 
25th of October.13 
In the fall of 1956, within a time-span of two weeks, the regime 
of compulsory deliveries was abolished not once but twice. The burden 
that had been placed on the shoulders of the peasantry during the war, 
came to an end. This burden had existed for more than a decade. After 
the war it continued, purportedly to assure the country's food supply and 
to enable the payment of reparations demanded by the victorious Allies; 
and, staring in 1949, they became more onerous in accordance with the 
demands of the newly introduced planned economy. With the abolition of 
the regime of deliveries ended a state of everyday dependency of the 
producers on the state. The result was a substantial improvement in the 
situation of producers. 
It has to be pointed out that with this step a component of the 
planned economy was altered that up to then had been considered unalter-
able — and Hungary was the first to do this among socialist states.14 In 
the interest of consolidating its power, the Kadar regime gave up a 
mechanism that up to then enabled the communist state to gain possession 
of produce virtually without cost, and to transfer significant income from 
agriculture to industry. 
With the dismantling of compulsory deliveries a situation emerged 
in which the state could gain access to agricultural produce only if it 
offered realistic prices to the producers. From this time on the state, 
instead relying on compulsion, established new bases for its relations with 
the producers, both the individual peasants and the collectives. It began to 
use market mechanisms and tried to make producing profitable for the 
people of the villages. After 1956 then, in an important sector of the 
Hungarian economy, the market and production for profit gained some 
limited legitimacy. Soon it became evident that the new system was more 
effective in supplying of the country's population with foodstuffs than the 
previous one had been.15 
The Kadar government seemed ready to remedy the peasantry's 
grievances in other respects as well. The elements of its new agrarian 
policies were announced on November 27, 1956, in its proclamation to 
the peasantry: 
The Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government condemns fully 
the erroneous agrarian policies of the previous years, the 
aggressive collectivization, the harassment of potential mem-
bers, and all the measures that had resulted in the setting-back 
of Hungary's agriculture by years. These measures had caused 
material and moral damage not only to the peasantry but also 
impaired the supply of foodstuffs to the workers and the people 
of the cities. The government has already abolished forcible 
collectivization... and the regime of compulsory deliveries.... 
The government is determined to use every means available to 
it to support that efforts of the peasantry to improve agricultural 
production and will provide economic support to both the 
collectives and individual peasants.16 
This government proclamation promised to support both the 
private and the collective sector of the agriculture without any discrimi-
nation between the two. What is even more important, it left the decision 
to choose between the two to the peasants. This was strengthened by the 
directions issued by the Department of Agriculture for the leaving of the 
collectives and for their dissolution by the members.17 
These promises were repeated in newer and newer directives that 
lightened the duties of the producers. They revoked the compulsory plans 
for planting and for the selling of produce according to state regulations. 
They made the buying of fire and hail insurance optional, abolished the 
special "kulak-tax" and permitted, with certain restrictions, the selling and 
buying of land.18 
As a result of these measures, two-thirds of the existing collec-
tives dissolved themselves and, with that, several hundred thousand 
private agricultural units started functioning. The general trend was for 
formerly landed peasants to leave the collectives and those who originally 
had little or no land, to stay in them. 
At the end of 1956 not only those people said no to the regime of 
kolkhozes who left the collectives but also those who, lacking other 
economic opportunities, had stayed in them. The fact was that the colle-
ctives that survived found that their members wanted them to function 
differently from the way they had functioned before. This amounted to a 
wholesale abandonment of the Soviet-style model for collectivised agri-
culture.19 
This aspiration on the part of members of the collectives is not 
surprising since among the peasants' demands of the fall of 1956 we can 
find those that insisted on the complete independence of the collectives. 
They urged the enacting of legislation that enabled the creation of the 
widest range and variety for producer's collectives and assures their 
financial and administrative independence. 
The Kadar regime supported these aspirations as indicated by the 
following passage of its November 27 proclamation: "The government 
deems it necessary that the law regarding the collectives should enable 
these to determine the conditions of their functioning and the distribution 
of their profits. The government does not tolerate interference in the 
affairs of the collectives."20 
In this changed atmosphere the collectives that continued func-
tioning began formulating their own destiny in more and more aspects of 
their existence. They searched out the more effective forms of producing 
and they regulated their lives according to their local circumstances.21 The 
democratically elected leadership in more and more places took on 
arguing with the local authorities, especially those of the Party which out 
of old habit wanted to exercise the principle of Party supremacy. 
The greatest ambition of the co-operatives' members was a regular 
and adequate income. Instead of waiting for being allocated certain work 
units after the end of the financial year, the cooperatives switched to 
rewarding the members with shares of the produce. This was done thro-
ugh the traditional means of share-cropping or through related systems of 
reward.22 
The most important consequence of the above initiatives by the 
members of the collectives was the fact that they got income throughout 
the year either in form of cash or through receiving a share of the pro-
duce harvested. Through this the needs of the members were met before 
those of the state or local authorities. 
As the Party was reconstructed after 1956, it took a survey of the 
transformation that had taken place in agriculture. The changes they 
discovered in the functioning of the collectives that had survived genera-
ted a lot of argument among the Party leaders. The conservative elements 
of the leadership vehemently attacked the initiatives that had been taken 
in the collectives as they saw in these the implementation of "capitalist 
means" — and they argued that it was not possible to build socialism by 
capitalist methods.23 At the same time another faction of the leadership, 
those with a reform spirit argued that through the implementation of 
formulas that allowed the members to profit through their work they 
would become interested in increasing the collectives' output and effi-
ciency, and all this would serve the interests of the state as well.24 
Collectivization through new methods 
In the first half of 1957 it seemed that the HSWP expected Hungarian 
agriculture to come be multi-sectored in the long run.25 The emphasis had 
been put on the increase of produce rather than the re-establishment of 
big collective farms. At the end of 1958 however, came a sudden change 
in the Party's agrarian policies. On pressure from the Soviet Union the 
Party set out to complete the transformation of Hungarian agriculture into 
large-scale collectivised agriculture.26 For the peasantry this was the third 
occasion in a decade that it became obvious that the communists would 
tolerate the practice of individual farming only on a temporary basis. The 
disappointment was again great. 
The winter of 1958-59 was a difficult time for the Communist 
Party of Hungary as well. First of all, the acceleration of collectivization 
meant that the earlier promises made to the peasantry had to be aban-
doned. Secondly, the Party had to cope with the fact that the memory of 
the forced collectivization campaigns of the past were still vivid both 
among the peasants and among the party functionaries. The latter had not 
forgotten the failures of these campaigns. But the new campaign was 
important: the Kadar regime had to prove its ability to rule Hungary in 
the eyes of the Kremlin. 
At the beginning of the new collectivization campaign during the 
winter of 1958-59 only 13 percent of the country's land was in the hands 
of the collective farms. By the end of March, 1961, this had increased to 
71 percent. Concomitantly the number of collective members had grown 
in the first three months of 1959 from 200,000 to 500,000, during the 
winter of 1959-60 from 500,000 to 900,000, and finally, during the 
following winter from 900,000 to 1,200,000. This meant that from 80 
percent of the people being in the private sector of the agrarian economy 
at the beginning of the campaign, by the time of its completion 75 
percent of the peasants were members of collectives.27 
Precisely because the transformation was so important, the Kadar 
regime, in addition to old measures of compulsion, used new, innovative 
means of achieving success. Unlike in previous campaigns which focused 
on the poor peasants, the government looked to the more experienced and 
knowledgeable small and middle elements of the peasantry as their 
potential base. The men in charge of the campaign first approached the 
most respected men in the villages and tried to convince them to enter, 
hoping that the others would follow their example. In this way they 
expected to accelerate the new transformation of the countryside. This 
method assured the village elite that it would not be displaced from its 
place in the social hierarchy. While in the 1950s the regime usually 
placed politically reliable city dwellers at the head of the collectives, now 
such positions were often awarded to a local farmer. An important aspect 
of this process was the fact that entry into the collectives was open also to 
the peasants who used to be deemed "kulaks" in the 1950s. They could 
even join the leadership. To gain the support of the peasantry, the land 
that was brought into the collective remained nominally in the possession 
of the peasant, who had nevertheless to be paid a fee for such land. It was 
also proclaimed that every collective member had to be given a certain 
amount (up to half a hektar) of household land for his private use. This 
land would play an important role in supplying each household with its 
basic food needs. Also important was the fact that members of the 
collectives were made eligible for state pensions and the other benefits of 
the country's social safety net. From 1959 to 1961 relatively more — 
compared to previous practices — funds as well as technical personnel, 
were allocated to the agrarian sector of the economy.28 
On the surface the new collectivization campaign was successful, 
but in reality problems arose already during the process of transforming 
Hungary's agriculture. The defensive strategies that had been used by the 
peasantry in the first half of the 1950s re-surfaced. The villagers surveyed 
their chances of existing outside the collectives: if there was a chance of 
getting a job in industry, the most productive member of the family took 
that chance and the others, usually the wife and elder members, joined the 
collective. The person who represented the family in the collective often 
worked just enough to maintain the family's entitlement to the private 
household plot of land. Wherever the head of the household was unable 
to get a job in industry, he tried to get temporary work outside the 
collective. He would work illegally in construction, or undertook contract 
work in a nearby state farm. For such work pay was immediate. 
The situation regarding labour in the village of Duzs in Tolna 
County was not uncharacteristic of the general situation. Here according 
to a contemporary press report "... even the members of the Party left, at 
the time of peak demand for labour, for the neighbouring village of 
Szakaly, to do some hoeing of com for private producers..." At the same 
time in the collective the corn remained uncultivated to the end of the 
growing season. According to the report someone added to this story 
information on what the wife of the party secretary was doing all this 
time: "She spent the entire summer in their family's summer residence on 
Lake Balaton where she cooked for and did the laundry of house guests 
and brought home the proceeds to her husband."29 
The tendencies revealed by such anecdotal evidence are corro-
borated by national statistics.30 As a result of the transformation of 
agriculture the number of people gainfully employed in agriculture 
declined by 350,000. Their proportion among the wage-earners declined 
from the 1959 figure of 42.5 percent to 35 percent by the end of 1962. 
The membership of the collectives also declined from the point of view of 
age and sex composition. In 1958 half the members were under 40, while 
at the end of 1961 two-thirds of the members were over 40, in fact 36 
percent of them were made up of members over 60. The average age of a 
collective member in 1958 was 41, while in 1961 it was 52. Since most 
of the members who had left the agricultural sector had been men, the 
proportion of women engaged in agriculture increased also: from the 1958 
figure of 26 percent to 38 percent in 1961.31 
In addition to this the problems of work discipline worsened — 
especially in the newly established collectives. A good portion of the 
members (varying from 25 to 60 percent) took no part or took an inade-
quate part in the work of the collectives. Furthermore, the amount of 
work the members performed on the average kept declining from one year 
to the next. The number of work units preformed by the average family in 
1958 was 390, in 1959 it was 301, and in 1960 it was 169.32 Family 
members became less and less involved in the collectives' activities. It 
took years for the peasants to become accustomed to the new, collective 
work organization of the agricultural cooperatives. 
To understand the labour problems of the collectives we have 
realize that the mechanization of production did not ante-date the exodus 
of manual labour but followed it with a considerable time-lag.33 As a 
result of this in the majority of collectives detrimental co-relations 
developed between the available machinery and manual labour. Even 
though, when compared to previous collectivization campaigns, after 1959 
the actual amount and the proportion of funding increased significantly, 
the provision of machinery could not keep up with the rapid increase in 
both the number a size of collectives.34 
Dialogue between the Collectives and the Authorities 
Despite the success and quick conclusion of the collectivization campaign 
the Communist Party was faced with the issue of being able to force the 
peasants into a communal form of agriculture but not being able to ensure 
that they performed their duties diligently and conscientiously. On top of 
this it proved impossible to compensate within a short while for the 
departure of the thousands who had left the agricultural sector with the 
increased mechanization of the collectives.35 The vast majority of these 
faced the problems of scarcity of machinery, shortages of labour, and an 
unenthusiastic and even disgruntled membership, and for years could not 
prove the superiority of large-scale production.36 Under these circumstan-
ces the Kadar regime, that had promised to improve the food supply of 
the country, had to rely on food imports. This in a country that before 
1945 had been a significant exporter of food. Between 1959 and 1962 
Hungary had to import 227,000 tons of grains a year on average.37 
Early in 1960, on his return from a trip to Moscow, Kadar said 
the following about this problem: 
The situation in connection with the production of grain is that 
in our [socialist] camp... is that... not only can we make no 
impact on world markets... but we can supply our own internal 
needs only with difficulties.... In this connection the opinion 
was expressed [in Moscow] ... that the first duty of every 
member of the socialist camp is to assure its own grain sup-
plies. In this regard Comrade Khrushchev, speaking in the 
name of the Soviet delegation, announced in an unmistakably 
clear manner, that [the Soviet Union] could not assume in the 
long term the role of producing all the cereal needed and 
having everyone come to [it] for grain.™ 
By 1961 it had become obvious: for the newly established 
collective farms to become true large-scale enterprises they had to 
overcome their problems. For the regime to achieve its food production 
objectives it would have to rely on the traditional strengths of the coun-
try's agriculture. These included the Hungarian peasant's eagerness for 
work, his diligence, as well as the capacity of his private household plot 
for production. We have to keep in mind that, until as late as the middle 
of the '60s, agricultural co-operatives were based on a traditional, handi-
craft-based production.39 
The regime was in a difficult situation. Because of its experiences 
in 1956 and its promises regarding a higher standard of living, it was 
compelled to make newer and newer compromises. What concessions it 
had given after 1956 to the collectives that had survived — concessions 
that many in the Party considered temporary -— had to be extended to the 
newly re-established collectives as well, including share-cropping and 
premiums in kind made to the members. Through this "dialogue" with the 
regime, the members of the collectives gained the right to keep more 
livestock than the regime had originally intended. It has to be kept in 
mind that for the private farmers much of their income had traditionally 
derived from such sources. Such demands contradicted the Soviet, in 
particular the Stalinist model — as well as theory — of collective agricul-
ture. Since the Kadar regime did not want to turn formally against these 
tenets, it tolerated the practices established in the collectives for the 
motivation of the members to produce more, but for many years did not 
sanction them formally through legislation.40 
According to official ideology, the essential elements of socialist 
agriculture were such things as work units, organization into brigades, 
work teams, etc., and anyone who wanted something else in their place -— 
as has been mentioned above — was an opponent of socialism. The 
acceptance of the contradiction between ideology and practice, and the 
institutionalization of the practices that had been developed, took place in 
stages. Instrumental in the development of policies that facilitated this 
process was an increasingly organized and vociferous agrarian lobby. 
Among those who played significant roles in it were Lajos Feher, Ferenc 
Erdei, Janos Keseru, Erno Csizmadia and Janos Hont.41 
The resolution of this problem had started with the 16 February 
1960 decision of the Party's Political Bureau that, on an interim basis, 
allowed the collectives to deviate from the use of the work unit system. 
With this decree the regime accepted those locally-produced solutions that 
were designed to take advantage of the membership's interest in material 
profit. "The Political Bureau considers it necessary that the remuneration 
of the workers according to the locally proven methods receive the widest 
possible dissemination.... What constitutes the best way of doing this has 
to be decided by the general meeting of the cooperatives in every case."42 
The Bureau's decision was closely connected to the change that 
had been implemented in the leadership of the Ministry of Agriculture 
where the dogmatically oriented Imre Dogei was replaced by the practi-
cally minded Pal Losonczi, the president of a cooperative. This decision 
signalled an important change in the Party's policies regarding the cooper-
atives. In the implementation of the new policy the greatest problem was 
caused by the fact that everything that provided incentives for the 
membership remained illegal as it conflicted with the laws governing the 
cooperatives.43 To counteract this situation, a specific dialogue ensued 
between the cooperatives and the authorities. 
Early in 1961 the Minister of Agriculture announced his proposals 
for the means of distributing the profits of the cooperatives and for the 
remuneration of the work of its members.44 He proposed to accept those 
methods of rewarding and organizing work that had been practiced 
hitherto even though they had not been sanctioned legally. The Depart-
ment of Cooperatives of the Ministry of Agriculture suggested in the 
spring of 1961 the following: 
The cooperatives must receive further substantial assistance so 
that they can make the most of the work of their members, that 
they can use methods that had proven effective and though this 
they can implement the formulas for profit distribution and 
remuneration. The regular payment of advances have to be 
introduced everywhere. The way profits are distributed has to 
be systematically monitored. Making use of the lessons learned, 
the proven methods have to be disseminated in ever widening 
circles.45 
In the dissemination of the profit-sharing and remuneration 
practices that had proved themselves effective an important role was 
played by the press. At the same time the members of the Party's Agita-
tion and Propaganda Department organized local seminars for party and 
government functionaries to familiarize themselves with these practices.46 
That this was very necessary was revealed by the speech Lajos Feher 
made on Dec. 20, 1961, before one of the Party's organs known as the 
Political Academy: 
The initiatives of the cooperatives in regard to the distribution 
of proceeds deserve to be noticed and studied by the various 
organs of our Party. You should see to it that in every coopera-
tive the methods of distributing the profits that are more condu-
cive to interesting [the membership] in more effective produc-
tion are propagated as fast as possible.... We must combat... 
those tendencies that try to protect the [traditional way of 
remunerating work through work units] against the [new] 
methods of providing incentives....47 
In the course of my research, I managed to discover the true 
dynamics of the dialogue between the state and the agricultural co-
operatives. In particular, I found that from 1961 on, the formulation of the 
directives by the Ministry of Agriculture was always preceded by an 
analysis of the experiences of the cooperatives in the preceding year.48 
The directives for the new year were issued on the basis of these. For 
example for the year 1961 it was suggested that premiums be paid to 
members only in cases where such premium was due only in the case of 
the fulfilment of production plans. During the year it turned out however 
that this policy did not contain enough incentives for the membership and 
as a result for 1962 a more practical policy for the paying of premiums 
was introduced.49 
Parallel to these developments the Party's and the State's opinion 
of share-cropping also changed. In 1961 this practice had gone from 
being illegal to being tolerated — at least for the time being. From 1962 
on its spread became legal, when the Party acknowledged that this 
practice too, served the interest of both the cooperatives' members and the 
state.50 By doing so in effect an old tradition that had its origins in feudal 
times gained acceptance. Interestingly this practice better served the 
interests of both the peasants and the practice of large-scale production 
than did previously employed routines. 
One of the developments of 1962 was that the practice of cash 
payments to members became universal. With this a means of remunera-
tion became accepted, one that had little to do with the system of work 
units. The Stalinist dogma, according to which the cooperatives could 
distribute their profits only through the principle of work units, was 
abandoned.51 
The plans for the members' remuneration in 1962 was influenced 
by the fact that in that year the three-year ban of 1959 on withdrawal 
from the collectives was coming to an end. It could be expected that 
many of the people who entered then — since they did so under duress 
— would use this opportunity to leave. The new system of remuneration, 
as well as more widespread practice of share-cropping was expected to 
decrease the number of departures — and this is what happened. 
The dialogue between the cooperatives and the authorities over 
the years resulted in the fact that practices introduced locally went from 
the illegal but tolerated category into the accepted and even state-sup-
ported one. Through this the collectives gained greater room for manoe-
uvre. The resourcefulness of the peasants thereby alleviated the impact of 
the system based on work-units as a result of which in more and more 
places the old dogmas of remuneration were circumvented. At the same 
time, because the management of the cooperatives from above adhered to 
the Soviet model, the return of the old ways was not an impossibility. 
The knowledge of this fact, and the pressure exerted by the 
reformers grouped around Lajos Feher, resulted in the undertaking by the 
Party's leadership of a comprehensive reform effort during the winter of 
1961-62.52 The reform focused on three areas: the working out of new 
pricing, taxation and financing policies for agriculture, the review of the 
system of managing agrarian policies, and the formulation of new laws 
for the collectives.53 
The program of reform was worked out by 1963.54 Its implemen-
tation was delayed beyond the winter of 1963-64 because the economic 
problems Hungary faced at the time both at the local and the national 
level. Nevertheless the mere existence of these plans had an energizing 
effect in the emergence of a movement for the reform of the country's 
agriculture. This movement resulted in the revamping of Hungary's 
agrarian policies starting with 1966, two years before introduction of the 
famous New Economic Mechanism, a major revision of national econo-
mic policies that was introduced on 1 January 1968. 
Conclusions 
In the relationship between Hungary's communist regime and the peas-
antry 1956 brought new departures. While during the first half of the 
1950s the country's Communist Party pursued aggressive, strife-inducing 
agrarian policies, the post-1956 Kadar regime tried to minimize and even 
resolve the many conflicts it encountered in its dealings the Hungary's 
agricultural producers. 
This trend manifested itself already in November of 1956. The 
new government was compelled to realize that confrontation with the 
producers of the country's food supply, just when a general strike was 
paralyzing industrial production, could have disastrous consequences. This 
fact explains the new regime's apparent readiness to remedy the peas-
antry's most conspicuous grievances. Furthermore, the government even 
made promises that in the future it would respect the peasantry's tradition 
of the private farming and its right to the ownership of land on a small 
scale. 
This approach to resolving the problems of the countryside 
existed, to a varying degree, not only during the period that followed the 
crushing of the Revolution but also during subsequent years. The leader-
ship of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party had learned that the abuses 
that had led to the revolution of 1956 had to be avoided. Boosting the 
living standard in Hungary became a priority for Janos Kadar's govern-
ment. Accordingly, increasing agricultural output and, in this connection 
with this, the providing of incentives to the producers, became crucial to 
the government. Because of the regime's commitment to improve living 
standards, the country's agrarian sector, and thereby the peasantry, attained 
greater strategic importance. 
The relationship between the regime and the peasantry came 
under stress again when collectivization, as result of pressure from Mos-
cow, reemerged as a policy at the end of 1958. The Party's leaders were 
faced with a dilemma and in order to make sure that agricultural produc-
tion not suffer as a result of collectivization, they had to make conces-
sions to the peasantry. This pragmatic approach was not the result of 
conscious planning but was implemented as a byproduct of random 
decisions made in response to the developments in the countryside. The 
political decision-makers did play a role in it, as did the initiatives of the 
cooperatives and their membership. The policy came about as an interac-
tion of pressures from above and below. As a result of the dialogue 
between the country's leaders and its agrarian society we can observe in 
Hungarian agriculture, from the early 1960s on, a cautious and gradual 
deviation from the Soviet model. 
We have to emphasize however, that this departure from the 
Soviet-style kolkhoz pattern was never openly admitted by the Hungarian 
leadership. Kadar and his associates did not want to get into an ideologi-
cal dispute with the leadership of the Soviet Communist Party; they 
satisfied themselves with implementing procedures that were at variance 
with Soviet agrarian practices. The result of this pragmatic approach to 
the solution of agricultural problems was the beginning of the develop-
ment of a unique Hungarian model of collective agriculture. Yet the 
above-outlined duality of Kadarian agricultural policies continued into the 
late 1960s and beyond, and often caused strife between the regime and 
village society. 
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Falsifying History in Janos Kadar1 s Hungary: 
Early Cinematic Representations 
of the Revolution 
Beverly James 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Hungary of Janos Kadar, Communist Party 
chairman from 1956 to 1988, was widely recognized as the most liberal 
and open of the Eastern European communist regimes. With a mixed 
economy, the nation enjoyed relative prosperity and the status of "the 
happiest barracks in the Soviet camp." The Kadar era was also marked by 
a depoliticized citizenry more concerned with personal than public affairs. 
Kadar had been installed during the 1956 revolution, when he abandoned 
his initial support for the uprising and conspired with Soviet leaders to 
form a new government. The economic and social permissiveness that 
Kadar tolerated was the reward accorded the public for its political 
quiescence and acceptance of the legitimacy of his administration. This 
tacit bargain was struck as the communists sought to bring stability to the 
nation in the aftermath of the failed revolution and the period of brutal 
reprisals that followed it. 
Miklos Sulyok points out that this grand compromise required the 
public to do more than eschew politics.1 The communist regime's message 
was, "don't choose from that world that's closed to you, don't read any-
thing we don't place in your hands, don't look at anything we don't show 
you, don't think about anything we don't ask you to." This effort at mind 
control was intended not only to foster political apathy, but to erase 
memory of the past. In the words of Gabor Gyani, the essential element 
of the Kadarian depoliticization of society was the leaching out of collec-
tive historical memory.2 The compromise between the regime and the 
people "rested on nontalk,"3 and foremost among the taboo historical 
subjects was the 1956 revolution. 
However, the effectiveness of the state's policy of forced forget-
ting and the government's ability to erase memory has been questioned 
recently, as writers have noted the many ways in which information about 
the uprising circulated, either unofficially or as products of command 
culture.4 Gyani, for instance, disputes the myth of total amnesia, noting 
that 1956 leaked into public consciousness in countless ways: The sight of 
Russian soldiers stationed in Hungary was a visible reminder of the upris-
ing they had suppressed. The absence of the hundreds of thousands of 
people who fled the country in 1956 reminded their families and friends 
of the nation's loss. Even the experience of living under the relative com-
fort of "goulash communism" was an indirect reminder of the source of 
the compromise. 
Janos M. Rainer also refines the notion of collective national 
amnesia when he writes that the silence of the Kadar era hardly meant 
that people had forgotten what happened.5 The silence may have signalled 
acquiescence, he argues, but it did not imply public approval of the 
regime nor acceptance of its explanations about the "crimes" committed 
by the martyred revolutionary prime minister, Imre Nagy, and thousands 
of others. Besides, he points out, the silence was far from complete. The 
"counter-revolution" was taught in history classes, and it was the subject 
matter of television documentaries and journal articles on major anniver-
saries. Rainer makes a useful distinction when he points out that the 
revolution was off-limits as a historical subject in Hungary and was kept 
alive by emigres and picked up in the late 1970s by dissidents, but the 
counter-revolution, that is, the version of the events promulgated by the 
authorities, was indeed discussed.6 
This paper explores the role of film in the constitution of national 
memory about Hungary's 1956 revolution. From the period of massive 
arrests and reprisals, film was one site where images and interpretations 
of the events were presented to the public.7 During the high Kadar years, 
1956 was treated more subtly in such films as Zoltan Fabri's Twenty 
Hours (Husz ora, 1965) or Istvan Szabo's Father (Apa, 1966). In the 
decade leading up to the collapse of communism, the uprising was 
addressed openly by film-makers including Peter Gothar (Time Stands 
Still [Megall az ido], 1982), Pal Sandor (Daniel Takes a Train [Szeren-
cses Daniel], 1983), and Peter Gardos (Whooping Cough [Szamarkohog-
es], 1986). This paper is a first step in examining the shifting modes of 
presentation of the events of 1956 in feature films made during the Kadar 
years. My purpose is to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of 
the collective amnesia of the Kadar era as a case study in the formation of 
collective memory and national identity.8 Research questions to be 
addressed include the following: How have films about the 1956 uprising 
contributed to the establishment of collective historical memory about the 
events? What archetypal themes, images, icons, and musical motifs asso-
ciated with 1956 have been constructed and conveyed through film? How 
are the events and the historical agents involved in the events named? 
What is the relationship between the representation of these events and 
the historical backdrop against which they were produced and presented 
to the public? This paper will deal with films made during the immediate 
post-revolutionary period, that is, At Midnight and Yesterday. Before 
presenting my analysis, I want to offer some general remarks about featu-
re films that touch on 1956. 
An Overview of films about 1956 
There have been at least a couple of attempts to compile comprehensive 
lists of films that deal with the revolution. In 1991, Tibor Sandor pub-
lished a slim volume that comprises short descriptions of fifteen such 
films made between 1957 and 1990 (see Appendix A). The 1956 Institute 
published a comprehensive filmography in 1996 that includes feature 
films, documentaries, and television programs related to the uprising. 
Casting a broad net, the editors included films that can be read as veiled 
references to 1956, such as Miklos Jancso's The Round-Up (Szegeny-
legenyek, 1965), where reprisals after the 1848 revolution could be 
interpreted in light of more recent experiences, Peter Bacso's The Witness 
(A tanu, 1969), where a show trial can be read as the Rajk trial, or Karoly 
Makk's Another Way (Egymasra nezve, 1982), where the repression and 
intimidation of the characters recalls the climate of the times.9 Thus, the 
filmography lists 28 feature films that appeared between 1957 and 1989 
(see Appendix B). 
However, little sustained attention has been paid to film as a 
medium through which interpretations of 1956 were made available to the 
public. One exception is a chapter of Peter Gyorgy's Nema hagyomany 
(2000) in which he touches upon several films in the context of analyzing 
literature relevant to the uprising.'0 In fact, there is a misconception on 
the part of some writers that few such films were made. In his recent 
history of Hungarian film, John Cunningham writes that of the films 
released from 1957 to 1959, only Yesterday "relates directly to 1956."11 
Later in the book, he writes that the 1965 film Twenty Hours was "the 
first film to broach the subject of 1956."12 I hope this paper will begin to 
direct attention to the films of 1956 as a body of work rich for analysis. 
A word about terminology: In an address to Parliament on 
November 25, 1956, Janos Kadar argued that the October events "cannot 
possibly be defined as a counter-revolution."13 However, as resistance 
among intellectuals and the workers' councils intensified, he reversed his 
position at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
on December 2, lashing out against the "counter-revolution."14 This term 
would remain the official designation for the October events until 1989. 
In February of that year, the reform communist minister of state, Imre 
Pozsgay, remarked on the radio show 168 Hours that the 1956 events 
constituted a popular uprising. He was quickly corrected by the secretary 
general of the Communist Party, Karoly Grosz, who stated that only the 
Central Committee of the party was in a position to assess the events. 
Nevertheless, within two week's of Pozsgay's pronouncement, the Central 
Committee recognized 1956 as a popular uprising.15 My project focuses 
on films made during the thirty-two years when 1956 was deemed a 
"counter-revolution." But the power to determine the use of political 
language was not always exercised, nor did it go unchallenged, and one 
of my aims is to examine the terminology used in the films to refer to the 
historical episode and its agents. In the interests of clarity, when writing 
about the actual events, I will use neutral terms, such as "uprising" or 
"October events." 
At Midnight 
At Midnight was released on December 25, 1957, just over a year after 
the uprising. Directed by Gyorgy Revesz and written by Ivan Boldizsar, 
this film addresses the theme of expatriation. Between 220,000 and 
250,000 Hungarians, over 2 percent of the population, fled the country 
during and after the uprising. More than half left by the end of November 
1956, and another forty percent left between December 1, 1956, and 
January 1, 1957.16 Some were forced to flee because of their involvement 
in the uprising, "but others were students and workers simply looking for 
greater personal liberty and a better life."17 The film dramatizes the 
momentous question of whether to leave or stay through the story of a 
young couple. Janos Karolyi (Miklos Gabor) is a successful actor married 
to Viki Dekany (Eva Ruttkai), a ballet dancer whose career has been 
shackled by her bourgeois family background. Frustrated by her inability 
to realize her artistic potential in Hungary, Viki is determined to move to 
Brussels where a position awaits her. Janos's livelihood and identity are 
bound to the Hungarian language, and he resists the idea of leaving the 
homeland. 
The plot spans the hour between 11 p.m. and midnight on New 
Year's Eve of 1956. The couple are in the living room of their apartment, 
waiting for a car that will arrive at midnight to take them to Vienna. As 
they wait, they toss photographs and papers into the fireplace and remi-
nisce about the past. The photographs motivate a series of chronological 
flashbacks that tell the story of their relationship, their experiences during 
the uprising, and their arguments over the question of whether to leave 
the country. The flashbacks begin just a couple of minutes after the 
credits end. With the exception of a couple of short cuts back to the 
present early in the film, the flashbacks extend until the last five minutes 
of the film. 
At that point, the plot returns to the present where it is now 11:55 
p.m. Janos has evidently agreed to defect, because a happy Viki flits 
around preparing to leave, seemingly oblivious to his morose demeanour. 
As the radio announces midnight and the national anthem begins, she 
hands the brooding Janos a glass of champaign and proposes a toast to 
their success in crossing the border. He slowly shakes his head no, and a 
quarrel ensues. While Viki is heard off-screen warning Janos that the car 
will arrive at any moment, the camera focuses on his hand as he turns up 
the volume of the radio. The national anthem fills the diegetic space as 
the film ends. 
How is the uprising presented? 
The opening scene provides the viewer with several clues that At Mid-
night is set against the backdrop of 1956. Shot in black and white, the 
film's credit sequence consists of several still shots of deserted city streets 
at night. When the credits end, the camera begins to move, panning up 
the exterior wall of an apartment building to a window. The sound of a 
gong acts as a sound bridge to a close-up shot of a radio. The announcer 
identifies the station as Kossuth Radio and states that in an hour, "we will 
take leave of the year 1956 and greet 1957." The year, 1956, is a synec-
doche for the October and November events, so the announcement 
immediately triggers an association with the uprising. The medium 
through which the announcement is made, the radio, is itself a signifier of 
the uprising in a couple of respects. First, memories of the October events 
are firmly grounded in the everyday, material culture of the 1950s. We 
see this, for instance, in the Budapest History Museum's display of 1956, 
where a typical kitchen of the period is exhibited. Secondly, the radio was 
widely used to access information during the chaotic days of the uprising. 
In the early days of the uprising, Kossuth Radio served as the mouthpiece 
of the Nagy government. However, on October 30, as the government 
adopted a multi-party system and Soviet troops began to vacate Budapest, 
Kossuth Radio became Kossuth Free Radio, with control in the hands of 
the Revolutionary Workers' Council of Free Hungarian Radio.18 The radio 
plays a prominent role throughout At Midnight, linking the couple to the 
world outside their apartment and to the public events that intrude into 
their private lives and ultimately determine their fate. 
The camera lingers on the radio briefly and then scans the room, 
revealing scattered photographs, letters, and theatre handbills. An unseen 
hand tosses such items into a burning fireplace, suggesting the destruction 
of incriminating material and hinting at the house searches and arrests that 
began in early December of 1956. However, that grim reading is reined in 
by upbeat dance music emanating from the radio. The film cuts to a shot 
of Viki seated on the floor in front of the fireplace. As she continues to 
toss papers into the fire, she beams at Janos and reminds him that tomor-
row they will be in Vienna. The viewer is now certain that the couple 
have committed no offense; they are purging themselves of a past that is 
soon to be irrelevant when they start a new life in the West. The final 
allusion to 1956 in this opening scene also evokes memories of the state's 
crack-down as it sought to restore order. Emil, a film director who works 
with Janos, telephones to say that he will stop by to wish the couple a 
happy new year, and Janos asks whether Emil has forgotten that going out 
at night is prohibited. This remark also accounts for the empty streets 
shown during the credits.19 
The narrative structure of At Midnight — the lengthy flashbacks 
framed by brief scenes of the present — allows Revesz to devote most of 
the screen time to the couple's on-again, off-again courtship. Experiences 
such as the unexpected pregnancy, miscarriage, and recuperation of 
Janos's first wife, Agi (Zsuzsa Banki), suggest that the story takes place 
over the course of about a year. However, the characters are seemingly 
untouched by the dramatic political developments of 1956 — the Petofi 
Circle gatherings, the ejection of Rakosi, the reburial of Laszlo Rajk — 
until October 23, the day the uprising began. The first reference to that 
date occurs while the couple are on their honeymoon at Lake Balaton. 
Playfully enacting the role of a police agent, Viki asks Janos for his 
identity papers. She reads the information aloud: "Budapest, 6th District. 
Central Registry Hall. Married to Viktoria Dekany on October 9, 1956." 
She then adds, "And today is Tuesday, the 23rd. It's just been a couple of 
weeks." Viki is of course oblivious to the significance of her carefree 
remark, but it sets the viewer up for what is to come. 
At the hotel that evening, as Janos and Viki dance to "their song," 
one of the guests receives a long distance telephone call from Budapest. 
His side of the terse conversation reveals that something is amiss ("Why? 
What happened? Don't be so theatrical, Comrade Bodo, why can't you tell 
me over the phone?"), but neither he nor the other characters is yet aware 
of what is taking place in the capital. However, a delivery driver arrives, 
and when the desk clerk asks him what is new is Budapest, he replies that 
the students were holding some kind of demonstration and the streets 
were crowded when he left. Janos overhears this information, and the 
troubled expression on his face reveals his concern. 
The scene then shifts abruptly. Through an eye-line match, Janos 
is shown staring at the lobby door as it closes behind the delivery driver. 
The screen goes dark for several seconds, with Beethoven's Egmont 
Overture, "the anthem of the revolution,"20 beginning to play. This piece 
was written to accompany Goethe's tragedy, Egmont, which tells the 
heroic story of Count Lamoral Egmont, executed by King Philip II of 
Spain for his role in the Netherlanders' struggle for freedom. Played 
endlessly by Hungarian Radio during the uprising, its melancholic strains 
and glorious conclusion evoke the tragedies and triumphs of those 
October days. When the picture comes back into view, it is a nondiegetic 
insert consisting of a series of quick shots of waves breaking on the shore 
of Lake Balaton. One shot is particularly effective in conveying a sense of 
danger. The camera is positioned just above the water, squarely facing the 
incoming waves, so that viewers feel as if they are about to be inundated. 
In an earlier scene, Janos referred to Balaton as "Hungary's sea," under-
scoring its significance in national mythology and hinting at Hungary's 
tragic history.21 Backed by the haunting sounds of the Egmont Overture, 
this montage provides a powerful transition to the scenes that deal directly 
with the uprising. 
As the music continues, the action resumes at the hotel where it is 
now the morning of October 24. Janos and Viki are greeted by confusion 
and chaos when they go down to the lobby, as people scurry around, 
checking out or fruitlessly trying to place telephone calls. Among those 
who leave is an Austrian couple whom Janos and Viki have befriended. 
Their hasty, sheepish departure can be read as the abrogation of responsi-
bility by the West to intervene on Hungary's behalf. When Janos asks a 
police officer what has happened, he is told that "there are public distur-
bances in Budapest, with fighting in several parts of the city." The music, 
which started off as non-diegetic, is interrupted by the voice of a radio 
announcer saying, "Attention, attention!", followed by the sound of static 
and a close-up shot of the radio. As the hotel manager tries to tune the 
radio, the camera pans the anxious faces of the group that encircles it. 
When he finally manages to find a station, the program consists once 
again of the Egmont Overture.22 All of the technological means of access-
ing the outside world — the radio, telephones, trains — have been 
disrupted, signalling the turmoil caused by the uprising. 
The next scene is set several days later. Still unable to get through 
to Budapest, Janos and Viki speculate about what is happening. Janos's 
wording offers a characterization of the events that is similar to the 
interpretation presented through the dialogue of the delivery driver and 
the policeman. He says, "I can't imagine what's going on in Budapest.... 
Fighting in the streets, men in arms. What is all this?" While Janos is 
clearly concerned, Viki is frightened. She bursts into tears and repeatedly 
states that she is afraid. The next day, the couple set out hitchhiking. The 
truck that picks them up is ambushed by a small band of rebels and Janos 
suffers a minor wound. A village doctor patches him up, but he cannot 
travel for several days. The couple finally make it back to Budapest 
around October 31. Arriving at the flat of Viki's mother, they find a note 
telling them she is leaving for Vienna where they can find her at 10 Spie-
gelgasse. For the first time, Viki proposes that they leave the country. 
There is no response from Janos, and the scene shifts to the National 
Theatre where he wanders among the ruins, visibly torn over the decision 
he is forced to make. 
Back at the flat, he and Viki have it out. He tells her of his love 
for the stage, emphasizing that the Hungarian language is his only means 
of creative expression. As a near-hysterical Viki reminds him of the 
sacrifices she made for him, the frame is canted and the camera closes 
tightly in on her face, signifying that she is out of control. She storms out 
of the room, and the viewer's attention is refocused on the radio, where an 
announcer is relaying messages about people searching for relatives: 
"Three Indians send word to their parents that they're well. They've lost 
Little Brother. Micus... hasn't found Vera yet; they should take Ferike to 
Grandmother's house." Janos changes the frequency to Kossuth Radio, 
where the program is no less indicative of the nation's continuing crisis: 
"Dear Listeners, now a female worker from Ujpest will make a request to 
the striking miners." 
Viki returns to the living room after a short temporal ellipsis to 
find a now-drunk Janos composing his own radio messages: "Janos 
Karolyi sends word to Budapest that the Stefanskirche is beautiful. But he 
would gladly exchange it for the little Ujlak Church, because when he 
was a little boy, his mother always took him there.... Janos Karolyi sends 
word to Budapest that the Champs Elysees and the Boulevard St. Michel 
are marvellous. It's just that if you step on somebody's foot on the metro, 
nobody says, 'Idiot, can't you watch out?!"' In this scene, the camera is 
canted to the left when it focuses on Janos and to the right when it 
focuses on Viki, signalling their conflicting points of view over the 
fundamental question of whether to go or stay and the despair each is 
feeling. As Viki attempts to calm him down, Janos laments the deteriora-
tion of family relations without naming the obvious cause: "Fathers send 
messages to their families. Children to their parents. Husbands to their 
wives. Everything is falling apart, even us." 
Viki reaches her breaking point in the final scene of this lengthy 
flashback. She and Janos are standing in the middle of a crowd in front of 
a bakery. Desperate for bread, people are pushing and shouting as they try 
to work their way to the front of the line. Shots are fired as fighting 
breaks out in the vicinity, and the frightened crowd disperses. Viki and 
Janos run to the safety of a nearby building, but the distraught Viki cries 
that she cannot take it any longer. She vows to leave, even if Janos 
refuses to go with her. This scene is unusual in several respects. First, it 
is the only scene that takes place outdoors in Budapest during the upris-
ing, thus virtually demanding some visual representation of the events. 
Along similar lines, with the exception of the ambush near Balaton, a 
brief and restrained scene, it is the only occasion in which violence is 
shown. Second, most of the film is quite stylish, with gorgeous actors 
playing elegant, sophisticated characters against the backdrop of Andras 
Bagya's easy-listening music and Barnabas Hegyi's atmospheric shots of 
the Danube, Margit Island, and other familiar landmarks. The footage here 
has a grainy, documentary look, particularly a crane shot of the crowd 
dispersing. Like the characters themselves, the viewers are jolted out of an 
affected world of glamour and artifice, and brought face to face with the 
historical reality of 1956. Finally, it is the only scene that casts the 
uprising in a decidedly negative light. Now, the uprising is remembered 
as an episode in which the Hungarian people showed great selflessness 
and solidarity, unified as never before by a common desire for national 
autonomy.23 In this representation, however, the mob is ugly — shouting 
at the baker, fighting with each other, divided by greed and self-interest. 
The work as a whole presents a surprisingly nonjudgmental 
representation of the uprising. In the words of Erzsebet Bathory At 
Midnight treats 1956 as a shocking event that fundamentally shook up 
Hungarian society, but it neither condemns nor celebrates the uprising.24 
The film focuses mainly on how it disrupted lives and separated loved 
ones. Conveniently, the couple are in the countryside during most of the 
uprising, far from the centre of the storm.25 There are no images of 
fighting or physical destruction, and both the events and agents are named 
only in the mildest terms: "student demonstrations," "public disturbances," 
"street fighting," "armed men." With his dedication to the homeland, 
Janos is clearly presented more sympathetically than Viki.26 However, 
Viki's desire to leave is justified by the discrimination she is subjected to 
by virtue of her social class. Indirectly, this premise casts attention on the 
fundamental problems of the dictatorial state that culminated in the 
uprising. 
In a 1977 television interview, the writer of the film, Ivan Boldi-
zsar, was asked if he always wrote the truth. At first he answers affirma-
tively, but later in the interview he modifies his claim: 
Montaigne said when he was about as old as I am now: "I 
always wanted to write the truth, but I did not always dare to. 
Now that I am older, I am more daring." I don't think that the 
daring to speak the truth depends on your age, more on the age 
in which we live.27 
Ignac Romsics writes that the early period of the Kadar regime 
"was one of dealing out bloody retribution on the insurgents, restoring the 
machinery of dictatorship, consolidating his personal authority, and 
winning international recognition for the regime."28 The period began with 
the establishment of the legal and institutional framework for carrying out 
the retaliations.29 At Midnight was made soon after the uprising, during 
the transitional phase when authorities were just beginning to restore 
order and stabilize the country. Once the system had rigidified and the 
apparatus of terror was fully engaged, a very different interpretation of 
1956 would be offered to the public.30 
Yesterday 
By the time At Midnight actually appeared on Hungarian theatre screens, 
the arrests, imprisonments, and executions had reached massive propor-
tions.31 Yesterday, directed by Marton Keleti and written by Imre Dobozy, 
was released on January 29, 1959, just over a year after At Midnight. In 
the interim, the communist government published a series of White Books 
that established the official historical account of the uprising. Illustrated 
with graphic photos of the mutilated bodies of lynched policemen, soldi-
ers, and party officials, the White Books provided the public with a 
gruesome source of visual memory. The final volume, The Counter-
revolutionary Conspiracy of Imre Nagy and His Accomplices, claimed to 
"prove beyond all doubt that well before the counter-revolution erupted, a 
secret underground organization led by Imre Nagy existed for the purpose 
of overthrowing the state."32 In the period between the release of the two 
films, the popular prime minister and several members of his inner circle 
were tried, convicted, and executed. 
Yesterday was adapted from Dobozy's stage play, Windstorm 
(Szelvihar), performed at the Jokai Theatre the previous year. It recalls the 
events of the uprising in two settings, an army garrison in a provincial 
town (shot in Vac) and a nearby village called Varjas. The two sites are 
linked by a father and son. Lt. Imre Csendes (Tibor Bitskei), is a young 
army officer stationed at the garrison, and his father, also named Imre 
(Zoltan Maklary), is a respected member of the Red Dawn cooperative 
farm near the village. The narrative begins at the garrison, which is 
threatened by an unruly mob demanding weapons. The government has 
given the insurgents until 10 p.m. to lay down their arms, and as a result, 
the commander of the post, Lt. Col. Szabo (Ferenc Ladanyi), has been 
ordered to avoid shooting unless it is absolutely necessary. Lt. Csendes is 
troubled by the ambiguity of the situation as is Szabo himself; neverthe-
less, Csendes leads a platoon out into the square where they face off aga-
inst the crowd. 
Among the soldiers is a young recruit, Andras Szusza Kis (Gyula 
Szabo, Jr.), who is also from Varjas. His crippled father was forced 
through torture to join the cooperative. He later left it, but his small 
parcel of land was not returned. The crowd implores the soldiers to join 
their ranks, and, uncertain of his loyalties, Szusza Kis finds himself pulled 
to the other side. Even though the security of the garrison is at stake, 
Csendes cannot shoot his childhood friend. The soldiers withdraw to the 
garrison, where Csendes, humiliated by insults hurled at him by the crowd 
and frustrated by his impossible position, argues with Szabo about 
whether revolt and mutiny are justified by the political mistakes of the 
past. 
The action then shifts to the village. The unpopular leader of the 
cooperative farm has fled, and the peasants are ransacking the place, 
carrying off livestock, feed, and equipment. At the same time, the de-
posed squire, Geza Macsay (Antal Pager), is taking inventory and plotting 
to regain his ancestral lands. Old Csendes hastens to the farm and restores 
order, threatening both the peasants and the former gentry with a pitch-
fork. Back at the garrison, the situation is becoming increasingly tense. 
The insurgents have secured weapons and wait only for the imminent 
arrival of a tank before launching their attack. However, when the tank 
arrives in the square, Szusza Kis appears from behind the turret, announc-
ing triumphantly that the government has reached a cease-fire agreement 
with the rebels. Once again, the officers are divided over how to respond 
to the government's inconsistent orders and capitulation to the rebels. In 
the heat of the argument, Csendes professes loyalty solely to his father. 
He storms out in defiance of Szabo's orders and heads home. 
Meanwhile, in the village, Macsay and other members of the old 
gentry meet in the headquarters of the Varjas Revolutionary Committee. 
In order to subdue the peasantry, they decide to get rid of Old Csendes. 
Szusza Kis arrives and demands that the gentry return his father's land. 
When Macsay, the squire, refuses, Szusza Kis rushes off to warn Old 
Csendes of their plans to capture him. However, Szusza Kis is shot by the 
gentry's ruffians just as he leaves the Csendes homestead. They then go 
after Old Csendes. He resists at first, but when they tell him that his son 
has joined their cause, he surrenders in despair. Lt. Csendes arrives in the 
village just in time to learn of the plot against his father from the dying 
Szusza Kis. He chases down the ruffians as they lead his father away and 
shoots them. Father and son join the other peasants now defending the 
collective property they have worked so hard to develop. The final scene 
shows the two of them at night standing guard at the entrance to the Red 
Dawn cooperative farm. 
How is the uprising presented? 
As was the case with At Midnight, Beethoven's Egmont Overture plays an 
important role in Yesterday. In this case, it is heard only at the beginning 
and end of the film, framing Yesterday as a drama about 1956. The 
opening bars of the music are heard for about twenty seconds against the 
backdrop of a black screen and the piece continues as the credits begin to 
roll. As with At Midnight, the film is shot in black and white, and the 
credit sequence establishes the location of the opening scene. Here, it 
consists of several shots in which the camera pans buildings of a typical 
provincial Hungarian town. While it is daytime, the streets are virtually 
deserted and the screen seems to darken, as if storm clouds were gather-
ing. The credits and music end simultaneously, cut off by a black screen 
and the voice of a radio announcer reading a government communique 
ordering the rebels to lay down their arms. As the announcement is made, 
a shot of a soldier comes into view. His face is expressionless and his 
head is cocked to the side, indicating his grave attention to the an-
nouncer's words. The camera begins to move, and the faces of other 
soldiers clustered around the radio are revealed. When the announcement 
ends, the music softly resumes as Lt. Csendes issues orders to the sol-
diers. Thus, as in At Midnight, the overture becomes diegetic here, 
emanating from the radio. The music ceases when this brief scene is over 
and is not heard again until the end of the film. 
The Egmont Overture is used at the conclusion of Yesterday to 
bring closure to an otherwise ambiguous ending. The penultimate scene 
shows the Csendeses and their comrades at the cooperative farm sitting 
around in the evening, smoking and listening to the radio. The camera 
explores their faces as the announcer states that the Cardinal Prince 
Primate, released from prison by the revolutionaries, arrived at his palace 
in Buda where he blessed the people who had gathered and spoke briefly. 
He vowed to continue the work he had to stop eight years ago and 
promised to make a public appeal two days later. In the final scene, it is 
the Csendeses' turn to stand guard. Pacing in front of the iron gate with 
its communist star, they hear a vehicle approaching in the distance. In a 
medium long shot, they are shown glancing at each other in acknowledge-
ment of the ominous sound, moving together to stand side by side and 
aiming their rifles into the night. Just when it sounds as if the vehicle has 
reached the gate, the frame freezes,33 the lens zooms in to a medium close 
up of the two figures, and the Egmont Overture's victorious finale is 
heard. The last several bars accompany the words, "The End." 
The reference to Mindszenty dates the film's conclusion to 
Thursday, November 1, three days before the second, decisive inter-
vention of the Soviet Union. The return of the "revanchist" primate and 
the spectre of a truck filled with insurgents suggest that the true revolu-
tionaries — those who would build a socialist state — still face obstacles 
and perils. However, the majestic ending of the Egmont Overture assures 
the viewer that now they are ready, certain of the Tightness of their cause. 
In 1949, Hungary adopted a national emblem that featured a red 
star radiating its bright light on a hammer and wheat sheaves, symbolic of 
the proletariat and the peasantry. One of the demands of university 
students in 1956 was the abolishment of this emblem. As the demonstra-
tions heated up on October 23, the communist insignia was cut out of the 
centre of the Hungarian flag, and the flag with a hole in it quickly 
achieved iconic status.34 In Yesterday, this symbol often appears in shots 
of the insurgents, and the context always casts them in a negative light. 
The viewer first sees the flag with a hole in it from the point of view of 
army officers as they watch the unruly crowd converging on the square. 
Similar to the familiar keyhole shot, a shot of Lt. Csendes looking thro-
ugh binoculars at the crowd is followed by a subjective shot in which his 
field of vision is framed by the horizontal figure eight of the binoculars. 
He scans the teeming crowd, pausing on a Holy Trinity statue. Reminis-
cent of still photographs of students at Bern Square in 1956, a large group 
is scaling the monument, waving flags. Csendes passes the binoculars to a 
comrade, and in a similar eye-line match, the viewer looks through the 
binoculars with the second officer. As a demonstrator in front of the 
statue waves his flag, a gaping hole in its centre becomes clearly visible. 
This shot is repeated a third time several minutes later from the point of 
view of Lt. Col. Szabo. His view of the crowd reveals numerous Hungar-
ian flags, some intact and some with the emblem removed. This type of 
shot physically aligns viewers with the authorities as they attempt to 
maintain order and protect public property from the lawless mob. 
A second important use of this symbol occurs in the confrontation 
between the army platoon and the crowd. Led by Lt. Csendes, the goose-
stepping, uniformed soldiers are disciplined and orderly, a sharp contrast 
to the frenzied mob. The leader of the mob is a beefy, middle-aged man 
dressed in a trench coat with a tricolour armband, beret, and leather riding 
boots. He has just arrived from Budapest, and we learn later in the film 
that he is Major Kalman Weller (Laszlo Ungvari), the former village 
squire's brother-in-law, and that he left the country in 1944. As the two 
sides square off, Weller breaks through to the front of the crowd, de-
manding weapons and brandishing a defaced Hungarian flag as if it were 
a bayonet. Csendes slowly leads the platoon forward, and when the two 
sides are just feet apart, Weller turns to the crowd, raises the flag, and 
shouts, "Forward, Hungarians!" But when the soldiers continue to ad-
vance, he slowly lowers the flag and begins to retreat. The camera then 
cuts to a shot of his boots. He slowly steps back, out of the frame, and 
the flag, which has now reached the ground, comes into view. Already 
desecrated when its emblem was cut out, the Hungarian flag is now 
dragged along the muddy pavement as the cowardly Weller retreats. 
Finally, the act of mutilation itself is shown in the most striking 
presentation of this symbol. A scene opens with a close up shot of a flag, 
the communist insignia filling most of the screen. Though the flag is still 
intact, an unseen figure is poised behind it and has just begun to cut out 
the emblem. As the fabric begins to fall away, the grinning face of the 
man who is doing the cutting is revealed. The size of the hole increases to 
reveal a young woman standing next to him, watching in admiration, and 
other people milling about in the background. The cutter triumphantly 
completes the job, the flag drops away, and the camera begins to pan to 
the right, revealing other people cutting the holes out of flags. The camera 
finally stops on the other main action of the scene, the distribution of 
weapons. Weller stands next to the back of a truck, smoking contentedly, 
while one of his sidekicks hands out weapons to a steady stream of men 
and woman, most of them dressed in civilian clothes, but others wearing 
army uniforms. The entire scene is captured in one shot, and the only 
discernible dialogue in the background chatter is the perfunctory com-
ments of the man handing out the guns. The camera focuses on the action 
— the defacing of the flag and the illegal distribution of weapons. This 
establishes a relationship of equivalence between the two acts and makes 
the most important symbol of 1956, the flag with a hole in it, the signifier 
of a reckless, treasonous affair. 
The rejection of the communist insignia in 1956 was accompanied 
by the widespread adoption of the 1848 Kossuth coat of arms, the most 
powerful symbol of the desire for national independence. It appeared 
spontaneously, handpainted on army helmets, sewn onto flags, and printed 
on the mastheads of newspapers.35 The Kossuth coat of arms shows up 
several times in Yesterday, on a sign identifying the Revolutionary Com-
mittee headquarters in Varjas, on the wall inside that same building, and 
on a tank. Other material objects that are now associated with 1956 were 
presented in filmic form here. They include weapons — automatic rifles, 
shotguns, pistols, machine guns — and vehicles — tanks, white sedans 
bearing a Red Cross flag, trucks with canvas-covered backs, cattle trucks 
filled with rebels waving flags and tossing out fliers. 
The main theme of Yesterday is the moral confusion and chaos 
caused by the uprising. As Lt. Col. Szabo remarks at one point, "Every-
thing has been turned upside down." The confusion is personified by the 
two soldiers who leave their post, Lt. Csendes and Szusza Kis. Young and 
inexperienced, Csendes is a loyal officer of the People's Army who loses 
sight of his principles in response to the government's equivocal response 
to anarchy. Szusza Kis is a simple, naive recruit who pins his hopes on 
the rebels as a means of reclaiming his father's land. However, by the end 
of the film, both of the men see the folly of their ways. Csendes's 
moment of truth comes when he learns that his father has been captured, 
and Szusza Kis's when he is told that he will not regain the land. He then 
denounces the rebels when he goes to warn Old Csendes that they are 
coming to get him: "This wasn't what I dreamed of, Uncle Imre." Then, 
as he lay dying in Lt. Csendes's arms, he tells Csendes that he was 
betrayed: "Imre, they've murdered me. They cheated me. You were right. 
We should have fired at them." 
Lt. Col. Szabo personifies the mature, wise, responsible commu-
nist. (His communist credentials are established when he hotly tells 
Csendes that he has no father to turn to: His father was executed in the 
post-1919 reprisals.) He indirectly acknowledges the excesses of the 
Stalinist years, but argues that a few mistakes do not justify abandoning 
the socialist project. In the midst of an argument, Csendes says to him, 
"Let's be honest. It [read Stalinism] was pretty bad." Szabo's affirmative 
response is veiled in an analogy: "What do you want?! There's a hole in 
the roof, so we set the house on fire?" His faith is occasionally shaken. At 
one point he states that those who seek justice with bullets will be 
answered by bullets from him. However, as a high-ranking officer, Szabo 
is bound to follow the commands of his superiors. The government has 
been highjacked by an illegitimate authority, and as a result, he is unable 
to restore order. 
Imre Nagy is the unnamed villain, the illegitimate authority who 
has highjacked the government and brought about all this turmoil. The 
references to Nagy and his government are indirect and subtle. Major 
Fekete (Sandor Pecsi), a hardliner, insists that the soldiers must be 
ordered to fire into the crowd. Csendes replies, "Are you crazy? The 
Prime Minister is a communist." In response, Fekete states, "They 
betrayed us." Then, when the cease-fire is declared, Csendes complains to 
Szabo, "What are they doing to us? They make agreements, and we have 
to fight? ... When will they come clean? If they were in the right, they 
wouldn't dance around. If they aren't right, what do they want?" Old 
Csendes summarizes the lesson to be learned from Yesterday regarding 
Nagy's decisions and actions. When his son rescues him and unties his 
hands, he exclaims, "It's a wretched thing to have one's hands tied." 
On the surface, Dobozy resisted oversimplifying the positions 
adopted in 1956. The complexity of points of view was articulated by 
Szabo in a scene where he rejects Csendes's charge that he's opposing the 
whole country. He states, "There is no 'whole country' now, or half, or 
quarter. There are just people, different kinds of people. Some like this, 
some like that." Various positions are represented through the many 
characters, as if the film-makers wanted to offer all viewers someone with 
whom they could identify.36 The officers' opinions range from that of the 
uncompromising Fekete to the anguished Csendes. The peasants are 
similarly diverse in character. They range from Old Csendes, the personi-
fication of strength and responsibility, to the pitiful swineherd Pandur 
(Janos Gorbe), who seeks work from the squire so that he can put bread 
on the table. 
In contrast, however, the insurgents are uniformly unsympathetic. 
In reality, those who advocated regime change in 1956 were divided into 
a number of factions: reform communist politicians; students, writers, and 
other intellectuals; factory workers seeking workplace democracy; exiled 
reactionaries who favoured a return to the feudalistic social structure of 
the pre-war years. In Yesterday, this diversity is reduced to the homogene-
ity of an ugly crowd or to its most reactionary elements — the squire 
who remained in Hungary after his land was confiscated only because he 
was too cowardly to leave, according to his embittered wife, and his 
pompous brother-in-law, a former officer in Horthy's army who did leave 
the country. The news bulletin about Cardinal Mindszenty at the end of 
the film is a further allusion to the "forces of reaction." Mindszenty was 
imprisoned in 1948 for his opposition to the nationalization of church 
property and the secularization of education. As the leading figure of the 
conservative right wing in 1956, he opposed the reform communist Irnre 
Nagy and his followers as the "heirs of the fallen regime."37 
Romsics writes that by 1958 — the year Yesterday was made — 
"the task of restoring the political system to its pre-[1956] state was 
completed." However, he adds, "the process of consolidation was far from 
complete."38 Among the defiant social groups that remained to be dealt 
with were the Catholic clergy and the peasantry. In 1958, in an effort to 
break the resistance of Catholic priests and bishops, the Communist Party 
instituted a policy of tolerance for religious expression but uncompro-
mising intolerance for political opposition by the Church. Tensions 
between Church and state were thus eased only in 1959.39 
As for the peasants, they had abandoned the collective farms in 
droves during the uprising. By the end of 1956, Romsics reports, "barely 
6% of Hungary's peasants were members of a cooperative."40 Fully aware 
of the peasants' resistance to forced collectivization, the government at 
first pursued a policy of "friendly persuasion." However, it was largely 
unsuccessful, so that there was only a slight increase in cooperative 
membership by the time Yesterday was released.41 
Yesterday discursively reinforced the party's condemnation of the 
recalcitrant Catholic hierarchy through the reference to the Cardinal Prince 
Primate. The appropriate reaction to his return, implied in the film, was 
undisguised in the crass propaganda of the White Books: "Mindszenty's 
reappearance was a signal that we had to launch a counter-attack against 
the bourgeois reactionaries in order to defend the people's democracy."42 
In the case of the peasantry, the film's rhetoric is even more strident. The 
scenes of looting demonstrate that the peasants — hardly more advanced 
than the livestock they tend — needed the heavy hand of authority to 
tame their inherent selfishness and greed. When Weller first arrives in the 
village, he tells his brother-in-law that he and his men have taken com-
mand of the county seat and have now come to establish control in the 
countryside. M&csay warns him that the rural areas will be more difficult 
to subdue because the farms are scattered over vast distances. One of the 
other insurgents adds, "And these are stubborn people, terribly stubborn 
people." 
Still, given the poisonous public discourse surrounding the upris-
ing in 1958, Yesterday is more restrained than one might expect. At first, 
the crowd greets the soldiers with chants of solidarity: "Long live the 
Hungarian soldiers!", "Arms to the people!", "Whoever is Hungarian is 
with us!" As the tension intensifies, the crowd does begin to taunt the 
soldiers, addressing them as "henchmen," "traitors," and "bloodsuckers." 
In turn, the inflexible Fekete refers to them as "scum," though not to their 
faces. While the insurgents occasionally refer to the events as a "revolu-
tion" or "fraternal war," the term "counter-revolution" is never heard. The 
only hint in that direction is when Lt. Col. Szabo states that what is 
happening "is no longer a peaceful demonstration." Interestingly, at one 
point, the characters themselves reflect on the language used to name the 
events and its agents. Lt. Csendes poses a rhetorical question: "If they're 
freedom fighters, are we the enemy?" Perhaps that question is meant to 
imply a follow-up: "If, on the other hand, we're the heroes, then aren't 
they the villains?" But that question remains unstated. 
Film and collective memory 
If the film-makers were circumspect in how they named the uprising and 
its instigators, reviewers of the film were not. In a review in Filmvilag, 
Lajos Mesterhazi writes that the lesson to be drawn from the film is that 
"a predominantly well-intended mass was led astray and followed an 
armed, counter-revolutionary minority that knew exactly what it was 
doing." Through cultural expressions such as this film, "society can 
examine its conscience and finally be cleansed of the scum and filth of 
the counter-revolution."43 Similarly, Nepszabadsag reminds readers that 
the ceasefire agreement that hamstrung the army was the result of "Imre 
Nagy's compromise with the bloodthirsty rabble."44 Lest Yesterday's 
viewers have any doubt, reviewer after reviewer explained the meaning of 
the film, imploring them to recognize themselves in the characters and to 
take stock of their own responsibility for the treasonous events: "Our 
'yesterday' stands before all of us. This yesterday raises a question and 
expects an answer: Remember where you stood, on which side! Where 
the October storm swept you! Why did you stand on the other side, or 
only on the sidewalk, or maybe behind the windows?"45 
Thus, we see the interaction of film with other media in shaping 
public perceptions and attitudes toward 1956. As Harold Adams Innis 
would put it, the bias of film as a medium of story telling is such that its 
creators must exercise some subtlety in their depiction of historical events 
if the audience is to suspend disbelief and temporarily adopt the film's 
premises. However, it then stands as a text for reinterpretation and 
commenta ry in m e d i a that are not constrained by this considerat ion, where 
the convent ions at play set the reader up for vitriolic hyperbole. O n e thing 
is fo r sure: As of 1959, the Kadar regime did not yet feel secure enough 
to launch its p r o g r a m of forced forgetting. The mind managers were still 
busy at work, shap ing public perceptions of 1956. 
The year af ter Yesterday appeared, its sequel, Day is Breaking 
(Virrad), was produced by the s ame group of f i lm-makers . It depicts the 
fate of Lt. Col. Szabo and Lt. Csendes in the early days of November . 
And at the end of 1960, A Town without Aspect (Az arcnelkiili varos), 
T a m a s Fejer 's d r a m a about a mine strike in N o v e m b e r 1956, appeared. In 
the world of f i lm, 1956 then goes silent until the Golden A g e of Hungar-
ian f i lm-making , when such respected f i lms as Zoltan Fabr i ' s Twenty 
Hours (1965), Is tvan Szabo's Father (1966), and Karoly M a k k ' s Love 
(1970) appeared. Exploration of these works is likely to reveal very 
d i f ferent presentat ions of Hungary 's 1956 revolut ion. 
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Appendix A 
Films included in Tibor Sándor's Forradalom 1956 
1. Éjfélkor 1957 György Révész 
2. Tegnap 1959 Márton Keleti 
3. Virrad 1960 Márton Keleti 
4. Az arcnélküli város 1960 Tamás Fejér 
5. Húsz óra 1965 Zoltán Fábri 
6. Tizezer nap 1965 Ferenc Kósa 
7. Apa 1966 István Szabó 
8. Szerelem 1970 Károly Makk 
9. A közös bűn 1977 Imre Mihályfi 
10. Szerencsés Dániel 1982 Pál Sándor 
11. Szamárköhögés 1986 Péter Gárdos 
12. A másik ember 1987 Ferenc Kósa 
13. Napló apámnak, anyámnak 1990 Márta Mészáros 
14. A halálra itélt 1989 János Zsombolyai 
15. Magyar rekviem 1990 Károly Makk 
Appendix B 
Feature Films listed in the 1956 Institute's Filmography (in Hegedűs, 
Beck, and Germuska 1996), 1957-89 
1. Éjfélkor 1957 György Révész 
2. Tegnap 1959 Márton Keleti 
3. Az arcnélküli város 1960 Tamás Fejér 
4. Virrad 1960 Márton Keleti 
5. Párbeszéd 1963 Jáqps Herskó 
6. Húsz óra 1965 Zoltán Fábri 
7. Apa 1966 István Szabó 
8. Szegénylegények 1966 Miklós Jancsó 
9. Keresztelő 1967 István Gaál 
10. Tizezer nap 1967 Ferenc Kósa 
11. A tanú 1969 Péter Bacsó 
12. Szerelem 1970 Károly Makk 
13. Szerelmesfilm 1970 István Szabó 
14. Kopjások 1975 György Palásthy 
15. Két történet a félmúltból 1979 Károly Makk 
16. Kettévált mennyezet 1981 Pál Gábor 
17. Egymásra nézve 1982 Károly Makk 
18. Megáll az idő 1982 Péter Gothár 
19. Szerencsés Dániel 1982 Pál Sándor 
20. Napló gyermekeimnek 1983 Márta Mészáros 
21. Szamárköhögés 1986 Péter Gárdos 
22. Lélegzetvisszafojtva 1985 Attila Janisch 
23. Hajnali háztetők 1986 János Domolky 
24. A másik ember I-II 1987 Ferenc Kósa 
25. Kiáltás és kiáltás 1987 Zsolt Kézdi-Kovács 
26. Napló szerelmeimnek 1987 Márta Mészáros 
27. A dokumentátor 1989 István Dárday 
28. Eldorádó 1989 Géza Bereményi 

"[G]reat stone on our knees": 
Reflections of the Hungarian Revolution 
in World Literature 
Janos Kenyeres 
The relationship between literature and the 1956 Revolution is a rather 
complicated issue, as the events that led to the revolution were in very 
important — and well-known — ways shaped and influenced by Hungari-
an writers. A number of these authors did not merely reflect on the course 
of events, they took an active part in the making of history. The roles 
they played in the days leading to and during the Revolution have been 
analysed in a number of books and shorter studies. From a strictly literary 
point of view, however, these two aspects of their actions might best be 
divided: their historical roles should be separated from their literary 
responses. 
As opposed to the fairly large number of studies exploring the 
relationship between the events of 1956 and their Hungarian literature, the 
comprehensive collection and analysis of reflections on the Revolution in 
world literature has not been undertaken. Regarding responses to the 
Revolution outside Hungary attention has been primarily paid to historical 
and political works rather than works of literature, whereas ideally 
political statements and declarations should be distinguished from reac-
tions embodied in literature. I stress ideally, because in many cases it is 
extremely difficult to define the true nature of a particular text; whether it 
is merely a political writing or belongs to a category which is traditionally 
regarded as literature. As Northrop Frye has pointed out, Edward Gib-
bon's famous historical work, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, has 
shifted "its center of gravity from history to myth and literature."' This 
observation is generally true to any text whose style and main composi-
tional features qualify it to be read as literature. In addition, these writings 
do not necessarily have to "date" as history, like Gibbon's Decline and 
Fall has done over time, or "date" as whatever other discipline they were 
primarily intended for. Lincoln's "Gettysburg Address", however brief, is 
clearly a work that can be read and interpreted as simultaneously belong-
ing to literature, philosophy and political theory. 
The same holds true to Albert Camus's "The Blood of the Hunga-
rians," his famous declaration made on the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. 
Camus's writing, written in 1957, is so sophisticated in its rhetoric, so 
highly eloquent, abounding in metaphors and other figures of speech, that 
it can be readily classified as a work literature. Although it was intended 
to address political issues in a particular historical situation, it simul-
taneously expresses a general truth about the guilt of those who remain 
inactive while seeing the suffering of others. Camus's text, like literature 
in many other cases, includes philosophical implications, testifying to the 
strength and example shown by the oppressed, demonstrating the true 
significance of freedom, which those who do not possess it, the Hungari-
ans, have demonstrated to the free world, which is capable only of being 
saturated with "impotent sorrow".2 
I would like to continue by taking account of some significant 
literary works dealing with the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and analyse, 
however briefly, some important responses to the Revolution in world 
literature. 
As suggested earlier, the collection of world literature about the 
1956 Hungarian revolution is far from complete. The single most impor-
tant and comprehensive source on this topic is the poetry anthology called 
Gloria Victis, collected and edited by Tibor Tollas, published in 1966 in 
Munich. Tollas, who was bom in Nagybarca in 1920, graduated from the 
Ludovika Akademia, and participated in the Second World War as a 
young officer. He was arrested in 1947 and was sentenced to 10 years in 
prison. 
When discussing Gloria Victis, mention must be made of the 
Fiiveskert anthology, collected by the convicts of the Prison of Vac. A 
literary circle, formed by the prisoners, was already starting to take shape 
in the summer of 1953, and in the spring of 1954, some convicts, show-
ing great interest in and commitment to literature, secretly put down in 
writing poems they knew by heart. The name Fiiveskert (Herb Garden) 
may have been selected for the anthology because the prisoners met for 
their literary meetings on the grassy spot of land outside the prison 
chapel,3 but more importantly it was an allusion to the ancient symbol of 
life and healing.4 The Fiiveskert circle at first mainly dedicated itself to 
the translation of classical world poetry into Hungarian. The hand-written 
manuscript, written and copied by the prisoners, including Gyorgy 
Szathmary, Tibor Tollas, Balint Toth, as well as Laszlo Alfoldi, Geza Beri 
and Attila Gerecz, was expanded in the course of the years to include the 
prisoners' own poetry. Out of the twelve volumes of the Fiiveskert 
anthology, only the first three manuscripts were preserved, taken out of 
Hungary to the west in 1956. The anthology was, however, further expan-
ded over the years to include Hungarian emigre poetry. It saw ten editions 
in seven countries in the 1950s and 60s, in Hungarian, German, Russian, 
Italian, Spanish, Norwegian, Danish and English versions. 
Tollas, who was released from prison in July 1956, took an active 
part in the Revolution as member of the Nemzetorseg (the National 
Guard), and left for Germany after the Soviet invasion. After he escaped 
from Hungary he settled in Germany where he continued to dedicate 
himself to literature and the Hungarian cause. Together with other emigre 
members of the Fiiveskert-group, he established the literary journal Nem-
zetor (Guardian of the Nation), working as its editor for four decades. 
Gloria Victis: Az 1956-os magyar szabadsagharc koltoi visszhangja a 
nagyvilagban (The Response of Poets throughout the World to the Hunga-
rian Fight for Freedom of 1956) was published five times over the deca-
des, the last edition appearing in 2003 in Hungary. The anthology became 
available on the Internet in 2006. 
Gloria Victis, dedicated to 1956, contains poems from five conti-
nents and 43 different countries/nations, and is the largest existing collec-
tion of its kind, presenting the original works together with their Hungar-
ian translation. The list of the countries/nations whose poetry on 1956 is 
included in this volume reflects the colossal work that was put into the 
anthology: Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Austria, United 
Kingdom, Holland, Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, 
United States, Canada, Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Honduras, El 
Salvador, Martinique, Australia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand, China, 
Turkey, Algeria, Nigeria, Kenya, and from behind the iron curtain: Esto-
nia, Latvia, Poland, Bohemia, Slovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, 
Ukraine and Russia, and there is one poem by a Cossack poet. 
Although the most extensive collection to the present, Gloria 
Victis was not the first poetry anthology on the 1956 Revolution. It was 
preceded by the publication of a number of poetry collections in the 
world, including Til Ungarn (1957) in Norway, Mot valdet (1956) in 
Sweden, Sad brcendte steppen (1957) in Denmark, Hommage des poetes 
frangais aux poetes hongrois (1957) in France, Canto di Liberta (1957), 
La saga degli Ungheri (1957) and Canto d'ira e d'amore per L'Unghe-
ria (1959) in Italy, Sangre de Hungria (1957) in Spain, a special issue of 
Nea Estia (1957, II) in Greece and Liras en las catacumbas (1959) in 
Argentina. The anthology From the Hungarian Revolution, published in 
1966 in the United States, for the most part contains translations of the 
Hungarian Fiiveskert poetry associated with the 1956 revolution, and its 
section containing American poems on 1956 by and large corresponds to 
the American section of Gloria Victis. Mention must also be made of two 
Polish anthologies Polscy poeci o w§gierskim paydzierniku (Polish poets 
on the Hungarian October), edited by Gyorgy Gomori, published in 1986 
and 1996 in England, and Polskim pidrem o wggierskim paydzierniku 
(Polish writers on the Hungarian October) (1996) edited by Istvan D. 
Molnar. Gomori not only collected the most significant Polish poems on 
1956, in his subsequent essays he also provided valuable commentary on 
the birth of some of them, giving critical assessment as well. As a result 
of Gomori's work, Polish poetry on 1956 is better documented than the 
poetry of other nations on the same topic. We learn from Gomori, for 
example, that two Polish poets, Adam Wazik and Wiktor Woroszilsky, 
did not only write poems about the revolution but were eyewitnesses to 
the events.5 
The latest edition of poetry specifically concerned with the Hun-
garian Revolution to date was published by Vince Sulyok in 2006, entit-
led Egy osZ orok emleke (The eternal memory of an autumn), containing 
his own poetry and translations of Scandinavian and Central-Eastern 
European poets, all of them previously published in Gloria Victis. 
Although the proper evaluation of all the poems in Gloria Victis 
requires not only a book-length study but also good knowledge of virtual-
ly all European languages, as well as Vietnamese, Malaysian, Siamese 
and Chinese, it is evident that the Hungarian Revolution has prompted the 
creation of literary works representing considerable differences in poetic 
talent. Therefore, while some poems are aesthetically less valuable than 
emotionally supportive, others show great poetic gift. The former works 
lack exactly those qualities which would make them good literature, 
while, no doubt, they are full of sincere and sympathetic feelings towards 
the anguish and torment of the Hungarian nation. While it would be 
wrong to exclude such works from future analysis, it would be equally 
wrong to ignore their artistic deficiency. I discuss below some important 
and interesting poems originally written in English. 
The motive of guilt felt by the bystanders appears in several of 
these poems, most strongly in E. E. Cummings' [or, as he always wrote 
it: e. e. cummings] "[T]hanksgiving 1956," which ridicules the official 
reaction of the USA to the Hungarian cause, as demonstrated by the fol-
lowing excerpt: 
"be quiet little Hungary 
and do as you are bid 
a good kind bear is angary 
we fear for the quo pro quid" 
uncle sam shrugs his pretty 
pink sholders you know how 
and he twitches a liberal titty 
and lisps "I 'm busy right now" 
so rah-rah-rah democracy 
let's all be as thankful as hell 
and bury the statue of liberty 
(because it begins to smell) 
John Knoepfle's "The Hungarian Revolution" concludes on a more 
serious note, also demonstrating the speaker's guilt and pangs of con-
science, depicting the rest of the world, the onlookers, in the form of the 
statute of an ancient tyrant: 
We were watching, 
great stone hands on our knees. 
The same sentiment of guilt and shame mingled with the ironic act of 
forgetting is echoed in Paris Leary's poem, "Budapest": 
Never relent in your task 
of forgetting it - when suddenly 
in the supermarket a child cries, 
do not be tempted to remember 
the cries of children against the tanks; 
do not look up. You can do 
nothing, it means nothing, nothing. 
David Ray's poem "Tickertape; Ten Years After" reflects the speaker's 
personal memories of hearing news about the Hungarian revolution. The 
poem works on a chain of associations, the same rain, pouring down like 
tickertape just like ten years before, the memory of the room, being 
behind locked doors, connected to the world by television and to an 
"unloving" other "wrist to wrist, eye to eye, love-locked rocking thigh to 
thigh", and then hearing of the messages from Hungary to the UN which 
only "the janitor read with all his heart". The poem concludes with these 
lines: 
Hungarians: 
now you have 
found out what 
it is to 
hear promises 
from the high 
towers of 
America 
where I sit 
and watch the 
rain as it 
falls like 
tickertape 
The Canadian Watson Kirkconnells's "Gloria Victis" describes the 
Revolution in terms of a mythical battle between the forces of evil and 
men and women craving freedom, but the shameful inactivity of the 
western world is also brought to light: 
The West was silent; and the Brontosaurus, 
Bellowing down the streets of those dark days, 
Trampled to blood and death the youthful chorus 
That sang but now in Liberty's high praise. 
1956 did not only inspire the creation of original works in re-
sponse to the revolution, reflecting its implications on the human condi-
tion; it also contributed to growing attention to Hungarian literature in the 
world. As Balazs Lengyel has noted, the emigre Laszlo Gara managed to 
convince forty-eight French poets, most of them outstanding ones, to 
translate Hungarian poetry, which was a very alien form of poetry for 
most of them. As the anecdote goes, Guillevic, while he was conscien-
tiously translating Hungarian poets, remarked several times: "Why should 
I read T.S. Eliot's poetry? French literature is rich enough for me ." Jean 
Rousselot complained about the strange names he had to learn, like that 
of Arpad Toth, but then went on to translate even The Tragedy of Man. 
The anthology published as a result of Gara's unrelented efforts was 
entitled Anthologie de la Poesie hongroise, which, as Balazs Lengyel 
notes, contained "1956, the heroism of the youth, the blood of the 
martyrs, the forced exile of the so called dissidents, and the shock of 
decent people in Europe."6 As part of this new interest in Hungarian lite-
rature, a number of Hungarian poetry and short story anthologies were 
published in foreign languages in the years following the revolution, one 
of the first prose anthologies being Flashes in the Night, published in 
1958. It was, no doubt, this new atmosphere, this novelty of reading 
Hungarian literature that prompted Ted Hughes to translate Janos Pilin-
szky, of whom he wrote the following lines in a letter to the Hungarian 
Lajos Koncz: 
The real excellences of Pilinszky — the peculiar qualities and 
tensions of his language, and his technical form — of which I 
have acquired a very strong impression, even though I know no 
Hungarian, are beyond me, naturally, and obviously cannot be 
approximated. What I concentrated on was his overall tone, as 
I understand it, and the vision which the poems transmit so 
clearly and strongly, and which seem to me unique. I am 
aware, even in the shorter poems, that Janos Pilinszky has 
touched an unusual sort of greatness — one which seems to 
touch me very closely.7 
Moving from poetry to drama, mention must be made of Robert 
Ardrey ' s Shadow of Heroes, a play in five acts from the Hungarian 
Passion, which was first produced at the Piccadilly Theatre, London, on 7 
October 1958 and broadcast on BBC's Sunday Night Theatre television 
program on 19 July, 1959. An adaptation of Ardrey's play was made by 
Australian Television in 1961. 
The main character of the drama is Julia Rajk, who is going 
through many hardships after her husband is arrested and then executed. 
The play presents historical characters, including Rakosi, Kadar and 
Laszlo Rajk. The plot starts in the winter of 1944, and the final act is set 
during the 1956 Revolution. We hear Imre Nagy' famous radio speech 
saying "Our troops are in combat" and then Kadar's announcement 
calling on the Hungarian people to "put down the counter-revolutionary 
bandits". The last scene depicts the arrest of Imre Nagy and Julia Rajk 
outside the Yugoslav Embassy, as they are herded onto a bus. Throughout 
the play, the audience is assisted by the Author's rather lengthy historical 
commentaries on the events. Shadow of Heroes is definitely not true to 
history in all detail, it is primarily a work of literature, that is the work of 
the imagination, and as such it is quite an interesting piece. Its language 
is sophisticated, the dialogues are certainly capable of arousing tension, 
and as a drama the play is quite successful. The dramatic composition is 
enhanced by the unfinished story — in the concluding scene we have no 
certain news about the whereabouts of the ex-refugees of the Yugoslav 
Embassy, and this is explicitly brought to the knowledge of the audience 
by the otherwise omnipotent Author. 
There are several historical novels that discuss the Hungarian 
Revolution. These include The Bridge at Andau (1957) by James Mitche-
ner, The Best Shall Die (1961) by the Eric Roman, or Ein Ungarischer 
Herbst (1995) by Ivan Ivanji, or novels which were published in English 
translation, such as Teaspoonful of freedom by Kata Ertavy Barath, or A 
time for everything by Thomas Kabdebo. I would like to say a few words 
about two such historical novels. 
The first, chronologically, is Vincent Brome's The Revolution, 
which was published in 1969 in England. Brome was an English writer, 
known for the diversity of his writings, including novels, dramas and 
biographies of such famous people as H. G. Wells, Sigmund Freud and 
Carl Jung. The hero and narrator of his novel, The Revolution, is Gavin 
Cartwright, an American foreign correspondent with some fading commu-
nist sympathies, keeping a notebook — the novel itself — during his stay 
in Hungary, sending reports and telephoning New York. The plot starts on 
5 October 1956, the evening before the rehabilitation and reburial of 
Laszlo Rajk and covers a period until the end of November, the kidnap-
ping of Imre Nagy and his companions. The real hero of this novel, 
however, is the narrator, who is evidently not identical with the writer, 
and who witnesses, records and also participates in the heat of the actions 
around him. In his private life he is struggling with an unsuccessful 
marriage, with a wife away in the US, but, in the midst of the revolution 
there is a romantic love affair evolving with a young Hungarian woman, 
Agi. Cartwright, an ex-communist who has become disappointed in 
Marxism, but has not altogether abandoned his communist ideals, is 
somewhat sceptical about the power that will finally emerge from the 
chaos of the revolt and the turmoil of the street fights, which are des-
cribed with some overheated exaggeration: 
Madness breaking out over the whole city from eleven years of 
repression... frustration... fear of the Secret Police. Freedom 
was suddenly a fire...the more splendid, the greater the free-
dom.. . throw anything — even oneself — into the blaze.. . to 
make it all-consuming. They had to drag one student back 
forcibly because — hypnotized by the fire and the chanting 
voices, drunk on Bull's Blood or the uprush of intoxicating 
liberation — he wanted to immolate himself among the flames. 
I do not deceive myself. These were not all high-minded free-
dom fighters. Some were riffraff ready to join any riot, some 
merely exploiting the hot blood of extreme youth, some sheer 
thugs; but the mass were ordinary people, carried away by 
emotions too mixed to analyse, their blood invaded by some-
thing bigger than they understood.8 
Later on, however, Cartwright finds himself "deeply moved by the spec-
tacle of spontaneous uprising of thousands of ordinary citizens, pitifully 
armed, with no co-ordination and no preparation, challenging the massed 
array of tanks, and the ugly tyranny for which Gero stands, with the huge 
shadow of the Russian army waiting in the background."9 
The vivid descriptions of the fights and actions are constantly put 
in context by the events happening in the political sphere, while, on the 
personal level, the love affair with Agi is progressing towards consum-
mation. Cartwright, Agi and Agi's mysterious uncle, who later turns out 
to be her lover, are arrested by AVO at the Radio Station, finding them-
selves in a damp prison cell, which offers the romantic opportunity for 
Cartwright to kiss the girl's forehead. This happens at the very outset of 
the story, but towards the end of the novel we find ourselves in erotic 
bedroom scenes that in a movie would be certainly rated "adult", scenes 
with the added ingredient of psychological and self-reflective observa-
tions, the peak of which is the narrator's self-absorbing thoughts about his 
likely negro decent. The ex-communist Cartwright feels a growing passion 
for the revolution and after 4 November he actively participates in the 
fighting against the Russians. He is exposed by Russian intelligence and 
placed under house arrest, with the notebook breaking off abruptly. 
Brome's novel is a complex narrative, with the Hungarian revolution 
constantly looming in its background. As a final note on this work I must 
say that the book would certainly deserve more critical attention than it 
has received. 
Under the Frog by Tibor Fischer, first published in 1992 in 
England, depicts the Revolution from a different perspective, the perspec-
tive of Hungarians. Fischer is an English writer, born in 1959 in Stock-
port, near Manchester, to Hungarian parents. He is the author of several 
novels, including The Thought Gang (1994), The Collector Collector 
(1997) and Voyage to the End of the Room (2003), and the collection of 
his short stories were published under the title Don't Read This Book If 
You're Stupid (2000). Under the Frog was Fischer's first novel which 
brought him immediate fame and success; the book received the Betty 
Trask Award and was shortlisted for the Booker Prize for Fiction. 
Under the Frog was inspired by the biography of the author's 
father, who left Hungary in 1956. The hero of the novel is Gyuri Fischer, 
a basketball-player. The plot is set against the backdrop of Hungarian 
history from December 1944 to some time in November 1956, but it is 
for the major part presented in a non-linear narrative. Despite the very 
dismal historical period in which the story is set, the novel is full of 
humorous scenes, so what eventually emerges in the book is what is 
called "black humour", humour based on the grotesque, absurd and 
morbid, which helps one survive under the circumstances of terror and 
constant threat, and which evolves into a life interpretation. The charac-
ters, who are players in a basketball team, are preoccupied with finding 
amusement in life in spite of their hostile and oppressive environment, 
making pranks, avoiding work and womanizing. The following passage 
describing the hero as he learns about Stalin's death graphically illustrates 
the style and political stance of the novel: 
When he heard the news of Stalin's death, from the radio, 
Gyuri was shampooing his hair. Apart from experiencing an 
intense well-being, his first thought was whether the whole 
system would collapse in time for him not to have to take the 
exam in Marxism-Leninism he was due to sit the following 
week. Could he count on the downfall of Communism or was 
he actually going to have to read some Marx?10 
In the final analysis, the novel is about how to retain one's 
integrity in a cruel and harsh world. In the last chapter, the Revolution is 
described with much realism, depicting the mixed feelings of hope, fear, 
courage and despair, as the main character participates in the flow of 
events. The humour present throughout the novel gradually gives way to 
a tragic tone as we learn that the Revolution is crushed and Gyuri's 
Polish girlfriend, Jadwiga, dies: 
Half the building behind them disappeared. It took Gyuri a 
while to convince himself he was still alive and that all the 
components of his body were in the right places and still 
working. Jadwiga was next to him, covered in dust and debris. 
When he saw her wound two thoughts raced through him, the 
axiom that stomach wounds were always fatal, and the other 
that his sanity couldn't cope with this. Holding her as if that 
would help, he tried to keep the horror from his face, the 
knowledge that he was about to see the last thing anyone 
wanted to see, the death of the one he loved.11 
Gyuri loses the beloved one and the country is also lost. He must 
leave for Austria. 
A remarkable feature of the novel is that although it was written 
in English, it manages to depict and present Hungarian life from the 
perspective of Hungarian characters, facets of life which are otherwise 
extremely bound up with the Hungarian language. Fischer's linguistic 
mastery inheres in using an extremely sophisticated and witty English 
register intended for English-speaking readers and still giving the impres-
sion of a genuinely Hungarian text. Although one would believe that 
translating the novel into Hungarian must be an easy task, as Agnes 
Gyorke has noted, there are some untranslatable nuances, including those 
Hungarian words in the English original, like kocsma, which carry a 
foreign taste in English, but which are inevitably lost in translation.12 
Finally, as my topic is the Hungarian Revolution as reflected in 
world literature, I'd like to say a few words about the relationship be-
tween history and literature. I must point out that although there is no 
doubt that this relationship exists, literary works reflecting a specific his-
torical period should not be primarily judged from the perspective of 
history; they do not and do not have to correspond to historical truth. The 
writer is primarily responsible for the internal consistency of the work as 
a literary text and not as a text subordinated to a truth outside it. Who 
would hold Shakespeare accountable for deviations from history, as we 
know it, in his historical plays? Taking Richard III as an example, it is 
probably very difficult for historians to accept that the king called for a 
horse in the Battle of Bosworth Field and offered his country for it, as 
there are no other reliable sources that indicate the occurrence of this 
incident. This motive in Shakespeare, however, perfectly brings home the 
despair and exasperation of the king to the audience. This motive of "a 
horse for a country", in addition, is not unique in literature, it also appears 
in legends about the Hungarian conquest, where too, it serves a literary 
purpose rather than a truth that actually happened. Therefore, in literature, 
a particular story element is incorporated in the work for literary rather 
than historical reasons. Shakespeare's history plays, just like historical 
plays and historical works of literature in general, demonstrate that what 
these works are essentially concerned with is producing an effect, whether 
tragic or comic or whatever else in nature. Literature does not have to 
comply with the requirement of "only the truth, the whole truth and 
nothing but the truth;" it does contain imaginative elements which histori-
ography as such cannot readily accept. Even documentary works in litera-
ture are written and constructed in a way to be first and foremost litera-
ture, most often following an internal shape which serves purely artistic 
purposes. This does not mean, however, that a historical work in literature 
can go as far as to falsify the true significance of historical events or the 
role of individuals who have contributed to the development of these 
events. On the contrary, a historical work in literature can successfully 
fulfil its purpose only if it is true to the events in a general, broad and all-
encompassing sense. In other words, literature does not have to describe 
what has happened but what might happen, the universal, an idea Aris-
totle discussed in relation to tragedy. To leap forward to the 20th century, 
let me invoke Northrop Frye's graphic distinction between "Weltgeschich-
te", history, as we know it, and "Heilsgeschichte", sacred history, a term 
often used to describe the Bible historicity. Frye says that 
Weltgeschichte uses the criteria of ordinary history, and at-
tempts to answer the question, What should I have seen if I had 
been there? Heilsgeschichte, as we have it for instance in the 
Gospels, may say to us rather: 'This may not be what you 
would have seen if you had been there, but what you would 
have seen would have missed the whole point of what was 
really going on.'13 
I must add, however, that as far as the 1956 Revolution is con-
cerned, the relative proximity of the events and the presence of eye 
witnesses, and also the vision of the revolution in the collective memory 
of those who were bom after the revolution, do not allow such a her-
metic, merely literary approach. The dispute arising in the wake of the 
release of Marta Meszaros's film on Imre Nagy, entitled The Unburied 
Man, clearly indicates that deviations from history and the memory of a 
whole generation for artistic purposes is an issue of debate even almost 
50 years later. 
With the lapse of time, however, no doubt, 1956 in the arts and 
literature will be assessed on the grounds of general aesthetic and/or 
ethical values inherent in the works rather than their historical accuracy. 
This does not at all mean that the memory or true significance of 1956 
will ever fade. To explain this, I'd like to quote the American poet, John 
Logan, who, when asked to explain why he refused to write a poem about 
the 1956 Hungarian revolution, wrote: "All my poems are about the 
Hungarian Revolution." As David Ray remarks, "the Hungarian Revolu-
tion has become a metaphor for the American poet's own experience of 
disenchantment and exile, an experience he suffers much less dramati-
cally, much more inwardly."14 The significance of the Revolution in that 
way indeed exceeds its specific historical relevance; it has become one of 
those symbols of literature which lay the foundation for art and literature 
in our whole culture. No wonder why E. E. Cummings evoked in his 
above mentioned poem, "Thanksgiving 1956", the names of "Thermo-
pylae" and "Marathon", ancient symbols of human courage and heroism, 
in connection with the Revolution. Like John Logan, Czeslaw Milosz, too, 
was unwilling to write a specific poem on 1956, but offered an old poem 
of his, "Antigone," to the Polish anthology Polscy poeci o xvggierskim 
paydzierniku. These examples all indicate that the revolution in poetic 
imagination indeed became part of a much larger cultural heritage as a 
symbol of heroism. But it is not only for this that the world remembers 
the Revolution. It also remembers it because its own impassivity, its own 
pangs of conscience and guilt, primarily present in poetry, for being a 
cathartic experience, as witnessed in drama, and also for the actions the 
individual or a whole nation can take in and against a tyrannical world 
order, as mostly depicted in novels. 
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Even before the 50th anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 
there was a huge literature on it; as a result of the regime-change in those 
countries that were involved in its events, a substantial part of the con-
fidential files relating to it have become accessible to researchers. It was 
expected that 2006 will see many new publications, but while they 
revealed important details, like the many local revolutions in the country-
side,1 or the impact and repercussions in the neighbouring states,2 the 
general picture was not substantially modified. Probably the most suc-
cessful and most widely read new publication was by an erstwhile young 
Budapest journalist witness, who, under the name of Charles Gati, became 
an acclaimed historian and political scientist in the United States.3 Draw-
ing on the findings of old and new scholarly works, Gati has pain-
stakingly searched through archives in Hungary, Russia and the USA, has 
interviewed participants and eye-witnesses who were accessible to him, 
and produced a concise, readable synthesis, which also appeared in 
Hungarian, Polish, Russian and Slovak. Its only shortcoming is that it 
takes no account of events outside the Hungarian capital. 
Gati gives a very sensible answer to the question who started the 
Revolution. It was disenchanted Marxists and Communists, the parti-
cipants in the Petofi Circle, who prompted the broad climate of opinion in 
favour of change. Given that it was taking place within the framework of 
a totalitarian dictatorship, the initiative could not have come in any other 
way except from inside, from within the orbit of the Party's intellectuals. 
It is not a new finding, but the general public may not be aware of the 
process that led Imre Nagy, who in the days immediately after 23 October 
was still "a prisoner... of his own Communist past" (p. 150) and who 
spoke of a counter-revolution (though he was opposed to the intervention 
of Soviet troops), to declare a week later, on 30 October, the restoration 
of multi-party democracy. His close supporters and subsequent fellow 
martyrs had a big part in this, and the thumbnail sketches of these figures 
that the book offers are one of its major strengths. Even more important is 
what Gati relates about the number of insurgents, their background and 
their thinking, based on the most recent publications (especially by Laszlo 
Eorsi and Laszlo Gyurko). Their strength (around fifteen thousand armed 
combatants) does not seem much; however, in effect they had the whole 
country behind them. Within a couple of days the state and party appa-
ratus throughout the country collapsed without offering any resistance, so 
on that point I cannot agree with Gati's comments about people being on 
both sides of the barricade. There were no two sides, as it was a tiny 
minority of party functionaries and the A v 6 security police, totalling no 
more than a few thousand or at most tens of thousands, who — primarily 
on account of past deeds and crimes that they had committed — were 
ranged against the whole country, the entire Hungarian nation (including 
those cut off by frontiers). That was the voice of the people as relayed to 
parliament by their delegations, and it is likely to have played at least as 
big a part in persuading Nagy to make his about face at the end of Octo-
ber as did his friends and immediate associates, including Miklos Gimes, 
Jozsef Szilagyi, Tamas Aczel, Ferenc Donath, Geza Losonczy, Miklos 
Vasarhelyi and Szilard Ujhelyi. 
At the launch of the book's Hungarian edition, Janos M. Rainer, 
one of the pre-eminent experts on 1956, described it as a lively and 
provocative essay which constitutes the first serious revision among the 
accounts of Revolution that have appeared to date. Gati's key thesis: if 
Imre Nagy had been a stronger leader during the days of the Revolution, 
and if the revolutionaries had been capable of moderating their demands, 
and if America, instead of mere rhetoric, had shown a more vigorous and 
more imaginative response to events, then there would have been a realis-
tic chance of the USSR holding back on its intervention. Had that been 
the case Hungary would have acquired a more moderate Communist 
regime, somewhere between the administrations of a Gomulka and a Tito. 
In short: was the most dramatic event of the Cold War doomed to failure? 
At the outset it indeed seemed impossible for a small nation to 
overthrow a tyranny imposed and maintained by the mighty Soviet Union. 
But when many Soviet tanks were successfully destroyed by the young 
insurgents in Budapest, and two prominent Soviet leaders, Mikoyan and 
Suslov, in negotiations with Nagy and Zoltan Tildy, the former 
Smallholder Party leader, had agreed to the demands of the revoluti-
onaries; moreover, a communique issued by the Soviet government on 30 
October promised to place relations with "the other socialist states" on 
completely new footing of equality and state sovereignty, and stated that 
it was prepared to discuss the matter of its military presence in Hungary, 
a miraculous victory seemed imminent. 
We already knew that one day later, during the night dawning on 
31 October, the Soviet leadership, with Khrushchev to the fore, changed 
its mind and decided to occupy Hungary and install a puppet government. 
That decision was unquestionably swayed by the Suez Crisis that blew up 
on 29 October with the military action taken by Great Britain, France and 
Israel against Egypt, but the decisive factor must have been a fear that the 
collapse of the Communist regime in Hungary, quite apart from the 
enormous loss of face that it would entail, might set off a chain reaction 
of protests against the equally loathed Communist governments in other 
satellite states. The Hungarian government was already informed the fol-
lowing day that new Soviet army units were crossing the country's fron-
tier. Nagy had no illusions: the disappearance of Kadar and Miinnich, two 
less compromised prominent Communists, could only be taken as a bad 
omen. His declaration of Hungarian neutrality later that day and then, 
after the sighting of the military ring around Budapest and the last straw 
of Soviet ambassador Andropov's lies, the announcement on 3 November 
of the country's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact were last-ditch 
attempts to avert the threat of attack. The fact that Khrushchev received 
unanimous backing in a series of lightning visits that he paid to the Polish 
comrades at Brest, to the Romanians, Czechs and Bulgarians in Bucharest, 
and to Tito on the island of Brioni — indeed, was urged by them to 
intervene militarily against Hungary — has been known for some time. 
Gati also cites as a final crucial factor the continued in-fighting for power 
within the Soviet leadership, and the opportunity offered to Khrushchev to 
counter any accusations of being too soft. He also suggests that if the 
insurgents in Budapest had not entertained "illusions about their 
courageous insurgency forcing the Soviet Union to retreat"; if Hungary 
had not rejected the one-party system; and if Imre Nagy had been more in 
charge of the situation and been able to check outrages such as the siege 
on the Party headquarters in Republic Square and the ensuing lynchings, 
then perhaps the Soviet Union would not have launched its aggression on 
4 November and "the revolt might well have succeeded" (p. 220). 
The Revolution swept the Communist regime aside, and all Prime 
Minister Nagy did up until 30 October was to acknowledge and legitimize 
that fact. The idea that the whole revolution might have been able to 
restrain itself, that there was no necessity for it to run to demands for 
multiparty democracy and complete independence from the Soviet Union 
— it is simply unrealistic. Even if he had been more forceful and 
resolute, Nagy would have been unable to contain public sentiment. Even 
supposing that he did succeed in braking the momentum and halting the 
process, it is highly unlikely that this would have mollified Moscow. 
After all, it was precisely through drawing the lessons of 1956 that the 
Czechs in 1968 were in the position that Gati posits of Hungary 1956: a 
programme of democratic socialism with a human face that did not defy 
Moscow — but to no avail. When the Solidarity movement in Poland 
carried through a "self-limiting revolution" in 1980-81 by only battling 
for the social demands of employees, leaving the political elite in place 
and not even trying to break free from the "geopolitical cage," a Soviet 
leadership that was a good deal more enlightened than it had been in 
1956 was unwilling to allow even that. Given these subsequent examples, 
I would hazard a guess that insofar as Imre Nagy would have wanted a 
"Big Compromise" amounting to a milder form of Communism like that 
advocated by Gomulka and, later on, by Khrushchev himself, that truly 
would have spared a few hundred lives, but the one-party system and the 
ultimately ruinous economic policy would have been left intact. 
For an alternative that was not realised in 1956 but stood a 
realistic chance one has to look not to Budapest or Moscow but to 
Washington. Gati's analysis of Washington's policy is the most valuable 
part of his book, and I have to confess that his conclusions have led me 
to modify my own earlier understanding.4 Like most contemporaries and 
later commentators, I too was of the opinion that the United States could 
not be accused of abandoning the Hungarian Revolution, because military 
intervention on its part could easily have led to world war or a nuclear 
catastrophe. Gati's researches in the archives support Bennet Kovrig's 
earlier claim5 that any talk of "liberation" was nothing more than empty 
propaganda sloganising, and the U.S. government had no specific plans 
what to do if a spontaneous revolt broke out in a Communist country. 
Based on classified U.S. records Gati shows that Washington had very 
little knowledge and even less understanding of the internal conditions of 
Hungary prior to the outbreak of the uprising. America failed to appre-
ciate Imre Nagy's importance even after the turning-point at the end of 
October. 
The gravest fault of all was the failure of America's leaders to 
turn to the Kremlin, while the Revolution was in progress, with a mean-
ingful proposal that was worthy of consideration. Eisenhower was con-
cerned that the Soviet Union would respond aggressively if it perceived 
that the tacitly accepted post-1947 division of Europe was under threat; 
after 23 October his main goal was to reassure the Soviet leadership that 
the United States was not going to endanger Soviet interests in Eastern 
Europe and was not seeking to overthrow the Communist regimes there. 
On October 27th, having cleared it first with the president, Secretary of 
State John Foster Dulles in a speech in Dallas, Texas, reassured Moscow: 
"The United States has no ulterior motive in desiring the independence of 
the satellite countries... We do not look upon these nations as potential 
military allies."6 Had the Soviet Union been well-intentioned and anxious 
for peace and co-operation, the speech might have provided a good 
argument for not intervening militarily; however, what Moscow's hard-
liners read into it was that it was offering a carte blanche to go ahead, as 
they would not have to reckon with an American intervention. Meanwhile 
the Hungarian staff of Radio Free Europe (RFE) in Munich were unaware 
that the confrontational stance that they had been broadcasting with the 
blessing of their paymasters now had no political backing and that 
America had not the faintest idea how the promised "liberation" was to be 
achieved. Left to their own devices, guided by their own emotions, the 
Hungarian editors enthusiastically watched the downfall of communism in 
Hungary. Gati does not mention, however, that the US National Security 
Council's directive NSC 174 stated that its goal was to destabilise the 
Soviet empire, but not to foment revolt and not to commit the American 
government to providing aid. It seems that this had never been brought to 
the attention of either the RFE's staff or its listeners. Gati might also have 
mentioned that the Democratic Party opposition demonstrated more sensi-
tivity to Hungarian expectations. Adlai Stevenson, who was then running 
as the Democrats' presidential candidate, urged the United Nations to step 
in on the side of the Hungarian Revolution. A leading article in the New 
York Times for October 27th suggested that there could not be a more 
clear-cut case for foreign intervention under the aegis of the UN. 
Obviously Stevenson's statement had much to do with electioneering. 
It is true that the Suez conflict did divert attention away from 
Hungary, and it certainly undermined the solidarity of the Western 
powers, but that was not the real reason for their passivity towards Hun-
gary. There were experts within the National Security Council and the 
CIA (Frank Wisner for one) who considered, and even went so far as to 
recommend, that military aid be given, but the logistic difficulties of 
doing so, Austria's neutrality, and the line adopted by Hungary's other 
neighbours all provided convenient excuses for doing nothing. 
Gati does not deal at any length with events at the UN. Not only 
America's record there was deplorable, but that of the whole institution, 
for which primary responsibility lies with the Secretary-General, the 
Swedish Dag Hammarskjold, and other high-ranking officials of the 
Organization. This has been shown in a meticulously researched (1657 
footnotes!) and highly convincing work by Andras Nagy, a non-
professional historian, who probed into the mysterious death of Povl 
Bang-Jensen, a Danish diplomat at the UN, who refused to reveal the 
names of the Hungarians who testified before the Special Committee on 
Hungary. For his disobedience he was discharged, and his suspicion of 
Soviet influences, especially in the aftermath of the Revolution, in cur-
tailing the activities of the Committee, led to his dismissal, explained by 
his alleged mental disorder. The Dane was unable to convince Allen 
Dulles that the work of the Special Committee was deliberately sabotaged 
by several people upon orders coming from Moscow, but the charges 
eventually led to his death. While Andras Nagy's monograph is a moving 
testimony to the impact of and inspiration by the tragedy in Hungary, it is 
also a convincing indictment against Hammarskjold, suggesting that he 
was ready to pass on the names of the witnesses and exposing their 
families to terrible repercussion, in exchange for Soviet support for 
extending his assignment. The author shows that the UN was deeply 
penetrated by Soviet agents, without that the condemnation of the Soviet 
Union and his Hungarian puppets could have been far more powerful and 
effective, probably alleviating the reprisals in Hungary. 
Admittedly the UN and its member states could not have given 
history a different course following the second Soviet intervention, but in 
the days immediately preceding a different conduct by the U.S. and its 
major allies may have. That is another of the many alarming findings by 
Nagy, and is supported most convincingly by the collection edited by 
Bekes and Kecskes. They have published definitive works on the 
diplomatic background of 1956;7 here the introductory essay by Bekes 
gives a concise summary of how and why first the British and the French 
(already planning for the invasion of Egypt), later the U.S. delayed any 
discussion by the Security Council of the first Soviet intervention. It is 
easy to find fault with the old colonial powers over their failure, once the 
Hungarian revolt had broken out, to delay their long-planned action in 
Suez, which completely overshadowed the events in Hungary. But I can 
only agree with Bekes that the Soviets would have intervened even if the 
Suez crisis had not taken place, and the passivity of the West was caused 
not by events in the Middle East but was due to fear of overthrowing the 
delicate status quo and scuttling detente. 
In the crucial days October 30 to November 3, when the real 
difference was not between the West and the Soviet Union, but between 
the U.S. and its allies, no response of any kind was given to the 
Hungarian declaration of neutrality. Even the incoming news of Soviet 
troop movements failed to prompt action. Once the news of the Soviet 
attack on Budapest and Nagy's dramatic appeal reached New York, the 
Security Council began an extraordinary session. Henry Cabot Lodge, the 
U.S. delegate to the United Nations, stated: "If ever there was a time 
when the action of the United Nations could literally be a matter of life 
and death for a whole nation, this is the time." Then he addressed some 
words to the Hungarian nation: "By your heroic sacrifice you have given 
the United Nations a brief moment in which to mobilise the conscience of 
the world on your behalf. We are seizing that moment, and we will not 
fail you."8 Alas it was mere propaganda, trying to show the world (and 
especially the "third world") the real face of Soviet imperialism. 
Although an emergency session of the General Assembly passed a U.S. 
motion on 5 November that Soviet troops be withdrawn and a commis-
sion be sent, this did not alter the brute facts: Hungary was crushed and 
remained a Soviet satellite for another 33 years. 
One can accept that fear of a third, this time nuclear world war, 
more than the physical impossibility of providing military help to the 
Hungarians, acquits the U.S. from the charge of having let Hungary 
down. But in a volume that was published to commemorate the twentieth 
anniversary of the Hungarian revolution, the distinguished British 
historian Hugh Seton-Watson (son of R.W. Seton-Watson, the Scotus 
Viator who was so critical of the Hungarians before and after the First 
World War) expressed his doubts: 
We must ask ourselves the question: Could nothing have been 
done? I have spent many hours in the last twenty years discus-
sing this with British and American diplomats, journalists and 
even a few politicians; and all have insisted that nothing could 
have been done. And yet I confess that I am not convinced. Of 
course, American military invasion of Hungary was not 
possible, still less a nuclear ultimatum to Moscow. Of course, 
formal diplomatic notes could achieve nothing. But was it 
really impossible for the United States government, using all 
the private and public channels of communication available to it 
and all the means of pressure at its disposal, to have convinced 
the Soviet government that the consequences of invasion would 
have been very much more unpleasant for it than the con-
sequences of letting the Nagy government, which was in 
control of Hungary, stay in power until a settlement, acceptable 
to all parties concerned, including the Great Powers, could be 
worked out? The truth is that the United States government did 
not even try. Dulles revealed himself an empty demagogue. 
Nobody tried because everyone was obsessed with the presi-
dential election and the Suez Canal.9 
However justified it may be, condemnation of the Western democracies 
today over 1956 is pointless, except for a political message that is topical 
right now. In 1956 the governments of the day judged short-term interests 
to be more important than riskier policies with a broader perspective. 
America did not attempt to roll back the Soviet regime because it over-
estimated the Soviet Union's strength and underestimated the geostrategic 
importance of Central and Eastern Europe. Gati's arguments, in many 
respects convincing, were preceded almost forty years ago by Robert 
Murphy, the highly experienced diplomat who was Foster Dulles' Under-
Secretary in 1956: "Perhaps history will demonstrate that the free world 
could have intervened to give Hungarians the liberty they sought, but 
none of us in the State Department had the skill or the imagination to 
devise a way."10 Solving political crises calls for both expertise and 
imagination. 
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